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The behavioural symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to reflect underlying 
cognitive deficits/differences. Single cognitive deficit models of ASD have attempted to reduce 
the varied behavioural symptoms of the disorder to a single underlying cognitive deficit. 
However, there is a need to move on from these single cognitive deficit accounts of ASD. 
Therefore, the main focus of the thesis is to explore the potential for a multiple cognitive model 
of ASD using the predictions of the fractionated triad account. 
The data that is examined in the thesis originated from the Twins Early Development Study 
(TEDS) where one or both children met diagnostic criteria for ASD. A subsample of adolescents 
took part in the Social Relationship (SR) study. Overall, 181 adolescents with a diagnosis of 
ASD and 73 unaffected co-twins were included in the SR sample, plus an additional 160 
comparison control participants.  
The findings in this thesis do not support a strong version of the fractionated account of ASD, in 
which distinct causes at the genetic and neural levels relate to distinct deficits at the cognitive 
level, and are associated with distinct symptoms of ASD at the behavioural level. There were 
some selective relationships between cognitive atypicalities and the behavioural symptoms of 
ASD, but these differed depending on the diagnostic symptom measure used. A weaker version 
of the fractionated theory is supported in which multiple cognitive deficits characterise ASD, and 
these cognitive deficits relate to distinct symptoms, as in the strong version, but a single 
cognitive deficit can explain more than one symptom domain, and more than one cognitive 
deficit can explain a single symptom domain. General interpretations are discussed using the 
framework of the fractionated triad theory of ASD. The limitations of the current thesis and 
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Chapter 1 An Introduction to Autism Spectrum Disorder 
This chapter sets the scene for the empirical work presented in this thesis by reviewing the 
literature on autism spectrum disorder to provide an overview of the history of the disorder, how 
it is currently classified, and the causes of the disorder at the genetic, neural, and cognitive 
levels.  
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder that is classically described 
in terms of social-communication impairments and restricted and repetitive behaviours. ASD is 
currently diagnosed behaviourally. The prevalence of ASD is estimated to be around 1.2% in 
the UK (Baird et al., 2006), but differs somewhat according to country (see Elsabbagh et al., 
2012, for a systematic review of epidemiological surveys). The reported prevalence of ASD has 
increased over the last few decades, most likely due to increased awareness by clinicians and 
families, improved detection and the broadening of diagnostic criteria to encompass a wider 
range of individuals.   
1.1 History 
The term ‘autism’ was originally coined by Bleuler (1911) to describe a secondary symptom of 
schizophrenia. ‘Infantile’ autism was first described by Kanner in 1943. He noted a group of 11 
children who all displayed similar behaviours, such as the inability to relate to themselves, 
profound aloneness, lack of social communication, isolated special abilities, delayed echolalia, 
literalness, sensory issues, insistence on sameness, repetitive behaviours, and no interest in 
people. Kanner (1943) clustered these core symptoms into a distinct disorder termed ‘infantile 
autism’, instead of previous descriptions of these children as ‘feebleminded’ or schizophrenic. 
Coincidentally, Asperger (1944) also used the term ‘autism’ to describe children with “severe 
and characteristic difficulties in social integration” (p. 37, Frith, 1991). To add to Kanner’s 
description of autism, Asperger also highlighted the lack of facial and gestural expressions and 
abnormal eye gaze in this disorder. He also considered autism as a lifelong condition that 
persists into adulthood.  
For the next 30 years, autism was widely regarded as a form of ‘childhood schizophrenia’ 
caused by a lack of maternal warmth (Kanner, 1949) or “emotional refrigeration” (Eisenberg & 
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Kanner, 1956). This became known as the ‘refrigerator mother’ hypothesis, which was 
advocated by psychologists such as Bettelheim (1967). This theory shaped the understanding 
of autism in the scientific and general population during the 1960s, but the theory is widely 
discarded today.  
The 1970s were marked by major advancements in the understanding of the aetiology of autism 
with the first studies to show that autism and schizophrenia were distinct (DeMyer, Churchil, 
Pontius, & Gilkey, 1971; Kolvin, 1971; Rutter, 1972, 1974), the first clinical definitions of autism 
(Rutter, 1978), the first genetic studies of autism (Folstein & Rutter, 1977; Rutter, 2000) and the 
introduction of the concept of the ‘autistic spectrum’ and the ‘triad of impairments’ (Wing & 
Gould, 1979). Wing and Gould (1979) introduced the concept of the ‘triad of impairments’ in 
their pioneering study after finding that all of the children in their study with impairments in social 
interaction also exhibited repetitive stereotyped play and also often had impairments in verbal 
and nonverbal communication. It was concluded that the autism spectrum consists of a ‘triad of 
impairments’ in social interaction, communication and imagination, with varying severity at the 
individual level. It was not until 1980 that autism was diagnostically defined as distinct from 
schizophrenia, with separate diagnostic criteria for autism in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual third edition (DSM III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  
1.2 Diagnosis & Symptomatology 
Until recently, clinicians have used the Diagnostic Statistical Manual version IV-text revised 
(DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) or the International Classification of 
Diseases version 10 (ICD-10) (World Health Organisation, 1992) criteria, which categorised 
individuals with ASD under the umbrella term of pervasive developmental disorders (PDD). 
Using the DSM-IV-TR, clinicians could diagnose individuals with Autistic Disorder, Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), Asperger’s Disorder, Rett’s 
Disorder, or Childhood Disintegrative Disorder. A diagnosis depended upon the presence of a 
‘triad of impairments’ in social interaction, communication and repetitive and restricted 
behaviours and interests. 
The DSM-5 was introduced in May 2013, and ‘autism spectrum disorder’ replaced the term 
‘pervasive developmental disorders’, with the individual diagnoses of Asperger’s and PDD-NOS 
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being removed (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The new term was preferable to 
families and clinicians, with the exception of the preference for the diagnosis of Asperger’s 
syndrome for individuals with ASD symptoms but with intelligence and cognitive ability in the 
‘gifted’ or typical range. Many self-advocates and families identified with this term viewing it as 
less stigmatising and more descriptive of a more subtle form of ASD. The absence of a formal 
category for Asperger’s disorder/syndrome has prompted concern for many individuals, but Lord 
and Jones (2012) pointed out that the new criteria eliminate the confusion around the distinction 




Figure 1.1. a) DSM-IV classification for Pervasive Developmental Disorders; b) DSM-5 
classification for Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
 
The DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for ASD are presented schematically in Figure 1.1. ASD is 
defined as a dyad of impairments, as compared to the triad of impairments in the previous 
version, with social and communication symptoms collapsed into one symptom domain. The 
decision to collapse social and communication symptoms into one domain was based on 
substantial literature, such as factor analytic studies showing one social-communication factor 
(Gotham, Risi, Pickles, & Lord, 2007). According to the DSM-5, a diagnosis of ASD depends 
upon the presence of: 1) persistent deficits in social-communication and social-interaction, and: 
2) restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or activities. ASD can be diagnosed with 
accompanying intellectual and/or language impairment, listed under ‘specifiers’. In addition, 
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individuals who have deficits in social communication, but do not meet criteria for ASD, may be 
evaluated for ‘social communication disorder’ in DSM-5. 
ASD is rarely diagnosed before a child is three years old, with the average age of diagnosis at 
four years old. The age at diagnosis can depend on the number of behavioural symptoms 
identified, with children exhibiting more symptoms receiving an earlier diagnosis (Maenner et 
al., 2013). As infants rarely receive a diagnosis before two years old, studies investigating the 
emergence of autism-like behaviours in the first two years of life have focused on infants 
genetically at risk of ASD (younger siblings of children with an ASD diagnosis; Elsabbagh & 
Johnson, 2010). Findings from these ‘infant sib’ studies suggest that little that is different in the 
behaviours before age six months, with a decline in social-communication skills by 12 months of 
age in many infants later diagnosed with ASD (Ozonoff et al., 2010). Due to the reduction in 
family stress and earlier intervention that an earlier diagnosis can provide, a clinical screening 
tool for early detection of ASD in toddlers has been investigated and developed (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2000). 
1.2.1 Social-Communication Symptoms 
Social deficits have been emphasised as the most universal and specific characteristics of ASD 
(Volkmar, State, & Klin, 2009). The DSM-5 proposes three criteria in defining social deficits: 1) 
social-emotional reciprocity, 2) non-verbal communicative behaviours, and 3) deficits in 
developing, maintaining and understanding relationships. 
The social-emotional reciprocity impairments include absence of sharing interests, lack of 
initiation and maintaining conversation, no turn taking, absence in sharing affect, and lack of 
initiation or social approach. In early childhood, young children with ASD may show an inability 
to share and direct attention towards others, have difficulty imitating others and may not 
recognise others’ emotions (Happé, 1994b). Some children may ignore even a familiar person, 
and show an apparent lack of social interest. Furthermore, children with ASD do not appear to 
initiate joint attention with another person (e.g., Naber et al., 2008); parents of infants with ASD 
report that their toddler did not offer, give, show, or point to objects in relation to someone else 
(Wimpory, Hobson, Williams, & Nash, 2000). 
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The nonverbal communication deficits are characterised by poor verbal and nonverbal 
communication skills in social contexts (see Prelock & Nelson, 2012, for a review). These 
deficits are apparent in infancy, for example, infants with ASD avoid eye contact, do not greet, 
and fail to wave to their parents (Wimpory, et al., 2000). Abnormal eye contact has been 
reported in ASD ever since Kanner’s (1943) first descriptions of the disorder, with studies 
suggesting that this abnormality is in the use of eye contact, and is not merely due to avoidance 
of people (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995). There appears to 
be a delay in the development of gesture production in ASD (Charman, Drew, Baird, & Baird, 
2003), and in adolescence gestures are less synchronised with speech (de Marchena & Eigsti, 
2010). In addition, children with ASD produce unique and unusual facial expressions (Yirmiya, 
Kasari, Sigman, & Mundy, 1989), and less natural and more awkward facial expressions 
(Grossman, Edelson, & Tager-Flusberg, 2013).  
Deficits in relationships are characterised by the lack of imaginative play with peers, and also a 
disinterest in people and making friends. Individuals with ASD may not adjust their behaviour to 
suit different social contexts, for example indiscriminately approaching strangers. From a young 
age, children with autism may have no age-appropriate friends, with many forming bonds with 
adults instead (Hauck, Fein, Waterhouse, & Feinstein, 1995). Individuals may have difficulties 
forming and maintaining relationships, with individuals with ASD reporting greater loneliness 
and less satisfaction with their friendships (Bauminger & Kasari, 2000) and an increased 
prevalence of bullying (van Roekel, Scholte, & Didden, 2010). Social-interaction impairments 
persist into adulthood (Happé & Charlton, 2012) and even the most socially capable adults with 
ASD still show social-interaction impairments. 
1.2.2 Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours and Interests  
Restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) are a core symptom of ASD (for a 
comprehensive review, see Leekam, Prior, & Uljarevic, 2011). This is perhaps the least 
researched symptom domain of ASD. The DSM-5 proposes four criteria in defining RRBIs: 1) 
stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, 2) insistence on sameness, 3) highly restricted and 
fixated interests, and 4) hyper- or hypo-reactivity to sensory input or unusual sensory interests. 
Stereotyped or repetitive motor movements are shown by most children with ASD at some 
stage in their development, either using their own body parts, such as hand flapping and 
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rocking, or using other objects, such as spinning wheels and the repetitive lining up of toys. 
Echolalia is present in some children with autism, in which words or phrases from other people 
or sources are repeated immediately or with delay. Idiosyncratic speech is also characteristic of 
ASD. These behaviours are generally seen in younger children with ASD, or those who are 
more developmentally delayed (Leekam, et al., 2011).  
The restricted and repetitive behaviours in ASD may also present as insistence that aspects of 
the environment stay the same, inflexible adherence to routines and persistence on certain 
foods (Leekam, et al., 2011). Individuals with ASD become extremely distressed at small 
changes in their environment or daily routines. ASD can be characterised by concreteness and 
rigidity of thinking (Grandin, 1995). Most individuals with ASD restrict food acceptances (72%) 
or refuse most food items (57%), which are commonly related to food presentation (49%) 
(Schreck & Williams, 2006).  
In addition, highly restricted, fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus are 
characteristic of ASD. Individuals with ASD may show an intense interest in a particular object, 
topic or activity that is obsessive and sometimes to the exclusion of all other activities. 
Gathering facts and information through verbal learning and rote memory on special interests is 
common (Klin, Danovitch, Merz, & Volkmar, 2007). Klin et al. (2007) also noted over 250 
exemplars of special interests, from typical topics such as dinosaurs and Power Rangers, to 
specialised topics such as tsunamis and astronomy, to idiosyncratic topics such as cul-de-sacs 
and deep-fat fryers. It was also noted that the way special interests are pursued and the content 
learned is atypical in ASD.  
Lastly, sensory abnormalities are apparent in ASD, and have been included in the diagnostic 
criteria for the first time in the latest version of the DSM. Sensory abnormalities can manifest as 
either an over- or under-reactivity to sensory input or in unusual interests in sensory aspects of 
the environment. Sensory abnormalities have been found to be very common in children with 
ASD (Klintwall et al., 2011). The most common sensory abnormalities were found to be over-
reactivity to sound (44%) and under-reactivity to pain (40%). Other examples of sensory 
abnormalities were under-reactivity to temperature, over-reactivity to touch, abnormal reactions 
to visual stimuli, and oversensitivity to smell. 
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1.2.3 Symptom Severity 
The autism behavioural phenotype can be seen as the severe end of a set of continuous, 
quantitative traits that merge with the general population. Additionally, within the diagnosis of 
ASD, the degree of impairment can differ, from mild to severe. For example, there is 
considerable variability in the social-interaction impairments that individuals with ASD exhibit; 
from complete isolation and no apparent interest in interaction with others, through to those 
proficient in friendships who show only subtle impairments in social skills compared to a 
typically developing individual. Therefore, there is a vast range of severity within ASD making 
individuals with ASD unique, which led to the often-used quote ‘If you know one person with 
autism then you know one person with autism’. 
Severity levels were included in the DSM-5 for the first time. The revisions were implemented to 
provide information on the presence and severity of symptoms. The addition of a dimensional 
assessment reflects the wide held opinion that the symptoms of ASD represent a continuum 
from mild to severe instead of being discrete disorders. In the DSM-5, three severity 
classifications are used to indicate the degree of impairment for each symptom domain of ASD, 
from mild which ‘require support’ through to severe which ‘require substantial support’. 
Weitlauf, Gotham, Vehorn, and Warren (2014) investigated the validity of the new severity 
categorisation in ASD diagnoses, finding discrepancies in the distribution of severity 
categorisations across adaptive and cognitive functioning and autism symptomatology. It 
therefore remains unclear how clinicians will differentiate the severity levels, with no current 
quantitative methods or recommendations in use.  
1.3 Broader Autism Phenotype 
In Kanner’s (1943) description of ‘infantile autism’, he noted that the parents and grandparents 
of the children shared some features, such as abstract thinking, and limited social interests. The 
broader autism phenotype therefore refers to the milder autism-like features in the relatives of 
individuals with ASD, and has been extensively reviewed (see Bailey, Palferman, Heavey, & Le 
Couteur, 1998; Dawson et al., 2002; Piven, 1999; Sucksmith, Roth, & Hoekstra, 2011). 
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The notion of a broader autism phenotype was developed from the findings that the risk of 
reoccurrence of autism in a family was 8.6%, which is 215 times greater than the risk in the 
general population (Ritvo et al., 1989). Bolton et al. (1994) found that if a child had autism or 
ASD, then their siblings had an increased chance of having autism or ASD and between 12.4% 
and 20.4% of the siblings also displayed autistic-like behaviours. In a more recent and 
comprehensive study, ASD in one child also occurred in a sibling in 10.9% of families 
(Constantino, Zhang, Frazier, Abbacchi, & Law, 2010).  
This led Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, Childress, and Arndt (1997) to investigate the broader autism 
phenotype in multiplex autism families (families with more than one child with autism) and found 
that parents, grandparents, and aunts/uncles of the autism probands all showed milder autism-
like behaviours (social-communication deficits and stereotyped behaviours), which were 
qualitatively similar to the defining characteristics of autism. In addition, several studies have 
noted features in relatives of autism probands that are milder but similar to features associated 
with ASD, for example, language deficits (e.g., Taylor et al., 2013), personality characteristics 
(e.g., Piven et al., 1997) and cognitive and emotional deficits (e.g., Briskman, Happe, & Frith, 
2001; Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 2001; Szatmari et al., 2008; Tajmirriyahi, Nejati, Pouretemad, & 
Sepehr, 2013) leading to the development of measures to assess the broader autism phenotype 
(Dawson et al., 2007; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, & Piven, 2007). Another interesting finding 
is that fathers of children with ASD are over-represented in professions such as physics, 
engineering, computer science, and mathematics (Baron-Cohen et al., 1998). 
Other studies have investigated the broader autism phenotype in unaffected siblings of those 
with an ASD. Constantino, et al. (2010) reported increased subclinical autistic traits in siblings of 
autism probands from multiplex families compared to a relative absence of autistic traits in 
siblings from single-incidence families. In addition, Sucksmith, et al. (2011) reviewed the 
existing research findings and found that the emerging broader autism phenotype in younger 
infant siblings of autism probands could be defined by language delay and social deficits, such 
as abnormal gaze patterns, lack of requesting behaviours, poor initiation and responding to joint 
attention, and problems disengaging from visual stimuli. In older siblings of autism probands, 
the broader autism phenotype was defined by behavioural problems (pragmatic language skills, 
social responsiveness, and reciprocal social interaction), cognitive deficits (mentalising, emotion 
recognition and face-processing problems, executive dysfunction, and a local processing bias), 
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elevated personality traits (aloof, rigid and hypersensitive) and psychiatric disorders (such as 
anxiety and depression).  
Furthermore, there is evidence for the intergenerational transmission of autistic-like traits in the 
general population (Constantino & Todd, 2005). The study reported modest correlations 
between social impairments in parents and their children, indicating transmission of subclinical 
autistic traits across generations in the general population. In addition, parental pairs of children 
with ASD were most commonly characterised by a single parent out of the parental pair with the 
broader autism phenotype (Sasson, Lam, Parlier, Daniels, & Piven, 2013) and the broader 
autism symptomatology in parents has been associated with their child’s ASD symptomatology 
(Maxwell, Parish-Morris, Hsin, Bush, & Schultz, 2013). 
1.4 Psychiatric Comorbidity 
High rates of comorbidity with other psychiatric conditions have been reported in ASD (Leyfer et 
al., 2006; Mazzone, Ruta, & Reale, 2012; Simonoff et al., 2008). Simonoff, et al. (2008) 
conducted the first systematic study of associated psychiatric disorders in ASD using an 
epidemiological, population-representative sample.  Overall, 71% of children with ASD met 
criteria for at least one current psychiatric disorder. Forty-two percent of children with ASD met 
criteria for an anxiety disorder, 30% met criteria for an oppositional or conduct disorder, 28% 
met criteria for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and 1.4% met criteria for a 
depressive disorder. Autism severity, nor IQ, was a predictor of comorbid psychiatric disorders.  
Several psychiatric disorders, such as bipolar and schizophrenia are relatively rare in children, 
and so rates of comorbidity with ASD are unreported (e.g., Simonoff, et al., 2008). In addition, 
studies in adults in ASD are limited, but those to date also suggest that adults with ASD suffer 
from a higher burden of additional psychiatric disorders (Joshi et al., 2013). Lugnegard, 
Hallerback, and Gillberg (2011) reported that in young adults with Asperger’s Syndrome, 70% 
had experienced at least one episode of major depression, with 50% reporting recurrent 
depressive episodes, and 50% reporting anxiety disorders. Psychotic disorders, such as bipolar 
disorder, and substance-abuse disorders were uncommon, as compared to higher rates 
reported by Hofvander et al. (2009). One of the outstanding questions is whether these 
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psychiatric symptoms are phenotypic manifestations of ASD or if they are an expression of a 
separate, but comorbid disorder (Mazzone, et al., 2012). 
1.5 Gender Bias 
Kanner (1943) originally reported that four times as many males had autism than females, 
which has consistently been reported since with a male to female ratio of 4:1 (Ehlers & Gillberg, 
1993) and 3.3:1 (Baird, et al., 2006), dependent on the criteria used. The ratio is considerably 
higher towards the more able end of the ASD spectrum, with a male to female ratio of 15:1 
(Wing, 1981). The male to female ratio decreases to 2:1 in those with additional learning 
difficulties.  
The specific drivers for the higher prevalence of ASD in males remain unclear. There may be a 
difficulty in diagnosing ASD in females, perhaps due to its masking by or misdiagnosis as 
another condition (e.g. eating disorders), females being better able to adapt/compensate, or the 
inability of current diagnostic measures to detect a more subtle or unusual symptom 
presentation in females (Dworzynski, Ronald, Bolton, & Happe, 2012). Biological reasons for 
the gender bias in ASD have also been proposed; specifically the foetal testosterone theory, the 
X- and Y- chromosome theories and the reduced autosomal penetrance theory (see Baron-
Cohen et al., 2011, for a detailed review). 
1.6 Aetiology 
ASD has a strong genetic basis. Kanner (1943) first hypothesised a biological basis for autism, 
but this was not considered further until a seminal twin study by Folstein and Rutter in 1977. On 
the basis of their results, ASD became widely considered as a heritable disorder. Consequently, 
molecular research began to attempt to discover the genes behind ASD.  
1.6.1 Genetic  
1.6.1.1 Quantitative genetics 
There is compelling evidence from twin studies that ASD has a large genetic component. The 
psychogenic view of the cause of autism changed when four influential twin studies revealed 
that the concordance rate for autism was far higher in monozygotic (MZ) twins than for dizygotic 
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(DZ) twins (Bailey et al., 1995; Folstein & Rutter, 1977; Ritvo, Freeman, Masonbrothers, Mo, & 
Ritvo, 1985; Steffenburg et al., 1989). Folstein and Rutter (1977) conducted the first twin study 
comparing the concordance rates of strictly diagnosed autism in twin pairs and found that 36% 
of MZ twins were concordant for autism compared with no concordant DZ twins for autism. This 
twin study was the first to determine the significance of genetic factors in the aetiology of 
autism. Bailey, et al. (1995) subsequently replicated these results in a larger sample and found 
that the concordance rate for autism in MZ twins was even higher; 69% for MZ twins compared 
to 0% for DZ twins, which increased to 88% in MZ twins when a broadly defined definition of 
autism was used. Using twin modelling, the heritability of autism was estimated at 93%.  
More recent twin studies of ASD have found a concordance rate of between 88% and 95% for 
MZ twins and 31% for DZ twins (Rosenberg et al., 2009; Taniai, Nishiyama, Miyachi, Imaeda, & 
Sumi, 2008). Furthermore, the largest representative twin study of ASD found that genetic 
factors accounted for 80% of the liability for ASD (Lichtenstein, Carlstrom, Rastam, Gillberg, & 
Anckarsater, 2010). In addition, a recent twin study combined a continuous trait approach and 
diagnostic classification of ASD to provide heritability estimates of 56 to 95% (Colvert et al., 
2015). Overall, most twin studies have estimated a high heritability of ASD and have added 
considerably to our knowledge about the cause of ASD. 
In contrast, one twin study has suggested that ASD is only moderately heritable and that ASD is 
largely due to the shared twin environment (Hallmayer et al., 2011). The study claims that it is 
the largest and most rigorous twin study to date and included all twin pairs born in California 
between 1987 and 2004 with at least one twin diagnosed with ASD. It was determined that the 
heritability of autism was 37% and ASD was 38% with the shared environment accounting for 
55% of the liability for autism and 58% for ASD. These estimates are substantially lower than 
previous twin studies and suggest that autism and ASD are not as heritable as previously 
proposed. However, the authors did acknowledge that their calculations were subject to a wide 
margin of error as the sample showed high attrition and consisted of only 192 twin pairs. 
It has been proposed that autistic traits, i.e. social and communicative impairments and RRBIs, 
are continually distributed in the general population with individuals with ASD at the extreme 
end of the distribution (Hoekstra, Bartels, Verweij, & Boomsma, 2007; Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, et 
al., 1997; Spiker, Lotspeich, Dimiceli, Myers, & Risch, 2002). To investigate this notion, 
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population-based twin studies have investigated autistic traits in the general population 
(Constantino & Todd, 2005; Constantino, et al., 2010; Edelson & Saudino, 2009; Hoekstra, et 
al., 2007; Skuse, Mandy, & Scourfield, 2005; Stilp, Gernsbacher, Schweigert, Arneson, & 
Goldsmith, 2010). Hoekstra, et al. (2007) found that autistic traits show considerable heritability 
in the general population (57%). Constantino, Hudziak, and Todd (2000) examined the genetic 
structure of social behaviour in a population-based twin study of autistic traits. The genetic 
influence of social behaviour was estimated to be 76% which suggests that social impairments 
are highly heritable. Furthermore, Skuse, et al. (2005) measured social and communicative 
impairments in a population-based twin study and found that the genetic influence of social and 
communicative skills was 76%. Overall, twin studies have shown that autistic traits in the 
general population are moderately to highly heritable.  
1.6.1.2 Molecular genetics 
Twin studies and family studies led to the suggestion that the aetiology of ASD involves several 
genes. However, the identity and number of genes involved are not yet known with a review of 
the molecular genetic studies of ASD beyond the scope of this thesis, and the interested reader 
is referred to Betancur (2011) which summarises over 100 genes and 44 genomic loci 
implicated in the aetiology of ASD. In addition, a continually updated database of candidate 
genes for ASD can be found online (Basu, Kollu, & Banerjee-Basu, 2009). 
The importance of the contribution of molecular genetics to understand the aetiology of autism 
commenced with the identification that many rare and genetic conditions are associated with 
autism such as tuberous sclerosis complex, Fragile X syndrome, Down syndrome, Angelman 
and Prader-Willi syndrome to name a few. For example, tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) is a 
rare genetic disorder which causes non-malignant tumours in the body and is caused by a 
mutation in one of two genes, TSC1 (chromosome 9q34) and TSC2 (chromosome 16p13). The 
prevalence of autism in tuberous sclerosis complex is estimated from 16% to over 65% 
(Smalley, 1998; Wong, 2006). Additionally, Fragile X Syndrome is a genetic disorder caused by 
a trinucleotide repeat expansion in the gene FMR1 at Xq27.3. The prevalence of autism in 
Fragile X syndrome is estimated between 25% and 33% (Bailey et al., 1998; Rogers, Wehner, & 
Hagerman, 2001). Moreover, Angelman syndrome is associated with disruption to a maternal 
gene UBE3A at 15q11.2, with a lack of paternal contribution within the same region (15q11-13) 
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leading to Prader-Willi syndrome. The prevalence of autism is 42% in Angelman syndrome 
(Peters, Beaudet, Madduri, & Bacino, 2004) and 25.3% in Prader-Willi syndrome (Veltman, 
Craig, & Bolton, 2005). However, the comorbidity of these genetic conditions with autism is 
generally less than 50% (Zafeiriou, Ververi, & Vargiami, 2007).  Although these syndromic forms 
of ASD provide evidence for a genetic basis of autism, they only account for 1% of ASD cases. 
Some ASD cases are due to rare variants that have large effects, while a larger percentage of 
ASD cases are due to a combination of common variants that exert small effects. The 
contribution of rare genomic variants in ASD was first offered by studies investigating 
chromosomal abnormalities (Christian et al., 2008). The association between de novo copy 
number variations (CNVs) and ASD followed, accounting for nearly 10% of individuals 
diagnosed with ASD (Sebat, 2007). A higher frequency of de novo CNVs in simplex (10%) 
versus multiplex (3%) and controls (1%) has been reported (Sebat et al., 2007), suggesting that 
ASD is more likely to arise de novo in simplex families and inherited through common variants 
in multiplex families. Pinto et al. (2010) described the involvement of multiple rare CNVs, both 
genome-wide and at specific loci, in ASD. The CNVs implicated many novel ASD genes, and 
these CNVs disrupted certain gene pathways. In addition, Marshall et al. (2008) found CNVs in 
44% of ASD families, with most CNVs inherited and some with de novo alterations.  
Common variants are defined as those found in more than five percent of the population. 
Genome-wide association studies were designed to detect these common variants. However, 
they have largely been unsuccessful in identifying single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 
associated with ASD. Using a GWAS approach, Anney et al. (2012) did find an association 
between a SNP located within CNTNAP2, a gene previously identified as an ASD susceptibility 
gene. Authors concluded that common variants contribute significantly to ASD. Additionally, a 
recent study indicated that common genetic variants may contribute about half the risk of 
developing ASD, compared to just 3% for rare variants (Gaugler et al., 2014).  
The theory of defective synaptic function has been hypothesised to link rare and common 
variants at the level of biological function (Zoghbi, 2003). Moreover, it has been suggested that 
deficits in synaptogenesis may increase risk for ASD (Bourgeron, 2009). Additionally, a 
significant number of genes that are essential for synaptogenesis and synaptic function have 
been recently associated with ASD (Mitchell, 2011). Disruption in certain synaptic gene 
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pathways may lead to deficits in synaptogenesis during neurodevelopment, leading to the 
phenotype of ASD. Furthermore, Awadalla et al. (2010) investigated 401 synaptic genes in a 
large cohort of ASD and schizophrenic individuals and discovered 14 unique de novo mutations. 
The analyses showed that there was a significantly higher proportion of deleterious de novo 
mutations in synaptic genes compared to non-functional regions within the ASD and 
schizophrenic cohorts, suggesting a role of de novo mutations in synaptic genes in the aetiology 
of ASD. 
1.6.1.3 Epigenetics 
Monozygotic twins share the same genome. However, monozygotic twins are not phenotypically 
identical, and have widespread differences in their epigenome (Fraga et al., 2005). Epigenetic 
changes are chemical modifications when methyl and other chemical groups attach to DNA or 
histones that DNA is wrapped around, and these modifications control when and where genes 
are expressed, i.e., epigenetic changes can turn genes on or off. These epigenetic changes 
regulate the amount of RNA and protein that is produced without changing the genome. 
Epigenetic errors can occur as primary stochastic events or as secondary events due to genetic 
mutations or environmental factors such as diet, stress or toxins. Potential epigenetic 
aetiologies of ASD involve both genetic and environmental factors. 
Epigenetic markers have a key role in normal development, including neuronal development, 
and have been linked to many disorders including ASD. The epigenetic aetiology of ASD is a 
recent and emerging field (see Grafodatskaya, Chung, Szatmari, and Weksberg, 2010, for an 
initial review of the field). Shulha et al. (2012) investigated histone methylation in post-mortem 
brains of individuals with and without ASD. Abnormal epigenetic markers were found on or near 
known autism risk genes, indicating that a subset of autism susceptibility genes carrying strong 
penetrance for ASD could be epigenetically dysregulated. In addition, Schroeder, Lott, Korf, and 
LaSalle (2011) generated a genome-wide pattern of methylation in neurons and found that 
autism candidate genes were over-represented in areas with high levels of methylation. It was 
proposed that there may be epigenetic dysregulation of genes that are related to the neuronal 
synapse in ASD. 
As indicated in twin studies of ASD, there is still substantial discordance in MZ twin pairs for a 
diagnosis of ASD and also for symptom severity within ASD-concordant MZ twin pairs. Wong et 
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al. (2014) used this as a model to investigate the role of non-genetic epigenetic factors in the 
aetiology of ASD using a genome-wide approach. There were numerous DNA methylation 
differences in MZ twins discordant for ASD and ASD-related traits highlighting a role for the 
non-shared environment in the aetiology of ASD. In addition, there was a correlation between 
DNA methylation and autism symptom severity, suggesting a quantitative relationship between 
severity of the autism phenotype and epigenetic modifications. The study also found DNA 
methylation differences in MZ discordant twins that were specific for certain symptom domains. 
For example, a gene that encodes the GABA receptor, which has been linked to ASD, was 
found to be differentially methylated in twin pairs discordant for social traits. Interestingly, the 
authors suggested that there is a potential for epigenetic biomarkers to be used as predictors of 
the severity of autism symptoms. 
1.6.2 Environment 
The twin study by Hallmayer, et al. (2011) proposed a larger role for environmental factors than 
had previously been suggested. In addition, epigenetic research has suggested potential gene-
environment interactions in ASD (Wong, et al., 2014). This may highlight the role of 
environmental risk factors for ASD, especially during the pre-, peri- and neonatal periods when 
neurodevelopment proliferates. 
Guinchat et al. (2012) conducted a systematic review of case-control studies to estimate the 
impact of pre-, peri- and neonatal factors on the risk for ASD. A total of 85 studies were 
analysed. Firstly, the familial risk factors identified were advanced maternal age or paternal age, 
being firstborn vs. thirdborn (or later) and the mother’s status as foreign born. Secondly, the 
prenatal risk factors identified were bleeding, medication during pregnancy, diabetes, with 
limited evidence for maternal infection, pre-eclampsia and stress. Thirdly, the perinatal risk 
factors identified were preterm birth, breech presentation, and planned caesarean section. 
Lastly, the neonatal risk factors identified were low Apgar scores, neonatal encephalopathy, 
hyperbilirubinemia, birth defects and baby small for gestational age, with limited evidence for 
low birth weight. Overall, no individual factor was consistently validated as a risk factor for ASD. 
Therefore, several risk factors in the pre-, peri- and neonatal periods may increase risk for ASD.  
Another potential environmental risk factor for ASD is environmental toxicants. Rossignol, 
Genuis, and Frye (2014) systematically reviewed studies investigating the association between 
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ASD and environmental toxicants, examining 128 studies conducted preconception, during 
gestation or in childhood. Environmental toxicants implicated in ASD included pesticides, 
phthalates, polychlorinated biphenyls, solvents, toxic waste sites, air pollutants and heavy 
metals, with the strongest evidence found for air pollutants and pesticides. The majority of 
studies (92%) that examined a potential association between ASD and environmental toxicant 
exposure reported a significant relationship. Half of the studies investigating the concentrations 
of heavy metals as biomarkers in children with ASD found elevated levels in ASD compared to 
controls. In addition, seven studies reported that these biomarkers were associated with ASD 
severity. Overall, the studies reviewed by Rossignol, et al. (2014) support an association 
between environmental toxicants and ASD. 
An interesting study examined the association between inter-pregnancy interval and the risk of 
ASD (Risch et al., 2014). The study found that an inter-pregnancy interval of less than 24 
months was associated with increased odds of ASD in second-born children. The greatest risk 
was when the inter-pregnancy interval was less than 12 months. One explanation offered by the 
authors was that a short inter-pregnancy interval could be associated with nutritional depletion. 
However, this intriguing finding awaits replication. 
There are likely to be complex interactions between genetic and environmental factors 
conferring in risk for ASD. For example, individual variability in genetic susceptibility for ASD 
may lower the threshold at which environmental factors have influence. Therefore, genetic and 
environmental factors may work interdependently during critical periods in development to 
increase the likelihood of developing ASD.  
1.6.3 Neurobiological 
The neurobiology of ASD has been researched extensively over the past 35 years, with 
suggestions that ASD involves changes in regional brain anatomy and functional neural 
networks (Akshoomoff, Pierce, & Courchesne, 2002; DiCicco-Bloom et al., 2006; Minshew & 
Williams, 2007; Pardo & Eberhart, 2007; Parellada et al., 2014; Polleux & Lauder, 2004). 
Neuropathological and neuroimaging approaches have been used to identify these underlying 
brain regions, neural networks, and cellular systems that are implicated in ASD, and are briefly 
summarised here.  
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The neurobiological account of ASD began with the consistent finding of macrocephaly (larger 
head circumference; Courchesne et al., 2001) and megencephaly (larger brain volume) in ASD. 
An increase in brain volume in ASD has been observed in the first and second year of life in 
around 25-30% of children with ASD, and these differences reduce by late 
childhood/adolescence (Redcay & Courchesne, 2005). In addition, Sparks et al. (2002) found 
that 3- to 4-year old children with ASD showed an increase in the volume of the cortex and 
cerebellum, and in the amygdala. Various hypotheses have been proposed to explain the 
abnormal rapid growth in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes in young children with ASD, such 
as increased dendritic branching, reduced synaptic pruning and increased number, size, or 
myelin content of glia. In addition, decreased numbers of cerebellar Purkinje cells and changes 
in the mini-columnar organisation in cortical regions have been consistently reported in ASD 
(DiCicco-Bloom, et al., 2006). Defects in the brainstem and cerebellum, the limbic system and 
the cortex have been implicated in ASD.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) are useful 
approaches to examine the neural networks affected in ASD. The three core symptom domains 
likely involve extensive neural networks, highlighted in Figure 1.2 (Amaral, Schumann, & 
Nordahl, 2008). Pelphrey, Adolphs, and Morris (2004) reviewed three brain regions involved in 
different aspects of social functioning that may be implicated in the social impairments in ASD. 
Briefly, the review outlined that: (1) there are functional abnormalities in amygdala activity in 
ASD (Critchley et al., 2000) and amygdala size is correlated with the severity of social 
impairment (Schumann, Barnes, Lord, & Courchesne, 2009); (2) there are decreases in grey 
matter concentration in the superior temporal sulcus (Boddaert et al., 2004), and this region is 
less activated by faces in ASD (Scherf, Luna, Minshew, & Behrmann, 2010); and (3) the 
fusiform gyrus is less activated for faces in ASD (Critchley, et al., 2000; Hubl et al., 2003; 
Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, & Courchesne, 2001; Schultz et al., 2000). The neurobiological 
basis of restricted and repetitive behaviours has been less studied than the social-
communicative symptoms, with a focus on the larger volume of basal ganglia and striatum, 
abnormalities in the anterior cingulate cortex, and atypical caudate-cortical connectivity (for 
review see Langen, Durston, Kas, van Engeland, & Staal, 2011).   




Figure 1.2. Brain areas associated with the  three symptom domains of ASD (taken from 
Amaral, et al., 2008) 
 
One brain-based theory of ASD called the ‘broken mirror theory’ involves dysfunction in the 
mirror neuron system (Dapretto et al., 2006; Hamilton, 2013; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & 
Perrett, 2001). The mirror neuron system is defined as the set of brain regions which are active 
both when a person performs an action, and when they observe another person perform the 
same action, and so is suggested to be involved in self-other mapping. It has been claimed that 
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this dysfunction of the mirror neuron system causes social and communication impairments in 
ASD (Williams, et al., 2001). However, support from neuroimaging studies is limited (Hamilton, 
2013). 
The cortical under-connectivity theory of ASD is a prominent brain-based theory that postulates 
abnormalities in the connectivity of neural systems in ASD. The first evidence of under-
connectivity was found in an fMRI study using a language comprehension task (Just, 
Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004). Just, et al. (2004) found poor synchronisation of the 
activation across cortical areas in ASD during the task, and so proposed that ASD is caused by 
under-functioning integrative circuitry that leads to abnormalities in the integration of information 
at the neural and cognitive levels. This under-connectivity has primarily been reported between 
the prefrontal cortex and posterior brain regions (for a recent review, see Maximo, Cadena, & 
Kana, 2014). This poor prefrontal-posterior connectivity could underlie the social and 
communication impairments in ASD due to a lack of integration of different types of information 
at a high level (Just, et al., 2004), with support from the finding of a negative relationship 
between symptom severity and the functional connectivity in the frontal-parietal network (Just, 
Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007).  
Under-connectivity has been reported in ASD between other brain regions and there have also 
been several studies in ASD that report over-connectivity between brain regions (reviewed in 
Maximo, et al., 2014). These enhanced connections may be linked to the increase in brain 
volume previously mentioned. Higher functional connectivity has been associated with more 
severe restricted, repetitive behaviours (Agam, Joseph, Barton, & Manoach, 2010; Monk et al., 
2009). Recently, Hahamy, Behrmann, and Malach (2015) found both over- and under-
connectivity in ASD compared to controls. The more idiosyncratic an individual’s pattern of 
connectivity was (as compared to controls), the more severe their symptoms of ASD were. 
Overall, abnormalities in functional connectivity appear to be a core characteristic of ASD, and 
are related to the severity of symptoms. 
1.7 Cognitive Theories 
Seminal experimental studies in ASD were conducted by Hermelin and O’Connor during the 
1960s. Early cognitive work focussed on impairments in perception, memory & language in ASD 
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(reviewed by Prior, 1979). In the 1980s, a primary cognitive deficit was proposed to underlie the 
behavioural phenotype of ASD (Rutter, 1983). Rutter (1983) described one individual with ASD 
who was unable to “mind-read”, i.e., he could not read other people’s thoughts. This description 
is perhaps a precursor to the pioneering cognitive deficit hypothesis of ASD, otherwise known 
as the ‘Theory of Mind’ hypothesis, which has been highly influential in psychological research. 
This pioneering cognitive theory of ASD (discussed below) led the way for the proposal of other 
cognitive theories over the past thirty years. These cognitive theories of ASD can be broadly 
divided into domain-specific and domain-general theories. Domain-specific theories situate the 
primary deficit in social processing. Prominent amongst these is the ‘Theory of Mind’ deficit 
account, which explains the social and communication impairments of ASD as resulting from 
difficulty representing mental states (e.g., Frith, Morton, & Leslie, 1991). Domain-general 
accounts of ASD propose that the primary deficit/difference is not in social cognition specifically 
but lies in, for example, ‘executive functions’ (EF; Hill, 2004). A number of domain-general 
accounts suggest areas of superior processing or differences in cognitive style, such as ‘weak 
central coherence’ (Frith, 1989; Happé & Booth, 2008; Pellicano, 2010a), a bias towards 
featural processing and reduced configural processing. Superior local processing, but 
accompanied by intact global processing, is also proposed by ‘enhanced perceptual processing’ 
(Mottron, Dawson, Soulieres, Hubert, & Burack, 2006), ‘systemising’ (Baron-Cohen, 2009) and 
enhanced discrimination (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001) accounts of ASD. The three main 
cognitive theories of ASD, theory of mind deficit, executive dysfunction, and weak central 
coherence (reviewed in Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007), are the primary focus of this thesis. 
1.7.1 Social-Cognitive Theories 
1.7.1.1 Theory of Mind 
The initial definition of a theory of mind was provided by Premack and Woodruff (1978) as the 
way in which an individual infers their own and others’ mental states that are not directly 
observable and these inferred mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires) are used to predict or explain 
the behaviour of others. Subsequently, Wimmer and Perner (1983) introduced the ‘false-belief’ 
unexpected transfer task to test when young children develop a theory of mind. In this task, a 
character places an object in location x. In the absence of the character, the object is 
transferred from x to location y. Participants are then required to indicate where the character 
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will look for the object; in location y (where the object is currently located) or location x (where 
the character thinks the object is). Wimmer and Perner (1983) used the unexpected transfer 
task to show that children’s theory of mind ability emerges between the ages of 4 and 6 years.  
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) investigated whether a deficit in theory of mind could 
explain the social impairment in ASD. In their study, 80% of children with autism failed Wimmer 
and Perner’s (1983) unexpected transfer false-belief task compared to 15% and 14% of 
typically-developing children and children with Down’s syndrome (respectively). Baron-Cohen, 
et al. (1985) concluded that children with autism lack a theory of mind and are unable to 
attribute beliefs to others and cannot predict the behaviour of other people. This seminal study 
to show that children with autism have an inability to attribute false-beliefs has been extensively 
replicated (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Grant, Grayson, & Boucher, 
2001; Luckett, Powell, Messer, Thornton, & Schulz, 2002; Yirmiya, SolomonicaLevi, Shulman, & 
Pilowsky, 1996), using various tasks such as unexpected contents tasks (Charman & Baron-
Cohen, 1992; Charman & Lynggaard, 1998; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989; Williams & 
Happé, 2009), mental state stories (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994b) and deception tasks 
(Baron-Cohen, 1992; Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991; Sodian & Frith, 1992; 
Yirmiya, et al., 1996). 
Some individuals with ASD pass first-order false belief tasks, which poses a problem for the 
universality of the theory. Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, and Solomonica-Levi (1998) conducted a 
meta-analysis of theory of mind tasks and found that a theory of mind deficit characterised most 
individuals with ASD, but this deficit was not unique to ASD as individuals with intellectual 
disability also exhibited a theory of mind deficit. Instead, individuals with ASD may have a more 
severe impairment in theory of mind ability.  
To account for the 20% of individuals with autism who passed the first-order false-belief task 
(Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985), Baron-Cohen (1989) examined the ability to pass a higher-level 
theory of mind task. This higher level task involved second-order false-belief understanding, i.e., 
the ability to think what another person thinks about a third person. Children with ASD who 
passed first-order false-belief tasks were impaired on the second-order false-belief task relative 
to typically-developing children and children with Down’s syndrome. Baron-Cohen (1989) 
suggested that theory of mind development is very delayed in children with autism by seven 
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chronological years, instead of an absolute lack of theory of mind ability. This was supported in 
a large-scale empirical study of theory of mind abilities in ASD (Happé, 1995). A two-threshold 
model was proposed in which the lower-bound of verbal mental age to pass false-belief tasks is 
two years, ten months for typically-developing children compared to five years, six months for 
children with ASD. Therefore, the theory of mind deficit in ASD may not be absolute, but rather 
may be revealed in a severe developmental delay.  
Bowler (1992) found that 73% of individuals with Asperger’s syndrome were able to solve a 
second-order false-belief task. However, when these individuals were asked to explain their 
answers, they did not use mental state terms. Additional studies have found that children with 
autism who passed first-order false-belief tasks also passed second-order false-belief tasks 
(Leekam & Prior, 1994; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994a). It was suggested that individuals 
with ASD use logical cognitive processes to solve false-belief tasks (Bowler, 1992; Frith, Happé, 
& Siddons, 1994; Williams & Happé, 2009), may have difficulty applying conceptual knowledge 
(Leekam & Prior, 1994) or that second-order tasks are too complex and may rely on information 
processing ability (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994a). To add, Senju, Southgate, White, and 
Frith (2009) found that individuals with Asperger’s syndrome passed both false-belief and more 
advanced theory of mind tasks. However, these individuals did not spontaneously attribute 
belief status to others in a nonverbal false-belief task. This reveals that although some 
individuals with ASD can reason explicitly about false-beliefs (perhaps through compensatory 
learning), they still have a persistent impairment in spontaneous mentalising. 
Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, and Plaisted (1999) suggested that passing first- and 
second-order false-belief tasks is a relatively early stage in theory of mind development and that 
theory of mind continues to develop beyond four to six years of age in typical development. 
Therefore, a theory of mind should not be regarded as either absent or present, but as 
quantifiable with a certain threshold of theory of mind needed to be attained in order to pass 
developmentally appropriate tasks. In addition, Yirmiya, et al. (1998) proposed that theory of 
mind should not be conceptualised as an ‘all-or-nothing’ phenomena. 
Several more advanced tests of theory of mind have been established to test theory of mind 
ability beyond simple false-belief understanding, such as the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), 
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Recognition of Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1999), Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994c; 
White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009), and a triangle animation task (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000; 
Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000; White, Coniston, Rogers, & Frith, 2011). Using the Eyes 
Task as a measure of theory of mind ability, it has been shown that males and females are 
equally impaired in theory of mind ability in autism (Lai et al., 2012). In addition, Brent, Rios, 
Happe, and Charman (2004) investigated the associations between performance in three more 
advanced tests of theory of mind in children with autism and typically-developing controls. A 
distinction was made between social-cognitive and social-perceptual aspects of mentalising, 
with the suggestion that mentalising abilities may be more fractionated in autism. 
The brain basis for a theory of mind has also been studied. One of the first functional 
neuroimaging studies of theory of mind found a specific pattern of activation in the left medial 
frontal gyrus during mental state attribution with increased levels of activation in the posterior 
cingulate cortex and the right inferior parietal cortex at the temporo-parietal junction (Fletcher et 
al., 1995). To further clarify this finding, an fMRI study found that brain activation during theory 
of mind tasks was increased in the medial prefrontal cortex (Gallagher et al., 2000), suggesting 
that the ability to mentalise is mediated by this brain region. Subsequently, Castelli, et al. (2000) 
investigated brain activation during the spontaneous attribution of mental states. Increased 
activation for mental state attribution was found in a network of brain regions, including the 
medial prefrontal cortex, the temporal pole adjacent to the amygdala and the temporo-parietal 
junction, and these brain regions have been implicated in the theory of mind brain network.  
The theory of mind brain network may be dysfunctional in ASD. One of the first neuroimaging 
studies in ASD found less activation in the medial prefrontal cortex in participants with ASD 
during a mentalising task (Happé et al., 1996). Castelli, Frith, Happe, and Frith (2002) found 
greater activation during mental state attribution in the medial prefrontal cortex, the temporal 
pole adjacent to the amygdala, and the superior temporal sulcus at the temporo-parietal 
junction. In comparison, there was less activation in these three brain regions of the theory of 
mind network in ASD. In addition, there may be frontal-posterior underconnectivity in the theory 
of mind network in ASD (Kana, Keller, Cherkassky, Minshew, & Just, 2009). Therefore, there is 
atypical activation of brain regions in ASD that are involved in theory of mind. 
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Some of the limitations of research into theory of mind have been identified, such as the verbal 
nature of tasks, the explicit nature of task presentation and the ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to 
performance in theory of mind tasks. Klin (2000) attempted to reduce these factors by using 
silent cartoon animations in which geometric shapes performed social actions. When asked to 
describe these animations, typically-developing individuals provided narratives that attributed 
social meaning indicating a spontaneous predisposition to perceive social meaning, even in 
geometric shapes. However, individuals with ASD who had previously passed second-order 
false-belief tasks provided either irrelevant descriptions or purely geometric accounts of the 
cartoons. To explain these results, Klin, Jones, Schultz, and Volkmar (2003) proposed a new 
framework termed the ‘Enactive Mind’ account. Central to the Enactive Mind account is the role 
of social motivation which predisposes the development of a theory of mind. This approach 
proposes that social stimuli are salient in typical development. However in ASD, social stimuli 
are not as salient and so physical stimuli attract attention leading to a specialisation in things 
rather than people. Whether theory of mind deficits are primary or whether they result from 
earlier abnormalities of social orienting or social motivation, has also been a topic of much 
debate (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Jones, Carr, & Klin, 2008). 
1.7.2 Non-Social Cognitive Theories 
1.7.2.1 Executive Function 
Executive function is a multi-faceted construct, intended to include planning, initiation, shifting, 
monitoring and inhibition of behaviours. Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, and Wallace (2008) 
defined executive function as a “set of cognitive processes that direct behaviour regulation and 
orchestration of attaining a future goal”. Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, and Wilson (1998) 
found that there were three underlying cognitive factors to executive function tests; inhibition 
(supressing a habitual response), intentionality (creating and maintain goal-directed behaviours) 
and executive memory (shifting attention). Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) suggested 
that ASD could be explained as a deficit in executive function as individuals with ASD show 
inflexible and perseverative behaviours with narrow interests that could reflect underlying 
problems with shifting behaviours. In addition, they may act impulsively, indicating problems 
with inhibition. 
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Hill (2004) provided a comprehensive review of cognitive behavioural studies of executive 
function in ASD, specifically focussing on planning, flexibility, and inhibition. Firstly, planning 
involves the sequencing of actions, and monitoring, re-evaluating and updating these actions. 
Individuals with ASD have been found to be impaired on tasks that assess planning ability, 
relative to typically developing controls, such as the Tower of London/Hanoi task (Bennetto, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Ozonoff, et al., 1991). Secondly, mental flexibility involves the ability to implement, track and 
change cognitive strategies. Set-shifting is a form of mental flexibility and involves the process 
of updating a cognitive strategy, e.g., abandoning an old rule to implement a new rule. Two 
similar tasks in which individuals with ASD have been shown to have poor mental flexibility are 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task and the intradimensional/extradimensional task (ID/ED), in 
which individuals with ASD appear to have difficulties set-shifting and exhibit perseverative 
errors (Bennetto, et al., 1996; Hughes, et al., 1994; Liss et al., 2001; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Ozonoff, et al., 1991; Shu, Lung, Tien, & Chen, 2001). Finally, inhibitory control involves 
selectively ignoring responses to inappropriate stimuli. Individuals with ASD have been found to 
be unimpaired on the Stroop task (Goldberg et al., 2005; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999), unimpaired 
on negative priming (Brian, Tipper, Weaver, & Bryson, 2003; Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997), impaired 
on prepotent inhibition and cognitive flexibility conditions of Go/No-Go tasks (Ozonoff, Strayer, 
McMahon, & Filloux, 1994), perseverative on Windows and Detour-Reaching tasks (Russell, 
Hala, & Hill, 2003; Russell, et al., 1991) and impaired on Luria Hand Game (Hughes, 1996); 
overall suggesting difficulties in the inhibition of prepotent responses. 
Executive functions in general have been linked to the frontal structures of the brain, and in 
particular to the prefrontal cortex. The frontal-parietal network seems to be key for executive 
functions. Functional neuroimaging studies have found atypical brain activity in individuals with 
ASD when performing various executive function tasks (Just, et al., 2007; Kana, Keller, 
Minshew, & Just, 2007; Schmitz et al., 2006; Solomon et al., 2009). For example, Just, et al. 
(2007) found lower activation between frontal and parietal regions for individuals with ASD 
during the Tower of London task using fMRI. There appears to be lower levels of functional 
connectivity in the frontal-parietal network in ASD that is crucial for executive functions (Just, et 
al., 2007; Solomon, et al., 2009). 
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Many studies investigating executive function in ASD have been conducted at a single time 
point. The developmental trajectories of different aspects of executive function are needed as 
the prefrontal cortex, which mediates executive function, shows a protracted developmental 
trajectory throughout childhood and into adolescence (Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000). 
Furthermore, Pellicano (2012) suggested that individual differences in executive function 
abilities could explain some of the variability in outcomes for children with ASD. Ozonoff and 
McEvoy (1994) conducted one of the first longitudinal studies to investigate executive function 
development in ASD. The ASD group did not improve in their executive function skills over a 
three year period, compared to an overall improvement in the control group. Therefore, 
executive function ability remained stable and static throughout development in ASD in this 
study. Happé, Booth, Charlton, and Hughes (2006) investigated age-related differences in a 
battery of executive functioning tasks for ASD, ADHD and typically-developing groups. In both 
the ASD and the typically-developing group, the older participants (11-16 years-old) 
outperformed the younger participants (8-10 years-old) on several executive function tasks. This 
is in contrast to Ozonoff and McEvoy (1994) findings, but could be explained by the differences 
in age across the two studies, with Happé et al.’s (2006) study containing a younger age group. 
Pellicano (2010a) examined the development of executive function even earlier in childhood, 
from 5- to 8-years-old. The ASD group’s planning ability significantly improved over this 3 year 
period, and improved at a faster rate than in the typically-developing group. This study suggests 
that executive function becomes less marked with age. However, executive function may not 
fully mature in ASD (Luna, Doll, Hegedus, Minshew, & Sweeney, 2007) with a greater 
divergence from typical development over time (Rosenthal et al., 2013). Overall, executive 
function may improve through childhood and adolescence, but may not reach adult levels in 
ASD. 
The uniqueness of executive function deficits to ASD can be questioned as executive deficits 
are also found in ADHD (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996), schizophrenia (Velligan & Bow-Thomas, 
1999), and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Olley, Malhi, & Sachdev, 2007). However, a 
differing executive function profile may define ASD. For example, Ozonoff and Jensen (1999) 
found that ASD was characterised by impaired planning and flexibility, compared to impaired 
inhibition in ADHD. In addition, individuals with ASD had elevated scores across executive 
function domains, and these scores were significantly higher for the shifting domain compared 
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to other clinical groups (ADHD, reading difficulties, and traumatic brain injury) (Gioia, Isquith, 
Kenworthy, & Barton, 2002). Happé, Booth, et al. (2006) examined the executive function 
profiles in ASD versus ADHD. Poor response selection/monitoring typified ASD compared to 
greater inhibition problems in ADHD. In contrast, Johnson (2012) argued that executive deficits 
are not core to developmental disorders. Instead, individuals with good executive function skills 
may be able to compensate or better adapt to atypicalities in neural functioning.  
Another issue with the executive function deficit hypothesis is that it is not universal in ASD. 
Many studies focus on group differences, comparing clinical groups with typically-developing 
controls, and so may mask any individual differences in executive function within ASD. Taking a 
group difference approach assumes that each group has a homogeneous cognitive profile. For 
example, 41% of the ASD group performed within the normal range on a task measuring 
perseveration, yet group differences were reported (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). Furthermore, 
executive function deficits characterised only half of children with ASD (Pellicano, Maybery, 
Durkin, & Maley, 2006). Therefore, not all individuals with ASD have executive function deficits, 
and so it could be argued that it is not a core feature of the disorder, but is instead commonly 
associated with ASD (Liss, et al., 2001). 
The lack of specificity of the ‘executive functions’ may also explain the mixed results in the 
literature. There is a lack of consensus regarding the definition of ‘executive functions’. 
Executive function is a multi-faceted construct with processes that are difficult to delineate. 
Some accounts present a unitary construct, whereas others suggest a fractionated model of 
executive function (e.g., Burgess, et al., 1998). Some of the differences between studies 
investigating the developmental trajectory of executive function in ASD may be hindered by the 
multiple processes of executive function that mature at different times. In addition, cognitive 
tasks purported to measure singular aspects of executive function also require many other 
executive function processes to complete. For example, the traditional tower tasks that are 
suggested to measure planning ability also require working memory, the inhibition of prepotent 
responses, and the generation of problem-solving ideas (Hill & Bird, 2006). Therefore, the 
outcome of many executive function tasks is in fact the sum of performance across a number of 
executive processes. Overall, the executive dysfunction hypothesis of ASD has been 
challenged regarding its issues of specificity, uniqueness and universality.  
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1.7.2.2 Weak Central Coherence 
The weak central coherence account of ASD proposes a specific perceptual cognitive style in 
which there is a processing bias for local details over a preference to perceive the global form. 
In 1989, Frith introduced the idea that there is a drive for coherence in typically developing 
children and adults, defined as the tendency to integrate large amounts of information (Frith, 
1989). It was proposed that this drive for coherence is diminished in ASD, i.e., individuals with 
ASD show ‘weak central coherence’. In 2003, Frith updated the weak central coherence 
account, proposing that the drive for global coherence, that is inbuilt in typical development, is 
weak in ASD, with an inability to integrate local details into a coherent whole and a drive 
towards local details (Frith, 2003). This proposal is evident in Kanner’s (1943) original 
description of autism, stating that children with autism appear to have an “inability to experience 
wholes without full attention to the constituent parts” (p. 246). In addition, ASD self-advocates 
and parents of individuals with ASD have supported this concept. For example, Temple Grandin 
(2013) stated that “the tendency to see details before I see the bigger picture has always been a 
central feature in how I relate to the world” (p.120). The central coherence account has been 
modified with an emphasis on a different cognitive style, rather than a deficit, in which 
individuals with ASD have superior local processing and have a decreased tendency to 
integrate information (Happé & Booth, 2008). Therefore, the weak central coherence account 
predicts that individuals with ASD will have good performance on tasks which attention to local 
details and/or not paying attention to context is advantageous, and poor performance on tasks 
which require integration of information using context, or involve the perception of global 
meaning. 
Happé and Frith (2006) provided a review of the empirical studies investigating weak central 
coherence in ASD. In the perceptual domain, individuals with ASD have been found to be less 
susceptible to visual illusions (Happé, 1996). In contrast, Ropar and Mitchell (1999) investigated 
this phenomenon using a different response method and found that individuals with ASD are 
susceptible to visual illusions. It was acknowledged that illusions are different as susceptibility to 
them is not a deliberate act and so the results do not necessarily conflict with the weak 
coherence account. Jarrold and Russell (1997) investigated the counting strategies of children 
with ASD. When counting dots that were presented in a canonical form, children with ASD did 
not engage in a global form of counting. Instead of subitising, children with ASD counted each 
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dot separately, perhaps indicating a preference for local processing. Similarly, Brosnan, Scott, 
Fox, and Pye (2004) found that children with ASD had a deficit in gestalt grouping. They 
concluded that there is a failure in ASD to process the relationships that exist at the local level 
that allow the perception of coherent forms, and therefore are unable to use context.  
The seminal tasks used in the visuo-spatial domain to investigate weak central coherence were 
the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and the Block Design task. In the EFT, participants have to 
find a simple figure in a more complex array. Shah and Frith (1983) found that an autism group 
performed significantly better than an IQ-matched control group on this task. It was suggested 
that the complex shape was not as relevant for children with autism and so their search was 
better and faster than for the control group. Another task in which a tendency towards local over 
global processing is advantageous is the Block Design Task. Shah and Frith (1993) 
manipulated the classic Block design task to compare performance on a segmented versus an 
un-segmented version. The ASD group performed significantly better than controls when 
presented with the un-segmented version. It was concluded that the ability to perceive parts 
when presented as wholes is a consequence of weak central coherence in ASD. Tasks in which 
a tendency towards global over local processing is advantageous have also been used. For 
example, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2001) found that individuals with ASD were less able to 
integrate visual elements to identify an object, suggesting impaired integration to produce a 
global form. To add, a more fragmented drawing style has been reported in ASD (Fein, Lucci, & 
Waterhouse, 1990). For example, Mottron, Belleville, and Menard (1999) found that individuals 
with ASD produced more local features at the start of copying a drawing compared to typically-
developing controls, suggesting a bias towards local processing. This study was supported by 
the finding that children with ASD have a more detail-focused drawing style, i.e., they were 
more likely to start drawing with a local feature, drew in a fragmented manner, and their 
drawings contained violations to configurations in comparison to typically-developing children’s 
drawings (Booth, Charlton, Hughes, & Happé, 2003). Another visuo-spatial task is the Navon 
task in which a large letter shape is presented (global level) that is made up of smaller letters 
(local level) and participants are required to identify the letters at the global or local level. 
Typically-developing individuals made more errors at the local than global level (‘global 
advantage’ effect) and were slower at identifying local letters (‘global interference’ effect) 
showing an overall ‘global precedence’ effect. In contrast, individuals with ASD showed a local 
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advantage and a local interference effect indicating diminished global processing and 
supporting the weak central coherence account (Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999). 
Verbal-semantic tasks have also indicated weak central coherence in ASD. For example, the 
Homographs Reading test involves reading homographs before or after a disambiguating 
sentence context, e.g., ‘In her eye/dress there was a big tear’ (Frith & Snowling, 1983). Happé 
(1997) used the Homographs Reading test and found that the ASD group failed to use the 
preceding sentence context to inform pronunciation compared to the control group. Jolliffe and 
Baron-Cohen (1999) also supported these results. In addition, they found that an ASD group 
were less likely than a control group to select a coherent inference and were also less likely to 
use context to interpret an auditory ambiguous sentence. Another verbal task to investigate 
weak central coherence is the Sentence Completion task, which involves providing one word to 
complete a sentence. For example, the participant will be told “The sea tastes of salt and …”, 
and asked to provide a word to complete the sentence with a local response being “pepper”, 
and a correct global response being “seaweed”. In this task, Booth and Happé (2010) found that 
an ASD group produced significantly more local completions than the control group. Lastly, 
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2000) investigated whether individuals with ASD could make context-
appropriate explanations for a story and found that a difficulty to extract information from context 
characterised the majority of those with ASD, providing support for the weak central coherence 
account. 
To end, a recent study has investigated whether there is a local bias and reduced global 
interference in ASD in the auditory domain (Bouvet, Simard-Meilleur, Paignon, Mottron, & 
Donnadieu, 2014). In a melodic decision task, participants had to decide whether the global 
(melody) or local level (group of notes) was rising or falling. The ASD group showed superior 
local processing, and a reduced global-to-local interference, indicating that weak central 
coherence is apparent in the auditory, as well as the visual and verbal, domain.  
Several neuroimaging studies have attempted to elucidate the underlying neural mechanisms of 
weak central coherence. Neuroimaging studies have examined local and global processing in 
typically-developing individuals using fMRI. This has indicated some degree of hemispheric 
specialisation for local and global processing, with left hemisphere regions typically involved in 
local processing and right hemisphere regions in global processing (Fink et al., 1996). In ASD, 
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neuroimaging studies first focused on the neural correlates of enhanced local processing. 
Higher activation in the early stages of visual processing has been found during the EFT in ASD 
compared to typical-development (Manjaly et al., 2007). In addition, Lee et al. (2007) found 
reduced cortical involvement in ASD during the EFT. In particular, the underlying neural network 
differed qualitatively in ASD compared to typically-developing adolescents. A reduction in the 
temporo-parietal-occipital network was found in the ASD group, suggesting that there is a 
reduced reliance on this network in ASD. This was supported by Boelte, Hubl, Dierks, 
Holtmann, and Poustka (2008) in which the neural correlates in the visual cortex in the Block 
Design task were investigated in ASD using fMRI. There was diminished activation in V2, the 
first area in the visual cortex for visual association, in the ASD group compared to the typically-
developing adolescents and adults. This could indicate reduced efforts to distinguish and 
visually segment stimuli in ASD. Overall, these neuroimaging studies suggest that enhanced 
local processing may be accomplished by more automatic visuo-spatial processing in ASD. In 
another fMRI study, local and global levels of processing were separately examined in ASD 
using an abstract hierarchical design task (Gadgil, Peterson, Tregellas, Hepburn, & Rojas, 
2013). During locally directed attention, the ASD group exhibited higher activation in the right 
prefrontal cortex. During globally directed attention, the ASD group exhibited higher activation in 
right lateral occipital areas. In addition, there was less deactivation of the medial prefrontal 
cortex in ASD. The medial prefrontal cortex is part of the default mode network, which is 
activated in the mind’s resting state. Less deactivation of this region in ASD compared to the 
control group in the global condition suggests that less attention is dedicated to the global level 
in ASD. Therefore, studies have generally supported the notion of weak central coherence in 
ASD at the neural as well as the cognitive level. 
A challenge to the validity of the weak central coherence account is the extent to which it 
characterises all individuals with ASD. Again, many studies focus on group differences, and so 
may conceal any individual differences in differences in cognitive style. In earlier work, 85% of 
an ASD group exhibited peak performance on the Block Design task (Happé, 1994d). In 
addition, 40% of an ASD group did not show evidence of local processing bias (Booth, et al., 
2003) and a quarter did not use local completions in Sentence Completion task (Booth & 
Happé, 2010). Therefore, not all individuals with ASD have this specific cognitive processing 
style. These individual differences may reflect the vast heterogeneity present in ASD. In fact, 
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Happé (1999) suggested that central coherence may be a cognitive style that varies along a 
continuum in the normal population from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ coherence, with those with ASD at 
the extreme.  
Another challenge to the weak central coherence account is that a local processing bias is not 
specific to ASD. For example, a local processing bias and global processing deficit has been 
implicated in schizophrenia (Chen, Nakayama, Levy, Matthysse, & Holzman, 2003; Ferman, 
Primeau, Delis, & Jampala, 1999). In addition, patients with anorexia nervosa showed superior 
performance on the EFT and poorer performance on the Homographs reading test compared to 
healthy controls (Lopez et al., 2008). This indicates a local processing bias and deficits in global 
processing in anorexia nervosa, consistent with the weak central coherence account. However, 
a meta-analysis of studies examining central coherence in eating disorders found poor global 
processing but not superiority in local processing in contrast to the studies of coherence in ASD 
(Lopez, Tchanturia, Stahl, & Treasure, 2008). Finally, an ADHD group did not show weak 
central coherence in the Sentence Completion task (Booth & Happé, 2010). 
1.8 Single vs. Multiple Cognitive Models of ASD 
This chapter has provided an overview of ASD, including the biological, cognitive and 
behavioural levels of explanation. Morton and Frith (1995) distinguished between these so 
called levels of discourse in explaining developmental disorders. They suggested that most 
developmental disorders are defined by the biological and behavioural levels. However there is 
a problem relating these two levels and a third level – the cognitive level - is also required 
(Morton & Frith, 1995).  
The preceding section described the theories put forward to provide an explanation of ASD at 
the cognitive level. Rutter (1983) suggested that the common clustering of behavioural 
symptoms in ASD implies an underlying single cognitive deficit. Morton and Frith (1995) also 
proposed that a common single cognitive deficit defines all individuals with ASD and this 
cognitive deficit underlies the core symptoms of ASD. This hypothesised single cognitive deficit 
model is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Morton and Frith suggested that a theory of mind deficit may 
be the single cognitive deficit that defines ASD. However, they acknowledged that this theory 
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cannot account for the restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests characteristic of ASD. 
Instead they postulate that ASD may be explained in terms of more than one cognitive deficit. 
Single deficit accounts have also had a recent resurgence, with the implication that the social 
and non-social features of ASD are caused by a single mechanism (e.g. de Cruys et al., 2014; 
Pellicano & Burr, 2012). Pellicano and Burr (2012) provided a new hypothesis that ASD was 
due to a failure of Bayesian inference. This hypothesis proposes that individuals with ASD have 
weak ‘priors’ (contextual information based on previous experience) so that their perception is 
less modulated by experience. In addition, a predictive coding error has been proposed to 
explain ASD (de Cruys, et al., 2014). The predictive coding hypothesis posits that individuals 
with ASD have a predictive impairment and so events seem to occur unexpectedly and without 
cause, affecting social interactions and leading to restrictive and ritualistic behaviours.  
 
Figure 1.3. A representation of a single cognitive deficit model (Morton & Frith, 1995).  
Notes: Arrows represent a causal relationship between levels. A horizontal line is used to 
separate levels. Hypothesised origins, O, represent genetic and brain abnormalities. The struck 
out C represents a cognitive domain that is found in normal development but is deficient/absent 
in ASD. 
 
Pennington (2006) explored the potential of a multiple cognitive deficit model for developmental 
disorders. He suggested that single cognitive deficit models should be abandoned because 
behaviourally defined developmental disorders do not have single causes at the biological or 
cognitive levels and developmental disorders are often comorbid due partly to shared genetic 
and cognitive risk factors. Instead, he proposed a multiple cognitive deficit model of 
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developmental disorders that: 1) recognises the multifactorial aetiology of behavioural disorders 
which involve the interaction of multiple risk and protective factors; 2) these risk and protective 
factors alter the development of cognitive functions that are essential for normal development, 
and so produce the behavioural symptoms that define the disorder; 3) no single aetiological 
factor is sufficient for a disorder; 4) comorbidity between developmental disorders is expected 
due to shared aetiological and cognitive risk factors; and 5) the liability distribution for a disorder 
is continuous and quantitative.  The complexities in moving from single to multiple cognitive 
deficit models was acknowledged, including issues in specification and testing of these models. 
Pennington et al. (2012) tested single and multiple cognitive deficit models in dyslexia and 
found that a hybrid model was the best fit with multiple possible pathways to the disorder, some 
involving single cognitive deficits and some involving multiple cognitive deficits. 
Within the literature on ASD, Happé (2003) presented the idea that different interacting casual 
factors and their associated neural abnormalities in multiple brain regions may map on to 
distinct abnormalities at the cognitive level. Happé suggested that instead of searching for 
genes of ASD as a whole, researchers should be searching for genes that predispose to 
different and distinct cognitive atypicalities in ASD. Therefore, it is important to know if ASD is 
characterised by a single or multiple cognitive atypicalities. Subsequently, Happé, Ronald, and 
Plomin (2006) proposed that the attempt to find a single cognitive account of ASD should be 
abandoned. Instead, different cognitive accounts that explain distinct symptoms of ASD should 
be sought (Happé, Ronald, et al., 2006), introducing the idea of a multiple cognitive deficit 
model of ASD. Accordingly, Pellicano, et al. (2006) examined the presence of multiple cognitive 
atypicalities in ASD. The results supported that not one but several cognitive deficits co-occur in 
ASD. 
The fractionated theory of ASD suggests that there is no single cause at the genetic, neural or 
cognitive level for the diverse symptoms of ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008). In addition, this 
theory suggests that the defining features of ASD are caused by different genes, associated 
with different brain regions, and related to different cognitive deficits. At the cognitive level, the 
fractionated theory suggests that multiple cognitive accounts may apply, instead of the 
traditional single cognitive deficit models of ASD, with each cognitive account explaining distinct 
symptoms of ASD. Therefore, the fractionated theory proposes a multiple cognitive deficit model 
for ASD, and Figure 1.4 illustrates two potential models within Mottron and Frith’s (1995) 
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framework that this theory could imply. Figure 1.4b illustrates a strong version of the 
fractionated theory in which distinct causes at the genetic and neural levels relate to distinct 
deficits at the cognitive level, and these are associated with distinct symptoms of ASD at the 
behavioural level. Figure 1.4a demonstrates a weaker version of the fractionated theory in 
which different causes at the genetic and neural levels relate to deficits at the cognitive level. 
The different cognitive deficits relate to distinct symptoms, as in the strong version, but a single 
cognitive deficit can explain more than one symptom domain, and more than one cognitive 
deficit can explain a single symptom domain. 
a) b) 
  
Figure 1.4. Representations of multiple cognitive deficit models (Happé & Ronald, 2008; Morton 
& Frith, 1995; Pennington, 2006). a) weak, and b) strong versions of the fractionated theory 
model (Happé & Ronald, 2008) 
Notes: Arrows represent a causal relationship between levels. A horizontal line is used to 
separate levels. Hypothesised origins, O, represent genetic and brain abnormalities. The struck 
out C represents a cognitive domain that is found in normal development but is deficient/absent 
in ASD. 
1.9 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of ASD. A description of how the 
disorder was historically defined and how it is currently classified at the behavioural level was 
provided. The causes of the disorder at the genetic, neural, and cognitive levels were also 
considered. Particular focus was given to three cognitive theories of ASD; theory of mind deficit, 
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executive function deficit and weak central coherence. These three cognitive theories will be the 
primary focus of this thesis. The chapter also discussed the history, empirical evidence and the 
neural basis for these cognitive theories, and the challenges made against these cognitive 
theories.  
The notion of single and multiple cognitive models was also introduced. Overall, the issue of a 
single versus a multiple cognitive deficit model for ASD is not resolved. However, it is unlikely 
that any single cognitive deficit is necessary and sufficient to cause ASD. A move to multiple 
cognitive deficit models of ASD is therefore warranted (Happé, Ronald, et al., 2006). The 
fractionated theory of ASD was briefly introduced, and will also be a primary focus of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the fractionation of ASD at the cognitive level, highlighting the 
predictions that the theory posits and the evidence for and against these predictions. 
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Chapter 2 Exploring the ‘Fractionation’ of Autism at the 
Cognitive Level 
This chapter is adapted from the published article: 
Brunsdon, V. E. A., & Happé, F. (2014). Exploring the 'fractionation' of autism at the cognitive 
level. Autism, 18(1), 17-30. 
Austim is defined by difficulties across a range of areas; social and communication difficulties 
and restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests. Chapter 1 provided an overview to ASD. 
The fractionated triad theory suggests that the triad of symptoms in ASD cannot be explained 
by a single cause at the genetic, neural, or cognitive level (Happé & Ronald, 2008). The present 
chapter reviews the evidence for a ‘fractionable’ autism triad at the cognitive level, highlighting 
questions for future research.  
2.1 Introduction 
Autism has for many years been diagnosed on the basis of the characteristic ‘triad’ of 
impairments; social deficits, communicative impairments, and restricted and repetitive 
behaviours and interests (RRBIs) (World Health Organisation, 1992). Although the latest edition 
of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) collapses social and communication 
symptoms into one domain (further discussed below), deficits across the three areas of the triad 
are still required for a diagnosis of ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’. Wing and Gould (1979) 
introduced the concept of the triad of impairments after finding that children with social 
impairments often exhibited communication deficits and impoverished imaginative play, with 
repetitive stereotyped behaviour.  
Based on Wing and Gould’s epidemiological data, it has long been assumed that the 
behavioural symptoms of ASD have common causes at the genetic, cognitive, and neural 
levels. However, Wing and Gould (1979) themselves noted that some children presented with 
only certain aspects of the triad. More recently it has been found that 10% of children in the 
general population present with just one impairment (defined as scoring in the most impaired 
5%) without co-occurring deficits in other parts of the triad (Ronald et al., 2006) and modest-to-
low phenotypic correlations between triad features have been reported in individuals with ASD 
CHAPTER 2: FRACTIONATION OF AUTISM AT COGNITIVE LEVEL 
 
50 
(Dworzynski, Happe, Bolton, & Ronald, 2009), and trait-wise in general population samples 
(Ronald, Happé, Price, Baron-Cohen, & Plomin, 2006). These findings have been taken to 
suggest that the triad of impairments is separable at the behavioural level, although this has 
been a matter of some debate. Work by Constantino and colleagues, for example, has 
suggested a single factor is sufficient to explain variation on the Social Responsiveness Scale 
(e.g., Constantino et al., 2004). However, more recent work by this group has supported a two 
factor solution, distinguishing social and communicative symptoms from rigid and repetitive 
behaviour (e.g., Frazier et al., 2012). In addition, twin studies have uncovered the relatively 
independent heritability of each of the three impairments of the triad (Robinson et al., 2012; 
Ronald et al., 2006; Ronald, Happé, Price, et al., 2006; Ronald, Larsson, Anckarsater, & 
Lichtenstein, 2011), suggesting that largely non-overlapping genes influence each part of the 
triad. These observations have led to the proposal of the ‘fractionable’ autism triad, a theory in 
which the social and non-social symptoms of ASD are suggested to have distinct causes at the 
genetic, neural, cognitive, and behavioural levels (Happé & Ronald, 2008; Happé, Ronald, et 
al., 2006). The purpose of the current chapter is to examine the proposal that autism is 
‘fractionable’ at the cognitive level. 
A range of cognitive accounts have been proposed to explain the symptoms of ASD and were 
discussed in Chapter 1. These theories posit either a primary deficit in the social domain (e.g., 
theory of mind, emotion processing, social motivation/reward) or in the non-social domain (e.g., 
executive dysfunction, weak central coherence, reduced top-down modulation). However, it is 
questionable whether any of these theories can account for the full triad of diagnostic features 
of ASD, let alone the associated features such as raised incidence of talents and uneven 
cognitive profile. For example, the theory of mind deficit hypothesis provides a good explanation 
for the social and communication impairments in ASD, but struggles to explain the non-social 
domain of ASD, such as RRBIs, motor problems, sensory abnormalities and savant skills. 
Conversely, non-social cognitive accounts of ASD provide a good explanation for the non-social 
aspects of ASD. For example, executive dysfunction in ASD may underlie RRBIs due to a 
failure to generate new behaviours or shift set. Additionally, a detail-focused cognitive style may 
account for ‘insistence on sameness’, narrow special interests and high rates of talent in ASD. 
Neither account, however, explains the specific pattern of intact and impaired social cognition 
(see Frith & Frith, 2010, for review). Consequently, Happé, Ronald, et al. (2006) proposed that 
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multiple cognitive accounts may apply, each explaining different parts of the ASD triad. This 
proposal makes a number of predictions (e.g. no one cognitive characteristic of ASD need be 
specific to ASD), but here we will focus on just two; (1) that performance on social and non-
social cognitive tasks should be relatively unrelated, and (2) that specific cognitive tests should 
relate differentially to distinct aspects of the triad of symptoms in ASD. 
This chapter reviews the evidence that cognitive functions are fractioned in ASD. First, the 
relative independence of cognitive functions will be explored. Second, published studies 
addressing the relation between cognitive tasks and symptoms in ASD will be summarised. 
Finally, a multiple cognitive deficit account of ASD, incorporating several cognitive functions, will 
be suggested to provide a better explanation for the complete profile of ASD.  
2.2 Prediction (1): Relationship among Putative Cognitive 
Characteristics of ASD 
While by no means the only cognitive theories of ASD, the ‘theory of mind’ (for review, see Frith, 
Morton, & Leslie, 1991), ‘Executive dysfunction’ (Hill, 2004) and ‘weak coherence’ (Happé & 
Booth, 2008; Happé & Frith, 2006) accounts are of sufficiently long-standing to have been 
examined empirically in relation to one another (introduced in Chapter 1). The fractionated triad 
account proposed that these three cognitive deficits/styles may be relatively independent and 
underlie different impairments in ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008). What is the state of the 
empirical evidence to date? 
2.2.1 Theory of Mind (ToM) and Executive Function (EF) 
In contrast to the prediction that cognitive deficits are independent, a link between theory of 
mind and executive function in ASD has been reported. Studies with children with ASD have 
reported positive correlations between false-belief tasks testing ToM and tasks measuring 
various aspects of EF, including the Luria Hand Game (Bigham, 2010), the Windows task 
(Russell, et al., 1991), the NEPSY Knock-Tap task (no correlations with 4 other EF tasks; 
(Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004), the Dimensional Change Card Sort task (Colvert, Custance, 
& Swettenham, 2002; Zelazo, Jacques, Burack, & Frye, 2002), the Wisconsin Card Sort Task, 
and the Tower of Hanoi (Ozonoff, et al., 1991). Ozonoff, et al. (1991) found that performance on 
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tasks measuring ToM and EF were related in ASD when controlling for IQ, although this 
correlation was not found in the control group. However, the ASD group exhibited a universal 
deficit in EF that was not apparent for ToM. Ozonoff et al.’s conclusion was that executive 
dysfunction is primary in ASD and is dissociable from ToM deficits, as the two deficits did not 
always co-occur. In contrast, Harris et al. (2008) reported that individuals with ASD who 
performed poorly on ToM performed poorly on EF tasks, and vice versa. In addition, Pellicano 
(2007) reported a significant correlation in an ASD group between a ToM composite and several 
components of EF (planning, set-shifting, and inhibition), independent of age and IQ. 
Furthermore, and contrary to Ozonoff et al’s original finding, EF and ToM were dissociable in 
one direction only; impaired ToM with intact EF.  
Pellicano’s (2007) findings offer insight into a possible developmental relation between ToM and 
EF in ASD. Russell (1996; 1997) suggested that EF is crucial for the development of ToM and 
that deficits in EF may lead to a failure to develop mental state understanding in ASD. This has 
been supported in a recent study in which EF (shifting and planning) contributed significantly to 
ToM in young children with ASD (Kimhi, Shoam-Kugelmas, Ben-Artzi, Ben-Moshe, & 
Bauminger-Zviely, 2014). In addition, Pellicano’s (2007) results showed that competent EF 
could be seen without ToM understanding. Examining the same cohort 3 years later, Pellicano 
(2010a) found that EF was longitudinally predictive of children’s ToM test performance. A 
relation in the opposite direction was not found. Pellicano’s work suggests that EF may be a 
prerequisite for ToM development and may also be critical in determining the developmental 
trajectory of children’s ToM.  
These findings do not support the fractionated theory of ASD, which predicts that the distinct 
cognitive impairments should be independent from each other. However, a number of points 
should be noted. First, correlational data do not speak directly to causation (Rutter, 2007), and 
two measures may show a relation due to, for example, general maturational factors at key 
developmental stages without any direct causal link. Second, cognitive tests are rarely ‘process 
pure’, and there is an important distinction to be made between correlations due to shared task 
demands, and correlations due to related underlying processes. For example, some ToM tasks 
(notably standard false-belief test) require inhibition of response based on own belief, and may 
therefore tap some aspects of EF as well as mental state attribution. Some EF tasks may also 
involve social elements; the Luria Hand Game (cited by Pellicano, 2007 as tapping inhibitory 
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control) may also tap the participant’s ability to infer the experimenter’s intentions so that the 
participant can produce the opposite action to the experimenter. Ozonoff (1995) showed that 
performance on a computerised version of the Wisconsin Card Sort Task showed less 
impairment in ASD than the traditional experimenter-presented version, again suggesting a 
possible social element to at least some standard EF tests. More recently however Williams and 
Jarrold (2013), using a more closely controlled experimental design, failed to find poorer 
performance on experimenter-administered planning and set-shifting tasks compared to 
computer versions of the same tasks in an ASD group.  
White (2013) has recently proposed, in place of executive dysfunction accounts of ASD, a 
‘Triple I impairment’; impairment in ‘Inferring Implicit Information’. White suggests that 
impairments on EF tasks are not in fact due to core executive dysfunction but instead 
secondary to mentalising difficulties, i.e., those with ASD have difficulties forming an explicit 
understanding of the experimenter’s expectations of the task, resulting in irregular behaviour 
and performance on only those EF (and other) tasks where inferring this information is 
essential. It may also be hypothesised that problems in reflecting on own mental states (part of 
the ToM impairment in ASD; Williams & Happé, 2009) may have secondary consequences for 
EF: for example, difficulties in imaginatively rehearsing possible future activities may lead to 
impaired planning. While Williams and Jarrold (2013) study disconfirmed one prediction made 
by the Triple I hypothesis (better ASD performance on EF tasks when computer- versus 
experimenter-administered), the authors maintain that ToM and EF may be indirectly linked via 
developmental effects of ToM on communication and subsequent inner speech. 
2.2.2 Central Coherence (CC) and ToM 
The relation between central coherence and cognitive deficits in ASD has been less widely 
studied. Some studies have found no links between tasks measuring central coherence (CC) 
and ToM (Happé, 1997; Pellicano, et al., 2006). A local processing bias and poor global 
processing have been observed in children with ASD, regardless of whether they pass or fail 
ToM tasks (Happé, 1994a, 1997). Burnette et al. (2005) found a link between verbal measures 
of CC and ToM ability but this was no longer significant once IQ was taken into account. A 
similar pattern of results was noted by Pellicano, et al. (2006) who found that correlations 
between performance in ToM and weak CC measures disappeared once age, verbal ability, and 
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nonverbal ability were accounted for. Only one study has described a relation between 
individual differences in ToM and weak CC task performance in ASD (Jarrold, Butler, 
Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000). These authors concluded that a ToM deficit may be the result of 
an inability to take a global view of social situations and a weak drive to integrate social 
information. It should, perhaps, be noted that Happé and Booth (2008) have suggested that 
weak CC may itself reflect two separable components that are often confounded in tests; 
increased local processing and decreased global processing. This raises the possibility that, for 
example, superior eye for detail is unrelated to ToM, but that reduced integration of information 
in context may have a detrimental impact on understanding social situations and accurately 
attributing mental states. 
There are a number of other theoretical accounts related to weak coherence, that posit only 
superior local processing, including Mottron et al.’s (2006) ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’ 
theory and Baron-Cohen’s ‘empathising-systemising’ hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 2009). The 
latter is relevant to the present discussion because systemising (the drive to discover and 
understand regular systems) is set in contrast to ‘empathising’ (understanding of social and 
emotional signals). In discussion of his model, Baron-Cohen typically portrays these social and 
non-social traits as orthogonal and independent. Though work from his lab on the effects of 
foetal testosterone suggests inverse effects on social-communicative functioning and visuo-
spatial and repetitive ASD traits (Auyeung, Taylor, Hackett, & Baron-Cohen, 2010). However, 
the correlation between performance on tests of empathising (e.g. Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes) and systemising (e.g. folk physics) has not been widely assessed in an ASD sample; 
Baron-Cohen, et al. (2001) did report a significant negative correlation in a small sample of boys 
with Asperger syndrome. 
2.2.3 CC and EF 
Lastly, executive dysfunction and weak coherence appear to be dissociable (Booth, et al., 2003; 
Pellicano, 2010b; Pellicano, et al., 2006). Pellicano, et al. (2006) found that good performance 
on CC measures was related to better performance on EF tasks in an ASD group, but that 
correlations were not significant once age and ability were co-varied, perhaps in part because 
the CC measures used (e.g. Pattern Construction Task) tapped visuo-spatial ability along with 
style. In addition, Booth, et al. (2003) compared boys with ASD and those with ADHD on a 
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drawing task examining both cognitive processing style and planning ability. Only boys with 
ASD were more detail-focussed than controls, but both ASD and ADHD groups showed 
planning impairments. Furthermore, poor planning ability did not predict a detail-focussed 
cognitive style. Booth and Happé (2010) also report results from a verbal test of coherence in 
the same ASD and ADHD groups. Here again, only ASD boys were characterised by detail-
focus (making more local sentence completions), while both ASD and ADHD groups showed 
response selection deficits on a Go No-Go task, and performance on the two tests was not 
significantly correlated. Research to date therefore suggests that weak coherence is 
independent of executive dysfunction, in line with the proposals of the fractionable triad account 
of ASD.  
Finally, Pellicano (2010a; 2010b) conducted the first prospective study to investigate the 
development of multiple cognitive atypicalities in ASD over a three year period. Group 
differences were reported; children with ASD showed difficulties in false-belief understanding, 
higher-order planning and cognitive flexibility at ages 4-7 years and 7-10 years old relative to 
typically-developing controls. Principal components analysis at time 1 yielded four factors, with 
ToM, CC and EF measures falling on separate factors – perhaps supporting in part a 
fractionable triad view. At time 2, however, only two factors emerged, with the ToM and EF 
tasks loading together and only the CC measures remaining distinct. Examining predictors of 
change over time, Pellicano found that change in ToM showed independent influence from EF 
and CC performance, while change in EF was not predicted by ToM or CC (over and above 
time 1 EF and general ability measures), nor was change in CC performance significantly 
predicted by ToM or EF measures. Thus the pattern of inter-relations was partly supportive of 
and partly counter to a fractionable triad view: while EF and CC emerged as relatively distinct, 
ToM and EF showed a significant concurrent (at time 2) and developmental relation. The 
relation between ToM and EF has also been much discussed and researched in the literature 
on typical development (e.g., Hughes & Ensor, 2007) and acquired neurological damage (e.g., 
Aboulafia-Brakha, Christe, Martory, & Annoni, 2011), with evidence of strong associations 
between task performance in the two domains. However, given the specific focus on ASD in this 
thesis, further discussion of this work is beyond the scope of the current chapter. 
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2.3 Prediction (2): Relations Between Cognitive Accounts and 
Behavioural Symptoms 
The fractionated triad theory of autism suggests that different cognitive functions may underlie 
the distinct symptom domains of ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008). This predicts that performance 
on, for example, ToM tests should relate most strongly to social-communicative symptoms, 
while executive dysfunction tests may correlate best with non-social repetitive behaviour, and 
CC measures may relate specifically to uneven cognitive profile, talents and narrow interests. 
However, surprisingly few studies have investigated whether different cognitive functions are 
differentially related to distinct parts of the ASD triad of impairments. Of course, the prediction of 
differential cognition-behaviour links rests on an assumption that significant correlations can be 
found between any cognitive tasks and everyday behaviours, symptoms or traits. Studies 
examining these links, and specifically those relevant to the differential links prediction of the 
fractionable triad hypothesis, are summarised in Table 2.1 and briefly reviewed below. 
  




Table 2.1. Published studies assessing cognitive domains in relation to symptom type and severity in autism spectrum disorder 






Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 
Theory of Mind 
Ames and 
White (2011) 
55 ASD (9 autism, 30 
AS, 16 ASD/PDD-
NOS); 48M, 7F, CA 




/ Theory of Mind Battery, 
Hayling Sentence 






Low ASD-social impairment group > high 
ASD-social impairment group on inhibitory 
control & ToM tasks (d= 0.55). 
ToM predicts social interaction in ASD 
(R
2
=.08), but not in ADHD group. 
Bennett et al. 
(2013) 
Time 1: 68 HFA; CA 
7, IQ>68, PIQ 86 
Time 2: 39 HFA; CA 
15 
Time 3: 35 HFA; 





Time 2: Reading the Mind 




Time 2 ToM predicts time 3 VABS 
Communication, controlling for language, 
but not Socialization. 
Frith, et al. 
(1994) 
24 autism; 17M, 7F, 
CA 15, MA 7, VIQ 52  
15 TD; 5M, 10F, CA 
4, MA 4, VIQ 93 
11 MLD; 7M, 4F, CA 
9, MA 5, VIQ 60 
DSM-III-R 
criteria 
/ 2 FB tasks 
(Groups divided into 
passers & failers). 
 
VABS ASD ToM-passers > ToM-failers on VABS 
Communication (d=0.63) & Socialization 
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30 ASD; 29M, 1F, CA 
10, VIQ 113, PIQ 111 
25 TD; 24M 1F, CA 








Face-Voice Battery for 
Children (CAM-C), Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes test 
Childhood Autism 
Spectrum Test (CAST) 











plus SCQ & 
SRS 
/ Theory of Mind Inventory Social Communication 
Questionnaire (SCQ), 
Social Skills Rating 
System – Parent, Social 
Responsiveness Scale 
(SRS) 
ToM scores X parent reported social skills 
correlated (r=.61), ToM scores X autism-
related social impairment negatively 
correlated (SCQ r= -.55, SRS r= -.75) 
Higher social skills & fewer autistic 






20 ASD (HFA or AS); 
all M, CA 12, FIQ 
108, VIQ 107, PIQ 
107 
18 TD; all M, CA 11, 







ToM: FB task, Strange 
Stories 
 
CC: Embedded Figures 
Test (EFT), Block Design, 
Sentence Completion Task 
CAST No correlation between ToM or CC tasks & 
ASD symptoms (r’s< .27). 
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25 ASD child; CA 13 
25 ASD child’s 
mother; CA 42 
25 ASD child’s father; 
CA 47 
28 TD child; CA 14 
28 TD child’s mother; 
CA 43 








ToM: Social Attribution task  Children:  






Pertinence index positively correlated with 
ADI-R social interaction (r=.27) & 
communication deficits (r=.39). 
Salience index negatively correlated with 
ADI-R (r=-.35) & communication deficits 
(r=.34). 
ToM Affective & Salience indices 
correlated with ADOS-G (Stereotypic and 
Limited interest items) (r=.51). 
White, et al. 
(2009) 
45 ASD (8 autism, 25 
AS, 12 ASD); 41M, 
4F, CA 9, VIQ 111, 
PIQ 98 
27 TD; 21M, 6F, CA 









Standard ToM battery; 11 
FB tasks & Penny-Hiding 
task, Strange Stories 
3Di ASD children with poor ToM had more 
severe social (d=0.83) & communication 





62 ASD; 47M, 15F, 
CA 9, FIQ 80 
ADI-R, 
ADOS-G 
/ Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System, 
ADI-R, ADOS-G Symptom severity does not predict 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 
Paul (2013) Developmental 
Neuropsychological 
Assessment, Behaviour 
Rating Inventory of 
Executive Functioning 
(BRIEF) 
score. Both PIQ & severity of ASD 






14 HFA; PIQ 107 
17 SLI; PIQ 99 
25 PLI; PIQ 105 
18 TD; PIQ 111 
SCQ & 
ADOS-G 
PIQ Two subtests from Test of 
Everyday Attention for 
Children (to measure 
inhibition) 
ADOS, SCQ, Children’s 
Communication 
Checklist 
No correlation between inhibition & 







61 HFA (31 autism, 
22 AS, 5 PDD-NOS); 
CA 10, IQ 100 






/ BRIEF Repetitive Behaviour 
Scale- Revised (RBS-R), 
Sensory Questionnaire 
 
Behaviour regulation correlated with 
repetitive behaviour (r=.43), not sensory 
impairments (r=.03). 
A diagnosis of ASD, lower age, higher 
scores on Sensory Questionnaire & BRIEF 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 
D'Cruz et al. 
(2013) 
41 ASD (22 autism, 
12 PDD-NOS, 7 AS); 
34M, 7F, CA 15, FIQ 
104, VIQ 102, PIQ 
105 
37 TD; 30M, 7F, CA 
18, FIQ 109, VIQ 








ADI-R, RBS-R Positive correlation between poor flexible 
behaviour & RBS-R total score (r=.34), 
ADI RRBI score (r=.37) and stereotyped, 
repetitive, or idiosyncratic behaviour (ADI-







50 ASD; CA 10 IQ 
102 






CA Generavity tasks: Animals 









Only correlations between communication 
impairments & animal fluency task scores 
(r=.42-.46). 
No correlation between generativity & 




23 ASD; 18M 5F, CA 
6.9, IQ 102 
20 TD; 15M, 5F, CA 





Dimensional Change Card 
Sort (DCCS), Children’s 
Memory Scale Numbers 
ADI-R, ADOS, Social 
Skills Rating System 
(SSRS), RBS-R 
ASD who passed DCCS had better social 
communication skills (SSRS; η=.27). No 
differences between passers/failers on 
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35 ASD (HFA or 
autism); 30M, 5F, CA 
10, IQ 104 
DSM-IV 
criteria 
/ BRIEF VABS BRIEF Initiate & Working Memory 
subscales negatively correlated with 
Communication (r=-.48; r=-.52) and 








89 ASD (34 autism, 
32 AS, 23 PDD-





/ BRIEF, Test of Everyday 
Attention for Children, 
Tower of London, Semantic 
Fluency 
ADI, ADOS EF tasks predict communication symptoms 
(semantic fluency: β=-.63; BRIEF: β=.30), 
social interaction symptoms (divided 
attention & working memory: β=-.44; 
semantic fluency: β=-.60) and RRBIs 






22 ASD; 5F, 17M, CA 
8, PIQ 98 
22 DLD; 5F, 17M, CA 












Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task,  Mazes subtest of 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale 
for Children, Revised 




30-min coded video of 
semi-structured play 




Lower EF scores predict higher 
frequencies & longer duration of 
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17 ASD; CA 29 







CA Delis-Kaplin Executive 
Function Scale, Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task 
ADOS, ADI-R, Gillam 
Autism Rating Scale, 
Aberrant Behavior 
Checklist-Community 
Cognitive flexibility, working memory, & 
response inhibition correlated with RRBIs 
(r=.63; r=-.56; r=.58, respectively). 
Planning & fluency not correlated with 
RRBIs (r=-.09; r=-.45, respectively). 
Together, cognitive flexibility, working 
memory, and response inhibition 
accounted for a significant proportion of 







17 autism; 10M, 7F, 
CA 5, NVA 12, VA 14 
13 DD; CA 4, NVA 12 
16 TD; 10M, 6F, CA 











TD:  VA 
Piagetian AB Error Task, 
Delayed Response Task, 




Social interaction & EF correlated (r=-.44), 
in part due to social interaction and joint 







60 ASD; 50M, 10F, 
CA 15, VIQ 100, 
NVIQ 101 








Penn Condition Exclusion 
Test 
ADI-R, ADOS Perseverative errors correlated with ADOS 
RRBI scores (r = .31), not related with 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 
and Mosconi 
(2015) 




18 ASD (13 autism, 5 
AS); 14M, 4F, CA 18, 
VIQ 110, PIQ 107, 
FIQ 109 
15 TD; 11M, 4F, CA 
20, VIQ 110, PIQ 





CA, IQ Visually-guided Saccade 
Task 
ADI-R Impairments in inhibitory control & higher-
order RRBIs positively correlated (r=.65), 





15 ASD; CA 8, PIQ 
71, MA 6 







ASD MA to 
TD CA 
Card Sort Task Gilliam Autism Rating 
Scale 
Perseverative errors correlated to 
stereotyped behaviours (r=.69). 
Perseverative errors not correlated to 
communication difficulties or social 






35 HFA; 26M, 9F, CA 




/ Card Sorting Tests, 
CANTAB 
Intradimensional/Extradime
nsional shift (ID/ED), 
Switch-in-series 
Checklist of 12 DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria, 
Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - 
Picture Arrangement, 
No correlations between EF tasks & social 
measures (social IQ r=-.31, social 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 










118 ASD; 102M, 16F, 






/ BRIEF ADOS No correlations between BRIEF subscales 
and ADOS. Autism severity did not add 
uniquely to variance of inhibition scale (all 
other subscale regression models were 
non-significant) 
Yerys et al. 
(2009) 
42 ASD (35 HFA, 7 
PDD-NOS); 33M, 9F, 
CA 10, FIQ 112 
84 TD; 65M, 19F, CA 





/ ID/ED ADI-R ID/ED & RRBI domain of ADI-R correlated 
(r= .43, FIQ partialled out). ID/ED & social 
or communication domain scores not 
correlated (social symptoms r=.19; 




19 ASD (15 AS, 2 
autism, 1 PDD-NOS; 
16M, 3F, CA 11, VIQ 
96, PIQ 95 
DSM-IV-TR CA, VIQ, 
PIQ 
Verbal Fluency Task, 
Concept Generation Task – 
Child Version, Rey Figure, 





Impairment in EF related to higher rates of 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 
17 OCD; 8M, 9F, CA 
12, VIQ 94, PIQ 96 
18 TD; 6M, 12F, CA 





Time 1: 31 HFA; 
26M, 5F, CA11 
16 TD; CA 11 
17 LD;  
Time 2 (15-19 
months): 23 HFA; 
19M 4F, VIQ 110, 
PIQ 110 
20 TD (12 TD + 6 LD 
+2 new LD); 15M, 5F, 
CA 11, VIQ 117, PIQ 
117 
 
DSM-IV VIQ, PIQ Block Design, Differential 







Australian Scale for 
Asperger Syndrome 
No correlations between CC tasks & ASD 
symptoms (no statistics stated). 
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29 ASD; 26M, 3F, CA 





/ EFT Childhood Routines 
Inventory, Short 
Sensory Profile 
Degree of RRBIs (r= -.39), but not sensory 
abnormalities (r= -.02), predict completion 















Performance on CC tasks not related to 
RRBIs (r’s< .27). 
Loth, et al. 
(2010) 
20 ASD (HFA or AS); 
all M, CA 12, FIQ 
108, VIQ 107, PIQ 
107 
18 TD; all M, CA 11, 








EFT, Block Design, 
Sentence Completion Task 
Childhood Autism 
Spectrum Test 
No correlation between CC tasks & ASD 
symptoms (r’s< .27). 
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21 ASD (19 autism, 2 
PDD-NOS); 19M, 2F, 
CA 5, MA 3, PIQ 95, 
VIQ 77 
21 TD; 16M, 5F, CA 






Preschool EFT, Differential 
Ability Scales - Pattern 
Construction 







21 ASD (all M), CA 
20, IQ 105 







Age, IQ Silhouette-to-Shape 
Matching task, Shape-
Integration task 
ADOS, SRS No correlations between task performance 
and social symptom severity. RT 
difference score and SRS-Social 







80 TD; CA 19, 56F 
 
/ Age & 
gender 
EFT (group divided by AQ 
‘social skills’ & 
‘details/patterns’ (either high 
or low)  
Autism Spectrum 
Quotient 
EFT scores: High social difficulty>Low 
social difficulty (d=.59). 
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19 ASD; 14M, 5F, CA 
15, VIQ 115, PIQ 
111, FIQ 114 
18 TD; 11M, 7F, VIQ 








EFT, Gestalt closure test ADOS, ADI-R, 
Repetitive Behaviour 
Interview, Yale Special 
Interests Interview 
No correlations between CC tasks & RRBI 
measures (r’s< .30). 
Teunisse, et 
al. (2001) 
35 HFA; 26M, 9F, CA 




 Children’s EFT, EFT, 
California Verbal Learning 
Test-Semantic and Serial 
Gradient, Visual Object and 
Space Perception Test - 
Object Recognition Tasks, 
Search-for-Difference Task 







No correlations between CC tasks & social 
measures (social IQ r= .00, social 





45 ASD; 41M, 4F, CA 
9, VIQ 111, PIQ 98 
27 TD; 21M, 6F, CA 
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Cognitive Tasks Symptom Measures Relevant Findings (with effect sizes) 





31 ASD (27 autism, 4 






/ 5 EF tasks; Word Span, 
Block Span, Day-Night, 
Knock-Tap, Tower 
ADOS ToM correlated with communication (r=-
.64), but not social symptoms or RRBIs 
when non-verbal mental age & language 
controlled for (r’s< .34). Language 
(R
2
=.33), ToM ability (R
2
=.28) and Tower 
score (R
2
=.05) predicts communication 
symptoms. Neither ToM nor EF accounted 
for additional variance in social interaction 
or repetitive behaviour symptoms. 
Pellicano, et 
al. (2006) 
40 ASD (30 autism, 
10 PDD-NOS); 35M, 
5F, CA 5.6, VIQ 101, 
PIQ 114 
40 TD; 31M, 9F, CA 















Developmental Test of 
Visual- Motor Integration 
ToM: 6 1st FB tasks, 2 2nd 
FB tasks. EF: Luria’s Hand 
Game, Mazes task, ToL, 
Set-shifting task 
ADI-R All cognitive tasks failed to correlate with 
either ADI-R total or domain scores. 
EFT & social domain (at 4-5 years) 
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45 ASD; 40M, 5F, CA 
5.6, VIQ 97, PIQ 113 
45 TD; 37M, 8F, CA 
5.4, VIQ 101, PIQ 
116 
Time 2 (3-years) 
37 ASD; 33M, 4F, CA 
8.4, VIQ 94, PIQ 104 
31 TD; 25M, 6F, CA 









PIQ (at time 
1) 
Time 1: 
ToM: 2 first-order FB 
tasks, 1 second-order FB 
task 
EF: Teddy-bear set-shifting 
task, Luria’s Hand Game, 
Mazes task 






ToM negatively correlated with social-
communication (r=-.42). EF negatively 
correlated with social-communication and 
RRBIs (both r=.42). CC not correlated (r< 
.21). 
EF predicts symptom severity (ADOS; 
R
2




Note: Cohen’s d, Pearson’s correlation coefficient r, and R
2
 are reported to convey effect sizes. Small, medium, and large effects for d are considered as 0.2, 0.5, 
and 0.8, respectively, and for r are considered as 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, respectively (Cohen, 1969). Small, medium, and large effects for R
2
 are considered as 0.01, 0.09 
and 0.25, respectively (Cohen, 1988). In the ‘Participants’ column, participant characteristics for ASD groups are reported first, followed by participant characteristics 
for any comparison groups. In order to group studies by cognitive domain, some papers appear more than once. 
Key: β: standardised regression coefficient; 3di: Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview; ADI: Autism Diagnostic Interview; ADOS: Autism Diagnostic 
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age in years; CC: central coherence; CELF: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; d: Cohen’s d; DD: developmental delay; DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders; EF: executive function; EFT: Embedded Figures test; F: females; FB: false-belief; FIQ: full-scale intelligence quotient; HFA: high-
functioning autism; ID: intellectually disabled; ID/ED: Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift; M: males; MA: mental age in years, MLD: moderate learning 
difficulties; NVA: non-verbal ability; OCD: obsessive compulsive disorder; PDD-NOS: pervasive developmental disorder – not otherwise specified; PIQ: performance 
intelligence quotient; PLI: pragmatic language impairment; r: correlation coefficient; R
2
: coefficient of determination; RBS: Repetitive Behaviour Scale – revised; 
RRBIs: restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests; SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire; SLI: specific language impairment; SRS: Social 
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2.3.1 ToM and ASD Symptoms 
Specific deficits in social cognition, specifically impaired ToM, are hypothesised to underlie the 
social and communicative symptoms that define ASD (see Tager-Flusberg, 1999). A number of 
studies have reported a relation between performance on ToM tasks and everyday social 
abilities in ASD. An early study by Frith, et al. (1994) found significantly better real-life social 
insight (e.g. ability to keep secrets, understand lies) in children with ASD who passed ToM tasks 
compared to those who failed. Four recent studies have supported and extended this finding. 
Lerner, et al. (2011) found that ToM ability was negatively correlated with ASD symptoms and 
social impairments and that fewer ASD symptoms significantly predicted higher ToM scores. 
Ames and White (2011) investigated the relation between ADHD-related behaviours in a sample 
of children with ASD and behavioural and cognitive impairments. Poorer performance on ToM 
measures was significantly related to social difficulties but not to ADHD-related behaviours. 
Shimoni, et al. (2012) found that performance on tasks measuring various aspects of ToM was 
related to social and communication impairments in ASD, as measured by the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Lecouteur, 1994). Finally, Bennett, et al. 
(2013) reported a significant association between ToM ability in late childhood with later 
communication skills in adolescence (when controlling for language ability in childhood). 
However, not all studies have found a significant relation between performance on ToM 
measures and everyday social ability in ASD. For example, Loth and colleagues found no 
significant relation between symptoms of ASD and ToM ability in a group of boys with ASD 
(Loth, et al., 2010). In addition, Bennett, et al. (2013) found no significant associations between 
ToM ability in late childhood with later social skills in adolescence. Overall, previous findings 
favour a link between ToM and social skills in ASD, but further studies are necessary to 
understand the somewhat mixed findings. 
2.3.2 EF and ASD Symptoms 
Executive dysfunction has been hypothesised to explain the restricted and repetitive behaviours 
and interests (RRBIs) observed in individuals with ASD. Difficulties in inhibiting inappropriate 
behaviour, shifting set, and generating appropriate new behaviours, have been hypothesised to 
underlie RRBIs (Turner, 1997). Several previous studies have investigated RRBIs in ASD in 
relation to specific executive processes. Turner (1995) found RRBIs were most strongly linked 
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to generativity deficits (e.g., verbal fluency) in a sample of young people with ASD. Mosconi, et 
al. (2009) reported that impaired inhibition of prepotent responses was related to increased 
severity of higher-order repetitive behaviours (e.g. compulsions) in ASD. Furthermore, inhibitory 
control was unrelated to social and communication symptoms, or sensorimotor behaviours. The 
same pattern was found for the EF domain of set-shifting; Yerys, et al. (2009) reported a 
significant correlation between set-shifting difficulties and repetitive behaviour (but not social or 
communicative symptoms) in ASD. South, et al. (2007) also found support for a link between 
cognitive flexibility and repetitive behaviours in children with ASD. In addition, behavioural 
flexibility has been recently reported to be related to RRBI behaviours but not to social or 
communication symptoms, in both high- and low-functioning ASD (D'Cruz, et al., 2013; Reed, et 
al., 2013). Taking a more comprehensive view of EF, Lopez et al (2005) noted that some 
specific executive processes (cognitive flexibility, working memory, and response inhibition) 
were highly related to RRBIs, whereas other executive processes (planning and fluency) were 
not significantly correlated with RRBIs in adults with ASD.  
Just as ‘EF’ is an umbrella term covering many dissociable components, the restricted and 
repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) diagnostic of ASD are a varied set. For example, 
Szatmari et al. (2006) found that RRBIs, as measured by the ADI-R, loaded onto two factors; 
insistence on sameness versus repetitive sensory and motor behaviours. It may be important to 
distinguish which aspects of RRBIs are correlated with distinct domains of executive 
dysfunction. LeMonda, et al. (2012) measured various aspects of EF in children with ASD and 
developmental language disorders. Lower EF scores predicted higher incidences and longer 
durations of motor stereotypies (e.g., hand flapping, rocking) in ASD only, when controlling for 
age, gender and parental education. On the other hand, Boyd, et al. (2009) found that EF 
correlated with RRBIs but not with sensory abnormalities. 
Not all studies have documented a significant relation between EF and RRBIs. Zandt, et al. 
(2009) assessed several executive processes and RRBIs in individuals with obsessive 
compulsive disorder and ASD. The only significant relation uncovered was between generativity 
and obsessions in the ASD group. Dichter, et al. (2009) also found no relation between 
generativity ability and severity of RRBIs, nor with subscales of higher- or lower-order repetitive 
behaviours. In contrast, they found that impaired generativity was related to communication 
impairments. In a different domain of EF, Bishop and Norbury (2005) did not find an association 
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between inhibition and any of the three symptoms domains of ASD. Failure to find a significant 
relation between executive processes and specific symptoms of ASD may in some cases reflect 
limited sample size and hence statistical power (e.g., Teunisse, et al., 2001). In addition, there 
is currently no single task or battery of tasks to cover comprehensively all aspects of EF, and 
different findings may reflect different task or domain selection (see, for example, White’s 
division of EF tasks according to implicit ToM demands, discussed above).  
While executive dysfunction has been hypothesised to explain RRBIs in ASD, it may also be 
relevant to everyday social interaction. Social interactions likely tax many aspects of EF, such 
as initiation of social approach, flexibility in social response, attention to social cues such as 
facial expressions, inhibition of socially inappropriate behaviour, and keeping social networks or 
different individuals’ mental states in working memory. In support of this, a link between EF and 
social communication skills has been described in young children with ASD (McEvoy, et al., 
1993). A more comprehensive study was undertaken by Kenworthy, et al. (2009) to investigate 
the link between EF and the three symptoms domains of ASD. A composite of scores from the 
ADI-R and the ADOS was used to characterise the three symptom domains and performance in 
multiple aspects of EF was examined. Correlation and regression analyses indicated that 
semantic fluency and divided attention were related to social symptoms, semantic fluency was 
related to communication symptoms, and cognitive flexibility was related to RRBIs, after 
accounting for verbal ability and age. This study shows the potential for the executive 
dysfunction account to expand beyond explaining RRBIs to include social and communication 
symptoms. The applicability of these results to everyday adaptive behaviour has been explored 
by Gilotty, et al. (2002); initiation of behaviour and working memory were found to be related to 
impairments in social interaction and communication. Thus, some specific elements of EF may 
have a special relation with social and communication impairments in ASD. 
2.3.3 CC and ASD Symptoms 
The weak central coherence theory of ASD, describing detail-focus and difficulty integrating 
information in context for meaning (Frith, 1989), was proposed to explain ‘insistence on 
sameness’, narrow interests, uneven cognitive profile, and perhaps sensory abnormalities and 
savant skills (Happé & Vital, 2009). However, as detailed below, studies that have investigated 
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the association between a detailed-processing style and the symptoms of ASD have produced 
mixed results. 
Chen, et al. (2009) found a link between a detail-focused processing style in the visual domain 
and degree of repetitive behaviour in children with ASD. However, there was no relation 
between detail-focused processing and sensory processing abnormalities. They concluded that 
sensory processing is a lower-level process and so cannot be directly compared to performance 
on higher-level CC tasks. Loth, Gomez, and Happe (2008) used sensitivity to context-
appropriateness in a change blindness paradigm to tap CC, and found a moderate but only 
marginally significant relation (r = -.49) between ADOS RRBI scores and differences in change 
detection as a function of context in an ASD sample. Other studies have found no relation 
between several measures of repetitive behaviours and CC measures in both children with ASD 
(South, et al., 2007) and typically-developing children (Drake, et al., 2010). In general, there is a 
surprising paucity of studies, considering the theoretical appeal of the weak CC account in 
explaining restricted and repetitive behaviours in ASD – perhaps reflecting the relative lack of 
research on non-social (compared to social/communicative) aspects of ASD.  
Happé and Frith (2006) have specifically limited the explanatory scope of the weak CC account 
to the non-social features of ASD. However, detail-focus may also have interesting implications 
for social and communicative functioning in ASD (e.g., Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005; 
Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2008). Social interactions involve the integration of discrete 
cues in context to understand social situations. For example, face-processing and (context-
dependent) communication may involve the integration of local details (e.g., facial features) in 
context. An association between detailed-processing bias and social impairments in 
‘neurotypical’ undergraduates has been reported (Russell-Smith, et al., 2012). However, weak 
coherence has been reported to be unrelated to several measures of social symptoms in ASD 
samples (Burnette, et al., 2005; Teunisse, et al., 2001). For example, Morgan, et al. (2003) 
found no relation between measures of CC and social or communicative skills (e.g., joint 
attention and pretend play) in children with ASD aged three to five years. 
2.3.4 ToM, EF and CC in Relation to ASD Symptoms 
Only a handful of studies have considered multiple cognitive deficits in relation to the 
behavioural symptoms of ASD. For example, amongst a sample of pupils receiving extra 
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support with learning, Best, Moffat, Power, Owens, and Johnstone (2008) found that ToM, weak 
CC, and EF, all contributed significantly and independently to the prediction of behavioural 
indicators of ASD (measured by the Social Communication Questionnaire). Only three studies 
have specifically investigated the relation between test performance in all these cognitive tasks 
and the symptoms domains in individuals with ASD. In Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) 
study, the ADOS was used to measure symptom severity in children with ASD, and ToM and EF 
tests were administered. Limited relations were found between the two cognitive tasks and 
symptom severity in ASD, and relations could be largely accounted for by language ability. 
However, ToM ability and higher-level EF were significantly related to the severity of 
communication symptoms in ASD, while reciprocal social interaction and RRBIs were relatively 
independent. Additionally, in Pellicano, et al.’s (2006) study, children with ASD completed the 
ADI-R as a measure of symptom severity, and were administered a similar battery of tasks to 
measure CC, ToM and EF. Contrary to Joseph and Tager-Flusberg’s (2004) findings and their 
own predictions, the three cognitive profiles failed to correlate with any of the three symptom 
domains of ASD.  
Pellicano (2013) examined whether early cognitive skills could predict later behavioural 
symptoms of ASD as measured by the ADOS and Repetitive Behaviour Questionnaire at a 3-
year follow-up. ToM was negatively associated with social-communication skills and EF was 
strongly associated with both social-communication skills and repetitive behaviours. Specifically, 
early EF, not ToM ability, predicted the degree of social-communication impairment and 
repetitive behaviours, thus elucidating the important role of EF in influencing the behavioural 
symptoms of ASD. This very recent study conflicts with the fractionable triad approach as 
specific cognitive functions were not found to be uniquely associated with distinct ASD 
symptoms. Instead, Pellicano has suggested that there is unlikely to be one-to-one mapping 
between cognition and behaviour, and that different environmental interactions may affect the 
way in which cognition influences behaviour, and vice versa. 
2.4 Towards a Multi-Faceted Cognitive Account of ASD: Questions 
and Future Directions 
Single cognitive deficit models of ASD have attempted to reduce the varied behavioural 
symptoms of the condition to a single underlying cognitive deficit. These single deficit models 
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predict strong inter-correlation between performance on tests of ToM, EF and CC. The present 
review of the existing evidence suggests significant relations between ToM and EF, with some 
evidence of independence of CC from these abilities. The evidence on relations between 
cognitive test performance and real-life behaviour or symptoms is patchier, and it is interesting 
to speculate why test-symptom correlations are often non-significant. Clearly, one of the factors 
that interposes between individuals’ underlying cognitive deficits or style and their behaviour or 
symptoms is their background of compensatory skills. The pattern of symptoms will reflect both 
the degree of impairment or cognitive style atypicality, and the alternative resources and 
abilities that the individual can bring to bear in order to compensate for, circumvent or alleviate 
those difficulties. While these will include measurable factors such as IQ and language abilities, 
they may also reflect differences in environment, intervention, memory, or attention. Johnson 
(2012) has proposed differences in EF as particularly important in compensatory skills. This 
might provide one explanation for the association found between ToM and EF in the work 
reviewed above. Work is needed to disentangle the effects of compensation, perhaps by 
contrasting implicit (e.g., ‘anticipatory gaze’, see Senju, et al., 2009) and explicit ToM task 
performance in relation to EF abilities in ASD. 
Among other areas requiring further research is examination of developmental effects (e.g., 
Pellicano, 2013). What might we hypothesise about the relative fractionation of the triad across 
development? On the one hand, even primarily distinct abilities or traits might be hypothesised 
to become more inter-correlated with age, due to downstream effects. For example, even if 
reduced global integrative processing and ToM have independent origins, a child’s tendency to 
interpret stimuli in a context-independent fashion might have developmental effects on their 
social skills; interaction might be sensitive to mental states but not to different contexts. 
Similarly, a child with poor inhibitory skills might be poorly tolerated by peers, have reduced 
social learning opportunities and develop less accurate social insight. On this view, studies with 
younger age groups will show clearer fractionation of symptom domains than studies with older 
groups.  
However, the opposite hypothesis might also be proposed. Neuro-constructivist theories, and 
accounts of brain development postulating ‘interactive specialisation’, might suggest greater 
definition (‘modularisation’; D'Souza & Karmiloff-Smith, 2011) of many cognitive abilities with 
age. Patterns of brain activation during some cognitive tasks become more specialised and 
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focal with age, and one might therefore predict greater differentiation of skills and cognitive 
functions with increasing age. Further longitudinal studies are needed to test which of these two 
predictions is correct.  
Previous studies have used correlational analyses to assess the degree to which cognitive 
deficits and behavioural symptoms are associated (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Pellicano, 
2010a; Pellicano, et al., 2006). However, these types of analyses cannot provide evidence of a 
direction of causality. Confirmatory factor analysis may be useful in assessing the underlying 
structure of the behavioural symptoms. Path analysis could be implemented to assess the 
degree of relation between cognitive processes and behaviour. More complex statistical 
methods could also be implemented to provide a more parsimonious approach, such as latent 
class analysis and factor-mixture modelling. These statistical techniques have the potential to 
provide additional information about cognitive and behavioural subtypes of ASD. For example, 
Georgiades et al. (2013) used factor-mixture modelling to suggest that the two ASD symptom 
domains of social-communicative impairments and RRBIs may be independent. The differing 
symptom profiles of severity suggested support for the existence of three homogeneous 
subgroups of ASD. Hypothetically, differing cognitive deficits may underlie the symptom profiles 
of these three subgroups of ASD. Additional analyses, such as latent growth modelling, could 
also be used to explore cognitive functioning across development and its altering relations with 
ASD symptoms using a longitudinal framework. These analyses could help test the multiple 
cognitive deficit model or fractionated triad theory of ASD. 
The present chapter has been concerned with studies of ASD, but clearly of relevance to the 
fractionated triad account is the existence of other clinical groups in whom deficits in just ToM, 
just EF or just CC can be documented (see Happé & Ronald, 2008, for discussion). The new 
DSM-5 includes a new category of Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder, aimed in part at 
capturing those individuals who may have social and communication problems without RRBIs. It 
will be interesting and important to see how this influences research and to discover whether 
ToM, EF and/or CC are affected in such individuals. 
If, as the fractionated triad account suggests, ASD is caused by different genes, neural patterns 
and cognitive components that influence distinct behavioural symptoms, then it is possible that 
intervention can target particular aspects of ASD while leaving other aspects valued by ASD-
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self-advocates untouched. Understanding the fractionable or monolithic cognitive underpinnings 
of the autism phenotype has the potential to be both theoretically and practically informative. 
2.5 The Present Thesis 
From the review presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that very few studies have 
considered multiple cognitive deficits in relation to the behavioural symptoms of ASD. In 
addition, many previous studies have used correlational analyses to assess the degree to which 
cognitive domains are inter-related and their associations with the behavioural symptoms of 
ASD. It was suggested that further statistical methods could also be implemented to provide a 
more parsimonious approach, and this thesis endeavours to explore the predictions proposed 
using more complex statistical methods. 
The data that is examined in this thesis originated from the Twins Early Development Study 
(TEDS) where one or both children met diagnostic criteria for ASD. A subsample of adolescents 
took part in the Social Relationship (SR) study, which is described, along with measures, in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 attempts to address the prevalence of multiple cognitive atypicalities in 
children with ASD, their unaffected co-twins and a control group. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate 
the predictions of the ‘fractionated triad’ theory that were presented in the current chapter; that 
1) cognitive atypicalities are relatively independent from one another and that 2) different 
cognitive atypicalities underlie the distinct symptom domains of ASD. Chapter 7 examines the 
heritability of these cognitive atypicalities and the genetic and environmental overlap between 
cognitive atypicalities and ASD using genetic model-fitting analyses. Chapter 8 acknowledges 
the heterogeneity present within ASD and examines if different subgroups can be found within 
ASD, based on behavioural symptoms, and whether these subgroups differ in terms of age, 
gender, IQ, diagnosis, cognitive profiles, and comorbid symptoms. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
All of the analyses presented in the empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4 to 8) utilise 
data collected as part of the Social Relationship (SR) study. This chapter therefore provides 
more in-depth information about the SR study, including participant selection recruitment and 
diagnostic assessments, the battery of cognitive tasks, a subset of the questionnaires and the 
general procedure. 
3.1 Participants 
Participants were part of the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS), a population-based 
longitudinal study of all twins born in the UK between 1994 and 1996. The 12,054 families 
involved at the start of TEDS were reported to be representative of UK families (Haworth, Davis, 
& Plomin, 2013). An initial contact questionnaire gathered general background information 
about the twins and their family. Subsequently, families have returned information at 2, 3 and 4 
years, at 7, 8 and 9 years, and at 10, 12, 14 and 16 years, with 18-year data collection under 
way. Various subsets of the initial sample have since been assessed by post, telephone, in-
person or using web-based assessments to gather information about the twins’ language, 
cognitive, and social development.  
The Social Relationships Study (SR study) focused on those TEDS families with one or both 
twins meeting diagnostic criteria for ASD (see Figure 3.1 for a flow diagram to illustrate the 
sample selection procedure). Twins ‘at risk’ of ASD were identified a) from a parental report of 
an ASD diagnosis directly to TEDS (via phone at any point or by ticking boxes about diagnoses 
on postal questionnaires) and/or b) elevated scores on the Childhood Autism Spectrum Test 
(CAST) (Scott, Baron-Cohen, Bolton, & Brayne, 2002) at age 8 (data available from 8,941 
TEDS families). 210 families reported a previous ASD diagnosis in at least one twin, and an 
additional 202 families had at least one child who scored above cut-off for suspected ASD on 
the CAST (≥15). Of these 412 families, 330 families were contactable and consented to take 
part in the second stage of screening. Families completed the ASD module of the Development 
and Wellbeing Assessment (DAWBA) (Goodman, Ford, Richards, Gatward, & Meltzer, 2000) 
via a telephone interview. This identified 203 families with at least one child who met DAWBA 
criteria for an ASD and so were invited to take part in the SR study. To address possible 
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selection bias and selective attrition in TEDS, a mail-out to child psychiatrists across the UK and 
advertisements through the National Autistic Society and the Twins and Multiple Births 
Association, were carried out to find any additional twin pairs with ASD born between 1994 and 
1996. This yielded an additional five twin pairs. Informed parental consent was obtained from 
129 families to complete a home visit, including diagnostic and cognitive testing; other families 
were not traceable or did not consent to in-person assessments. The 129 families who took part 
were comparable to those eligible for participation (i.e., CAST≥ 15 or suspected ASD) but who 
did not take part for CAST score (p = .14), socioeconomic status (p = .25) and zygosity (p = 
.23), with the exception of gender as more girls were in the ‘high CAST/suspected ASD group’ 
(36%) than the final sample (17%) (Colvert, et al., 2015). Twins in the ASD families who did not 
meet criteria for ASD comprised the unaffected co-twin group in the following thesis. 
Participants were diagnosed with ASD using gold-standard diagnostic instruments; the ADI-R 
(Lord, et al., 1994) and the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000). Additional cut-offs devised by the Autism 
Genetic Resource Exchange (AGRE) were implemented to identify family members with more 
subtle ASD symptoms and assigned cases to ‘ASD’ (AGRE categories Autism and ‘Not Quite 
Autism’), ‘Broad Spectrum Disorder’, and ‘unaffected’. A ‘broad spectrum’ diagnosis was 
permitted for the ADOS and corresponded to just below cut-off for diagnostic criteria for an ASD 
on the ADOS (-2 points). Participants were classified using available information (ADI-R, ADOS, 
DAWBA). In 37% of the ASD sample (N = 89), the ADI-R and the ADOS classifications were 
inconsistent. For these cases, diagnostic consensus was reached by a team of clinicians. One 
twin pair was excluded from analyses since neither twin reached diagnostic cut-off for ASD, but 
CAST score >12 rendered them unsuitable for inclusion in the control sample. Children were 
also excluded if there was knowledge of circumstances that may have affected the accuracy of 
diagnosis (N = 2). For analyses in the following chapters, ASD diagnoses and broad spectrum 
diagnoses were combined to create one ASD group to cover the complete autism spectrum 
from severely impaired individuals through to those with more subtle impairments. In the ASD 
group, 141 adolescents were diagnosed with ASD and 40 adolescents met the definition for a 
broad spectrum diagnosis. An unaffected co-twin group was also created consisting of 73 co-
twins without an ASD or broad spectrum diagnosis. 
A comparison control sample with CAST scores less than 12 was recruited via TEDS and 
matched to the ASD sample on gender, age, IQ, social economic status and zygosity. 80 control 
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twin pairs were recruited, making a total of 209 families visited in their homes by a team of two 
trained researchers.  
The ASD group contained 181 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 150 males), the unaffected co-
twin group contained 73 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 27 males) and the control group 
contained 160 adolescents (12 years, 10 months; 110 males).  
 
 
Table 3.1 provides further information regarding the age, IQ, gender, zygosity, ADI and ADOS 
of the ASD, co-twin, and control group. 
There was a significant difference between groups (ASD, co-twins, control) in age (F(2,411) = 
32.20, p < .001, η
2
 = .135). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the control group was 
significantly younger than both the ASD and co-twin groups (p < .001). There were significant 
differences in IQ across groups (F(2,411) = 28.23, p < .001, η
2
 = .121). Overall, the ASD group 
(M = 90.02) had a significantly lower IQ score than both the co-twin group (M = 104.76, p < 
.001) and the control group (M = 101.91, p < .001). There were no significant differences on 
scores for IQ between the co-twin group and control group (p = .476). 
  




Figure 3.1. Social Relationships study (SR study) sample selection stages and the overall 
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Table 3.1. Participant characteristics 
 




3.2.1 Diagnostic Measures 
3.2.1.1 The Childhood Autism Spectrum Test (CAST) 
The CAST is an informant-completed questionnaire based on behavioural descriptions of ASD 
as delineated in ICD-10 and DSM-IV. The 31 items are scored yes/no and summed; a cut-off 
score of 15 or above is reported to have 100% sensitivity, 97% specificity and a positive 
predictive value of 50% for a diagnosis of ASD (Williams et al., 2005). Parents completed the 
CAST when their twins were 8 years-old. A cut-off score of 15 was used to identify children at 
risk for ASD. In the first stage, children identified at risk of ASD were contacted to enrol in the 
SR study for further assessments. 
3.2.1.2 The Developmental and Well-being Assessment (DAWBA) 
Telephone interviews using the ASD-module of the DAWBA were used at the second stage of 
SR study enrolment and included 15 questions about social difficulties, 14 about repetitive, 
restricted behaviours and interests and three about developmental language milestones 
(Dworzynski, et al., 2009). A child received a DAWBA diagnosis of autism when the operational 
criteria in DSM-IV and ICD-10 were met. Asperger's diagnosis was given when parent reports 
indicated that all autism criteria were met but the child's early language development was not 
delayed and the child's intellectual ability was in the normal range. ASD (other) diagnosis was 
assigned if parents reported a minimum of three probable or two definite symptoms from the 
social difficulties domain, two probable or one definite symptom from the communication 
domain, and two probable or one definite symptom from the RRBI  domain. Children who were 
assigned a diagnosis of autism/ASD/Asperger syndrome on the DAWBA were further assessed 
during home visits using the ADI-R and ADOS (described below). 
3.2.1.3 Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R) 
The ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994) is a well-established standardised assessment tool for ASD 
conducted as a semi-structured caregiver interview enquiring about current function and 
developmental history (93 items). The ADI-R is carried out in-person and takes two to three 
hours to complete. There are 111 items to assess the developmental history and current 
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behaviour of the individual being evaluated and focuses on three main aspects; 
language/communication, reciprocal social interaction, and RRBIs. Most items are scored from 
0 (no impairment) to 3 (severe impairment) and scoring algorithms were used to create three 
different totals in communication, social interaction and RRBIs. For a diagnosis of autism based 
on the ADI-R, individuals must meet cut-offs in all three ADI domains and must meet the age of 
onset criteria (< 36 months). Additional cut-offs devised by the Autism Genetic Resource 
Exchange (AGRE) were implemented to identify family members with more subtle ASD 
symptoms and assigned cases to ‘ASD’ (AGRE categories Autism and ‘Not Quite Autism’), 
‘Broad Spectrum Disorder’, and ‘unaffected’. 
3.2.1.4 Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 
The ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) is a well-validated, semi-structured observational assessment 
and is considered a gold-standardised diagnostic tool alongside the ADI-R in ASD diagnosis. A 
trained examiner observed the child’s response to a social interaction with an unfamiliar adult, 
and also used a series of interview-style questions. The ADOS provides behavioural information 
about a participant’s reciprocal social interaction, language and communication, and RRBIs. 
This behaviour was then coded to create a diagnostic algorithm score to identify autism and 
ASD using clinical cut-offs (Gotham, et al., 2007). ASD and autism were combined to create 
one ASD category. A ‘broad spectrum’ diagnosis was also permitted for the ADOS and 
corresponded to just below cut-off for diagnostic criteria for an ASD on the ADOS (-2 points). 
The ADOS includes four modules dependent on the participant’s language ability and 
chronological age. In the SR study, 133 participants completed Module 3 (for verbally fluent 
children), 1 participant completed Module 2, and 14 participants completed Module 1. Each 
ADOS assessment lasted approximately 30 to 50 minutes. 
3.2.1.5 Best-Estimate Consensus Diagnosis 
Best-estimate diagnoses were assigned, blind to zygosity and co-twin diagnostic status, 
following review of all available information (ADI-R, ADOS, DAWBA, clinical reports). When all 
available sources of information were in agreement, cases were assigned to that category. In 89 
cases the diagnostic classifications across instruments were inconsistent. In these cases all 
available data were assessed by clinical experts and consensus best-estimate diagnoses were 
assigned on the basis of this review. 
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3.2.2 Questionnaire Measures 
After the home visits, parents and the twin pairs were asked to complete a questionnaire 
booklet. Only the measures relevant to this thesis are described here. 
3.2.2.1 Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire 
The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; Goodman, 1997) is a brief behavioural 
screening questionnaire completed by parents (N = 186) for children and adolescents aged 4- to 
16-years-old. It consists of 25 statements, such as “Restless, overactive, cannot stay still for 
long” and allows the parent to indicate 2 (“certainly true”), 1 (“somewhat true”) or 0 (“not true”) 
(some items reverse coded as per scoring criteria). The SDQ contains 5 subscales with 5 items 
for each subscale; emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity, peer problems, and 
pro-social behaviours. The total difficulties score (20 items) indicates normal (0-13), borderline 
(14-16), and abnormal behaviour (17-40). Subscale scores can also indicate normal, borderline, 
and abnormal behaviours in that specific domain (see http://www.sdqinfo.org/). A self-report 
version of the SDQ was also completed (N = 165) and asked about the same 25 items, but the 
wording was slightly different (Goodman, Meltzer, & Bailey, 1998). This self-report version is 
deemed suitable for 11- to 16-year-olds (Goodman, Meltzer, & Bailey, 1998). 
3.2.2.2 Revised Children’s Anxiety and Depression Scale 
The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale (RCADS; Chorpita, Yim, Moffitt, Umemoto, & 
Francis, 2000) is a 47-item questionnaire evaluating children’s anxiety symptoms with 
subscales including; separation anxiety disorder, social phobia, generalised anxiety disorder, 
panic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and major depressive disorder. The subscales 
yield a Total Anxiety Score (sum of the 5 anxiety subscales) with subclinical (t-score 60-69) and 
clinical cut-offs (t-score≥70). The current study did not include the subscale for major depressive 
disorder (10 items) due to its similarity with the SMFQ. The informant rated the items 0 
(“never”), 1 (“sometimes”), 2 (“often”), or 3 (“always”), based on the last three months (RCADS-
Child N = 164). A parent version of the RCADS was also used (N = 178), which assessed the 
parent’s report of their twins’ symptoms of anxiety across the same 5 subscales.  
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3.2.2.3 Short Mood and Feelings Questionnaire 
The Short Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (SMFQ; Sharp, Goodyer, & Croudace, 2006) 
evaluates children’s depressive symptoms and focuses on affective and cognitive symptoms. It 
asks how the child has been feeling or acting in the past two weeks and contains 13 items. The 
informant (SMFQ-Parent; N = 182; SMFQ-Child; N = 158) rated each item as 0 (“not true”), 1 
(“somewhat true”), or 2 (“certainly true”) to gain an overall total score (maximum = 26). Two of 
the items in the SMFQ were the similar to two items from the SDQ, and so each item was only 
asked once within the SDQ. Clinical cut-offs for the SMFQ-Parent (score ≥ 9) and SMFQ-Child 
(score ≥ 8) were based on Thapar and McGuffin (1998) suggestions. The total score from the 
SMFQ-Parent was used to index depression. 
3.2.2.4 Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994; Bagby, Taylor, & 
Parker, 1994) was developed as a self-report measure of the alexithymia construct. It consists 
of 20 items representing 3 factors; difficulty identifying feelings (7 items), difficulty describing 
feelings (5 items) and externally-oriented thinking (8 items). In the current study, only 19 items 
were administered, which excluded one item from ‘Difficulty Describing Feelings’ (“It is difficult 
for me to find the rights words for my feelings”). The items were rated by the respondent on a 5-
point Likert scale. The respondent was either the child (N = 71) or the parent (N = 86). 
Responses were totalled (range = 0-95) to provide a continuous variable.  
3.2.2.5 Short Sensory Profile 
The Short Sensory Profile (SSP; McIntosh, Miller, Shyu, & Dunn, 1999) is a 38-item 
questionnaire that identifies sensory problems in the tactile, taste/smell, movement and 
visual/auditory domains as well as under-responsiveness and sensory seeking behaviours in 
children via parental report. Items are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘never’ (scored 5) to 
‘rarely’ (4), ‘occasionally’ (3), ‘frequently’ (2), and ‘always’ (1). All SSP scores were reverse 
coded so that higher scores reflected greater levels of sensory abnormalities. 
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3.2.3 Cognitive Task Battery 
The cognitive tasks were chosen as they were deemed appropriate for the age range and ability 
level of the participants. They provide a comprehensive assessment of a full range of cognitive 
abilities in individuals and are sensitive to cognitive deficits which have previously been 
described in individuals with ASD. 
3.2.3.1 IQ 
Intellectual ability was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an estimated score for IQ. Fourteen nonverbal adolescents 
completed the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) and the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scales-Revised (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Pintillie, 1997) to 
obtain an estimated score for verbal and performance IQ. To include the low IQ individuals in 
the subsequent analyses, the 14 nonverbal children were given a provisional WASI full-scale IQ 
score of 49 (1 point below the lowest possible score on the WASI). The current study used the 
Block Design subtest as a measure of CC. Therefore, the two-subtest version of the WASI 
(includes Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary) was used as an estimate of IQ. 
3.2.3.2 Central Coherence Tasks 
Six tasks designed to measure central coherence were administered.  
3.2.3.2.1 Embedded Figures Test 
A modified version of the Embedded Figures Test was used (EFT; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & 
Karp, 1971), including seven items from the children’s version of the task (Children’s Embedded 
Figures Test, CEFT; all ‘house’ shape items: 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14) and eight items from Form A 
of the standard EFT (items 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12; Witkin et al., 1971) with one practice item 
before each set. Items were administered in numerical order, with the CEFT preceding the EFT. 
Participants were first shown a simple shape on a laminated sheet that remained in view. They 
were told that they would see a picture with the simple shape hidden in it and that the hidden 
shape would be the same size and shape as the simple shape. Timing began as soon as the 
complex shape was revealed and ended when the participant had found the simple shape 
(either by pointing or stating their success). To check that they were correct, participants were 
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then required to show the figure’s location using a transparent acetate sheet with the simple 
figure printed on it. If they were incorrect, the participant was encouraged to look again and 
timing was resumed. A maximum of 60 seconds was allowed per search and a failure was 
recorded if the correct response was not given within this time. 
Accuracy and reaction times (to the nearest second as measured on a stopwatch) were 
recorded. Accuracy was calculated by summing the total of correct items in both the CEFT and 
standard EFT with a maximum score of 15. Reaction times were calculated for correct trials only 
(White & Saldana, 2011).  
3.2.3.2.2 Block Design Task 
The Block Design Task was a subtest from the WASI that is used to measure perceptual 
organisation and general intelligence. The stimuli consisted of nine two-colour cubes and a set 
of 13 printed two-dimensional geometric patterns. Each cube (block) had two white sides, two 
red sides, and two half-red, half-white sides. The printed design patterns progressed in difficulty 
from simple designs requiring two cubes, to more complex designs requiring nine cubes. 
The participant first completed two practice trials, in which the experimenter constructed two 
four-block designs, and the participant was then required to replicate the design. If they were 
incorrect, then the experimenter repeated the demonstration and the participant had a second 
attempt. If the participant failed at the second attempt, then a two-block design was 
administered. 
The participant then completed 10 block designs in a fixed order according to the WASI Block 
Design procedure. The experimenter began timing after saying the last words of instructions 
and stopped when the participant indicated that they had finished the item. If the participant 
indicated that they had finished, and then realised that they had made an error, they were able 
to correct the design within the specified time limit. Once the participant had completed a 
design, then the blocks were scrambled and the next design was presented. 
The experimenter recorded the accuracy of each construction (according to the scoring criteria 
in the WASI manual) and the time to complete the design in seconds. There was a time limit of 
60 seconds for four-block designs and 120 seconds for nine-block designs. An error was 
recorded if the participant failed to construct the block design within the time limit. 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
92 
3.2.3.2.3 Fragmented Pictures 
The stimuli used were line drawings of an apple, a book, an elephant, a kite and a snowman 
(taken from Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). Each object had eight levels of degradation, from 
total degradation (frame 1) to full view (frame 8). Participants were instructed to identify each 
picture at the most degraded level possible. The mean average frame at which each participant 
correctly identified the pictures was then calculated.  
However, this task was not used in analyses in this thesis due to large amounts of missing data 
(N = 196). 
3.2.3.2.4 Homographs Reading Test 
The Homographs Reading Test was based on Happé (1997) procedure. The stimuli consisted 
of 16 test sentences and a set of 13 pre-test single words that included the homographs. Each 
test sentence appeared on a separate A4 page, printed across a single line (landscape 
orientation). Four of the original five homographs from Happé (1997) were used (tear, row, lead, 
and bow). 
Participants were first asked to read aloud 13 pre-test single words which included the 
homographs (e.g., tear, read, lead, and bow) to assess reading ability and familiarity with the 
homographs. Following this, the participant was presented with 16 test sentences. The test 
sentences contained four different conditions; frequent pronunciation before context (e.g., 
“There was a big tear in her eye”), frequent pronunciation after context (e.g., “Molly was very 
happy, but in Lilian’s eye there was a big tear”), rare pronunciation before context (e.g., “There 
was a big tear in her dress”), and rare pronunciation after context (e.g., “The girls were climbing 
over the hedge. Mary’s dress remained spotless, but in Lucy’s dress was a big tear”). The test 
sentences were presented one at a time in a fixed, pseudo-random order with no two 
homographs presented consecutively. The participant was required to read aloud the written 
test sentence and the pronunciation of the homograph and any self-corrections made by the 
participant were recorded. The participant also completed a post-test in the form of a picture-
vocabulary test to assess the participant’s knowledge of each homograph.  
Participants had to demonstrate that they knew all meanings and pronunciations for at least two 
of the four homographs on the post-test for their results to be considered valid. The overall total 
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number of homographs pronounced appropriately in each condition was calculated (maximum = 
4). The total number of homographs pronounced appropriately before context was calculated 
(before context total; maximum = 8) by adding the two conditions; frequent pronunciation before 
context and rare pronunciation before context. The total number of homographs pronounced 
appropriately after context was calculated (after context total; maximum = 8) by adding the two 
conditions; frequent pronunciation after context and rare pronunciation after context. An overall 
effect of context was then calculated (effect of context = after context total minus before context 
total). 
3.2.3.2.5 Planning Drawing Task, Part A 
The Planning Drawing Task was adapted from Booth, et al. (2003). Participants were required 
to copy a picture of a house and snowman, presented in that set order. The participant was 
shown a picture and told “this is a picture of a [house/snowman] that I drew earlier. I want you to 
draw a picture of a [house/snowman] like mine”. The picture was then left in view of the 
participant. The drawing process was videotaped for later analysis and the experimenter noted 
the first feature drawn and the order that the features were drawn.  
The participants were scored on three aspects of the drawings for a detail-focused style; the 
initial features drawn (local feature = 2, ‘in-between’ = 1, global feature/outline = 0), the 
fragmentation of the drawing (fragmented = 2, some fragmentation = 1, no fragmentation = 0), 
and the configuration of the drawing (poor final configuration = 2, some configuration = 1, good 
configuration = 0). These scores were then summed to create an overall weak coherence score 
(maximum = 12). 
3.2.3.2.6 Sentence Completion Task 
The Sentence Completion Task, as described in Booth and Happé (2010), consisted of ten 
sentence stems plus five control sentences. The task began with a practice sentence: “He 
cleaned up the mess with a brush and…”. Ten test sentence stems were then presented to the 
participants, which were designed to produce a conflict between making an appropriate global 
completion or a locally cued response. Participants were instructed to complete a sentence that 
the experimenter started, e.g., “The sea tastes of salt and …”, with a local response being 
“pepper”, and a correct global response being “seaweed”. Five control sentence stems were 
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also included that did not produce a local-global conflict for their completion (e.g., “A vet cares 
for cats and…”). These control sentences were interspersed with test sentences in a set order 
for all participants. Sentence completions could be a single word or a phrase. Responses were 
written down by the experimenter and audio taped for later scoring.  
An error score was calculated based on scoring criteria developed by Booth (2006). Scoring 
was based on participants’ initial response. A 3-point scoring system was used; 0 for a globally 
meaningful completion within 10 seconds; 1 for no response, a response delay greater than 10 
seconds, or an ‘odd’ response that was not a local completion; 2 for a local completion that was 
not meaningful in the context of the whole sentence. The error score was then summed to give 
a total error score out of 20 for the ten test sentences. 
3.2.3.3 Executive Function Tasks 
Four tasks designed to measure different aspects of executive function were administered, 
providing measures of planning (Planning Drawing task), mental flexibility (ID/ED), mental 
initiation (Letter Fluency Task), and inhibitory control (Luria Hand Game). 
3.2.3.3.1 Letter Fluency (FAS) Task  
The Letter Fluency Task followed Turner’s (1999) procedure. Participants were required to 
generate as many different words as possible beginning with the letters F, A, and S. For each 
letter, the participant was given 30 seconds and was instructed not to use proper nouns or 
repeat the same word with different endings. The mean number of correct responses was 
calculated. 
3.2.3.3.2 Luria Hand Game  
The Luria Hand Game was used to assess inhibitory control (see Hughes, 1996, for procedure). 
The participant was told that they were going to play a hand-game and were asked to copy the 
experimenter’s hand gestures. Firstly, the experimenter and participant placed their hands 
behind their backs. The experimenter than produced either a fist or pointed a finger and the 
participant was required to copy the experimenter’s hand gesture. When the participant had 
successfully imitated three points and three fists, then the experimenter introduced the test 
condition. The experimenter told the participant that if the experimenter made a fist, then the 
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participant was to point their finger, and if the experimenter pointed their finger, then the 
participant was to make a fist. The test condition was discontinued when the participant 
successfully completed five consecutive trials, with a maximum of ten trials. A total score was 
calculated by totalling the number of initial correct responses from the test condition and 
dividing it by the number of trials that the participant completed, then multiplying this number by 
ten. 
3.2.3.3.3 Intra-/Extra-Dimensional (ID/ED) Shift Task 
The ID/ED task (from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery) was 
presented on a computer and followed Hughes, et al. (1994) procedure. There were a maximum 
of nine stages (Table 3.2). On each trial, two test stimuli were presented in one of four boxes 
(top, bottom, right or left of the screen). The participant was told “One of these patterns is 
correct, and one of the patterns is wrong. Have a guess at which pattern is correct”. They were 
then told to keep choosing one of the two stimuli and the correct choice followed a rule that 
changed occasionally. Participants were given feedback in the accuracy of their responses, with 
the box turning green if the correct choice was made, and a red box if the choice was incorrect. 
The criterion for progressing on to the next stage was a run of eight correct choices within 50 
trials. The rule reversed on trial 2, 5, 7 and 9 and the number of errors was recorded. This was 
used to create the mean number of reversal errors. 
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Table 3.2. The nine stages in the ID/ED task. 







Shape Shape A 
2 Simple reversal Shape A 
Shape B 
Shape Shape B 
3 Compound 
discrimination 
Shape A adjacent to Line A  
Shape B adjacent to Line B 
Shape Shape B 
4 Compound 
discrimination 
Line A superimposed on Shape A 
Line B superimposed on Shape B 
Shape Shape B 
5 Compound 
reversal 
Line A superimposed on Shape A 
Line B superimposed on Shape B 
Shape Shape A 
6 Intradimensional 
shift 
Line C superimposed on Shape C 
Line D superimposed on Shape D 
Shape Shape C 
7 Intradimensional 
reversal 
Line C superimposed on Shape C 
Line D superimposed on Shape D 
Shape Shape D 
8 Extradimensional 
shift 
Line E superimposed on Shape E 
Line F superimposed on Shape F 
Line Line E 
9 Extradimensional 
reversal 
Line E superimposed on Shape E 
Line F superimposed on Shape F 
Line Line F 
3.3.1.1.1 Planning Drawing Task, Part B 
Part B of the Planning Drawing Task immediately followed Part A. When the drawing from Part 
A was complete, the original and the copy of the picture were removed. Another blank sheet of 
paper was provided and the participant was told “now I want you to draw another picture of a 
[house/snowman], but this time draw it with [four windows/teeth]”. The drawings were then rated 
and given an allowance score based on the degree of advanced planning that was evident to 
accommodate the additional features. Two points were given when a clear and effective 
allowance was made (e.g., extra spacing), one point for some allowance but not enough to 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
97 
prevent the drawing from appearing cramped, and zero points for no allowance. A total 
allowance score (0 - 4) was then calculated for each participant. 
3.3.1.2 Theory of Mind Tasks 
3.3.1.2.1 Penny Hiding Game  
The Penny Hiding Game procedure followed the original procedure introduced by Baron-Cohen 
(1992). This task tests the ability of the participant to deceive the experimenter and depend on 
self-awareness and mentalising ability. This game is a two-person game, in which the 
participant is a guesser in the first condition and a hider in the second condition. The hider hides 
a penny in either their right or left hand, and the guesser guesses which hand the penny is 
hidden in. In the first condition, the experimenter was the hider and the participant was the 
guesser. The roles changed in the second condition; the participant was the hider and the 
experiment was the guesser. The number of errors or tricks the participant used in the second 
condition was noted (see Baron-Cohen, 1992, for description of errors and tricks). The errors 
recorded were; both hands were not kept out of sight whilst holding the penny, only one hand 
was used, hand(s) were open, told where the penny is, or a display error (the penny was hidden 
but can tell where it is, i.e., by grip). The game was discontinued after four trials if the participant 
displayed no tricks or errors, with a maximum of six trials. The total number of errors across 
trials was calculated.  
3.3.1.2.2 Triangles Animation Task  
The stimuli were developed by Abell, et al. (2000). Participants watched short silent cartoons 
(34 to 45 seconds) depicting one large red and one small blue triangle moving about on screen 
within an enclosure. The current study only used the theory of mind (ToM) movement 
sequences; surprising, coaxing, mocking, and seducing. These sequences showed one triangle 
reacting to the other triangle’s mental state. For example, in the coaxing sequence, the big 
triangle is seen to coax the little triangle out of the enclosure. The triangles within the ToM 
sequences can be identified as people, for example, mother and child. Participants were then 
required to tell the experimenter what had happened in each cartoon. 
Accuracy of response was coded as 0, 1 or 2 (maximum = 8). A response was scored as 2 if the 
response met the intended meaning of the animation, with 1 scored for a partially accurate 
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response. Intentionality of response was coded 0 through to 5 (maximum = 20). A score of 4 or 
5 was given for responses that included mention of psychological states and so were classified 
as mentalising. Responses that mentioned interaction between the triangles, with no mention of 
mental state, were classified as interaction and given a score of 3. Responses that only 
described a simple action with no mention of interaction of mental states, was classified as an 
action and was given a score of 0. A total mentalising score (maximum = 4) was calculated by 
scoring 1 if participants scored 4 or 5 on the intentionality score (maximum = 5), only if an 
accurate description (a score of 1 or 2) was given. A mentalising score of 0 was given if 
participants scored 0 to 3 on intentionality score or if their responses were inaccurate. This 
method of scoring was used as children with ASD have been previously shown to provide 
mentalising descriptions to ToM animations as frequently as typically-developing 8-year-olds, 
but these mentalising descriptions were found to be inappropriate as compared to typically-
developing 8-year-olds (Abell, et al., 2000). This method of scoring therefore takes this finding 
into account. 
3.3.1.2.3 False-Belief Stories 
Participants were told four separate false-belief stories; “Pencil-Box”, “Sally-David”, “Chocolate” 
(Figure 3.2) and “Seaside” (Figure 3.3). All of the stories contained a first-order false-belief 
question, and the Chocolate and Seaside stories each contained a second-order false-belief 
question. However, as so few participants completed Sally-David (N = 41), it was not used in 
the analyses in the thesis. Participants scored 0 for a false-belief question if they were incorrect 
or if they were incorrect on the control questions. Participants were rarely correct on the false-
belief question and incorrect on the control questions (N = 10 for first-order false-belief; N = 23 
for second-order false-belief). Participants scored 2 for a false-belief question if they answered 
correctly and were also correct on the control questions. A first-order false-belief score 
(maximum = 6) and a second-order false-belief score (maximum = 4) were totalled (maximum = 
10). 
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Part A. First-Order False-Belief 
“This is Mary and her brother John. Their Grandad has given them some chocolate to share. 
‘Put it away now’ says Grandad, ‘You can have it when Mum says so’. John & Mary go inside 
and put the chocolate in the fridge. Then they go out to play in the garden. Later, John comes in 
for a glass of water. He goes in the fridge and sees the chocolate. He wants to keep the 
chocolate all for himself, so he takes the chocolate out of the fridge and puts it in his bag.” 
First-order question: Where does Mary think the chocolate is? 
Control question: Where has John put the chocolate really? 
Part B. Second-Order False-Belief 
“But look, Mary is playing by the window and she sees John putting the chocolate in his bag! 
John is so busy hiding the chocolate that he doesn’t see Mary watching him through the 
windows. Later, Mum comes to call John and Mary for tea. She says they can have some 
chocolate now. John and Mary come running into the kitchen” 
Second-order question: Where does John think Mary will look for the chocolate? 
Reality question: Where is the chocolate really? 
Memory question: Where was the chocolate first of all? 
Figure 3.2. Chocolate story from false-belief stories 
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Part A. First-Order False-Belief 
“This is Susan and her friend Tom. They are planning a trip to the seaside in Brighton and can 
go by either train or bus. The day before their trip they go to the train station to check train times 
and the bus station to check the bus times. The bus journey takes much longer so they decide 
to catch the 9:00 train the next morning. Susan tells Tom that she will meet him at his house the 
next morning so they can walk to the train station together.” 
Memory question: How are Tom and Susan planning to travel to the seaside? 
Reality question: Where have Tom and Susan agreed to meet? 
“The next morning, Tom decides to go to the station early to buy the tickets, because he is 
worried that the queue at the ticket office will be very long. However, when he arrives he 
discovers that all the trains to Brighton have been cancelled.” 
Reality question: Does Tom know the trains have been cancelled? 
First-order question: Does Susan know the trains have been cancelled? 
 
Part B. Second-Order False-Belief 
“Tom decides to go straight to the bus station to check if it is possible to buy bus tickets for the 
journey to the seaside. As she is getting ready to leave the house, Susan sees on the news that 
the trains have been cancelled.” 
Control question: Does Susan know the trains have been cancelled? 
“She walks over to Tom’s house and rings the bell. Tom’s mum tells Susan that Tom left early to 
buy the tickets to the seaside.” 
Second-order question: Where does Susan think Tom has gone to buy the tickets? 
Justification question: Why does she think that? 
Reality question: Where has Tom really gone to buy the tickets? 
Memory question: How did Tom and Susan originally plan to travel to the seaside? 
Figure 3.3. Seaside story from false-belief stories  
  




Home visits took place from 2007 to 2009 and were made to all ASD and control families by two 
trained researchers. The ASD families completed two home visits, which lasted approximately 
six hours in total. The ASD families completed gold standard diagnostic assessments; the 
ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) and the ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994). The control families completed one 
home visit, which lasted approximately two hours. Both the ASD and control families completed 
an extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, language ability, central coherence, executive 
function and theory of mind ability. The batteries were administered in a counterbalanced order 
with two fixed orders of tasks. The order of these tasks is shown in Figure 3.4. A different 
experimenter assessed each participant within the twin pair in order to reduce possible 
experimenter bias.  
After the home visits, parents and the twin pairs were asked to complete a questionnaire 
booklet, including questions about their behaviours, anxiety, mood and feelings, emotions, and 
sensory behaviours. Parents were also asked to give information about their child’s health and 
family history. The same parent completed the questionnaire booklet for both twins. A complete 
list of measures used in the SR study can be found in Appendix 1.  
  






Figure 3.4. A flowchart to illustrate the order of the measures in SR study 
Abbreviations: ADOS = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; BPVS = British Picture 
Vocabulary Scales; CELF = Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals; ID/ED = Intra-
/Extra-Dimensional Shift Task; WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
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Chapter 4 Exploring the Cognitive Features in Children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder, Their Co-Twins, and Typically-
Developing Children within a Population Sample 
This chapter has been published as the article: 
Brunsdon, V. E. A., Colvert, E., Ames, C., Garnett, T., Gillan, N., Hallett, V., Lietz, S., 
Woodhouse, E., Bolton, P., & Happé, F. (2015). Exploring the cognitive features in children with 
autism spectrum disorder, their co-twins, and typically-developing children within a population-
based sample. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 56, 893-902. 
  




Background: The behavioural symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are thought to 
reflect underlying cognitive deficits/differences. The findings in the literature are somewhat 
mixed regarding the cognitive features of ASD. The present study attempted to address this 
issue by investigating a range of cognitive deficits and the prevalence of multiple cognitive 
atypicalities in a large population-based sample comprising children with ASD, their unaffected 
co-twins, and typically-developing comparison children. 
Methods: Participants included families from the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS) 
where one or both children met diagnostic criteria for ASD. Overall, 181 adolescents with a 
diagnosis of ASD and 73 unaffected co-twins were included, plus an additional 160 comparison 
control participants. An extensive cognitive battery was administered to measure IQ, central 
coherence, executive function, and theory of mind ability. 
Results: Differences between groups (ASD, co-twin, control) are reported on tasks assessing 
theory of mind, executive function, and central coherence. The ASD group performed atypically 
in significantly more cognitive tasks than the unaffected co-twin and control groups. Nearly a 
third of the ASD group presented with multiple cognitive atypicalities. 
Conclusions: Multiple cognitive atypicalities appear to be a characteristic, but not universal 
feature, of ASD. Further work is needed to investigate whether specific cognitive atypicalities, 
either alone or together, are related to specific behaviours characteristic of ASD.  
  




Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a developmental disorder characterised by impaired social 
interaction and communication, and restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour and interests 
(RRBIs) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). These behavioural symptoms are thought to 
reflect underlying cognitive deficits/differences, which have been extensively researched (see 
Brunsdon & Happé, 2014, for review). Findings to date have been somewhat mixed, perhaps 
due to methodological factors and the inherent heterogeneity within the autism spectrum. The 
current study attempts to address this issue by investigating a range of cognitive atypicalities in 
a large population-based sample comprising children with ASD, their co-twins, and typically-
developing comparison children (termed ‘controls’). 
Cognitive accounts of ASD can be broadly divided into domain-specific and domain-general 
theories. Domain-specific theories situate the primary deficit in social processing. Prominent 
amongst these is the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) deficit account, which explains the social and 
communication impairments of ASD as resulting from difficulty representing mental states (e.g., 
Frith, et al., 1991b). This account has been influential in psychological research, neuroimaging 
and intervention, although the universality and specificity of ToM deficits has been questioned 
(Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998). Whether ToM deficits are primary or result 
from earlier abnormalities of social orienting or social motivation is also a topic of much debate 
(Dawson, et al., 2005; Jones, et al., 2008). 
Domain-general accounts of ASD propose that the primary deficit/difference is not in social 
cognition specifically but lies in, for example, ‘executive functions’ (EF; Hill, 2004). Executive 
dysfunction in ASD has been proposed to underlie RRBIs due to a failure to generate new 
behaviours or shift set. Executive dysfunction has also been hypothesised to explain 
social/communicative deficits (Kenworthy, et al., 2009). 
A number of domain-general accounts suggest areas of superior processing or differences in 
cognitive style, such as ‘weak central coherence’ (CC) (Frith, 1989; Happé & Booth, 2008; 
Pellicano, 2010a), a bias towards featural processing and reduced configural processing. 
Superior local processing, but accompanied by intact global processing, is also proposed by 
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‘enhanced perceptual processing’ (Mottron, et al., 2006), ‘systemising’ (Baron-Cohen, 2009) 
and enhanced discrimination (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001) accounts of ASD. 
Traditionally, cognitive accounts of ASD have attempted to explain parsimoniously both socio-
communicative impairments and RRBIs as resulting from a single underlying deficit/difference. 
However, more recently it has been suggested that multiple cognitive accounts may apply, with 
each explaining distinct symptoms of ASD (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Happé & Ronald, 2008; 
Happé, Ronald, et al., 2006). Thus, ASD might be seen as the result of a combination of 
cognitive deficits or atypicalities, with ToM deficits explaining socio-communicative features, 
executive dysfunction explaining RRBIs, and detail-focus (e.g., CC) explaining uneven cognitive 
profile and assets. Previous work has been limited in its scope to examine this hypothesis as 
most studies have investigated a single cognitive domain, with the notable exceptions of studies 
by Pellicano (Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano, et al., 2006) and Charman et al. (2011). 
The aim of this study was to address the mixed findings in the literature regarding the cognitive 
features of ASD and to investigate the prevalence of multiple cognitive atypicalities in ASD. 
Previous studies, which have reported mixed findings, have typically had sample sizes of 15 to 
40 individuals with ASD, and have often given tests of only one area of cognition. We aimed to 
test weak CC, EF and ToM in the same large sample of individuals with ASD. Mixed findings 
may also reflect differences in sample selection and recruitment (e.g., through specialist clinics, 
special schools, parent volunteers). We therefore tested a population-based sample, identified 
as meeting diagnostic criteria for ASD from a longitudinal study of all twins born in the UK in 
1994-6. In addition, we assessed along with the ASD twins, their unaffected co-twins, who may 
be expected to share some (subclinical) traits or cognitive characteristics, according to family 
studies of the ‘broader autism phenotype’ (Hughes, Plumet, & Leboyer, 1999). Therefore, the 




The ASD group contained 181 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 150 males), the unaffected co-
twin group contained 73 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 27 males) and the control group 
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contained 160 adolescents (12 years, 10 months; 110 males). Table 4.1 provides further 
information regarding the age, IQ, gender, zygosity, ADI and ADOS scores of the ASD, co-twin, 
and control group. 
There was a significant difference between groups (ASD, co-twins, control) in age (F(2,411) = 
32.20, p < .001, η
2
 = .135). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that the control group was 
significantly younger than both the ASD and co-twin groups (p < .001). There were significant 
differences in IQ across groups (F(2,411) = 28.23, p < .001, η
2
 = .121). Overall, the ASD group 
(M = 90.02) had a significantly lower IQ score than both the co-twin group (M = 104.76, p < 
.001) and the control group (M = 101.91, p < .001). There were no significant differences in IQ 
scores between the co-twin and control groups (p = .476). 
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Table 4.1. Participant characteristics 
 




4.4.2.1 Intellectual Ability 
Intellectual ability was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
(Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an estimated score for IQ. Fourteen nonverbal adolescents 
completed the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, et al., 1998) and the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scales-Revised (BPVS) (Dunn, et al., 1997) to obtain an estimated score for 
verbal and performance IQ. To include the low IQ individuals in the subsequent analyses, the 
14 nonverbal children were given a provisional WASI full-scale IQ score of 49 (1 point below the 
lowest possible score on the WASI). The current study used the Block Design subtest as a 
measure of CC. Therefore, the two-subtest version of the WASI (includes Matrix Reasoning and 
Vocabulary) was used as an estimate of IQ. 
4.4.2.2 Cognitive Task Battery 
The measures (with the targeted components), key variables, number of trials, and reference to 
procedure are shown in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2. Battery of cognitive tasks used in Social Relationship Study (SR study) by cognitive 
domain with references to studies describing task procedure  
 




Home visits were made to all ASD and control families by two trained researchers. The ASD 
families completed two home visits, which lasted approximately six hours in total. The ASD 
families completed gold standard diagnostic assessments; the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) and 
the ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994). The control families completed one home visit, which lasted 
approximately two hours. Both the ASD and control families completed an extensive cognitive 
battery to measure IQ, language ability, CC, executive function (EF) and ToM ability. The 
batteries were administered in a counterbalanced order with two fixed orders of tasks. A 
different experimenter assessed each participant within the twin pair in order to reduce possible 
experimenter bias.  
4.5 Results 
All twins were treated as singletons in the present analyses to allow comparisons between 
groups of adolescents with ASD (termed ASD group), unaffected co-twins, and a control group. 
The reaction time from Embedded Figures Test (EFT), total error score in the Sentence 
Completion Task, the coherence score and planning score from the Planning Drawing Task, 
reversal errors in ID/ED, and errors in Penny Hiding Game were reflected so that a higher score 
indicated better performance in all tasks. 
Preliminary data analyses indicated that some of the data did not meet assumptions of a normal 
distribution. Data from six of the cognitive measures were skewed (value > 2) and data from 
four of the cognitive measures had a leptokurtic distribution (value > 3). All variables were 
normalised using a Van der Waerden transformation. 
Pearson’s correlation analyses were carried out to investigate if age and IQ were related to 
performance on cognitive measures. For all groups, age was not significantly correlated with 
cognitive measures, except for Block Design Task performance in the ASD and control groups 
(ASD: r = -.24, p < .01, controls: r = -.44, p < .001). In the ASD group, IQ was significantly 
related to performance on most cognitive measures (12/13, all rs > .21, all ps < .01), except for 
Homographs Reading Test (r = .14, p = .094). Correlational analyses revealed fewer significant 
relationships between IQ and performance on cognitive measures for the unaffected co-twin 
group (2/13 measures) and the control group (4/13) as compared to the ASD group. Therefore, 
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IQ-adjusted standardised residuals for cognitive task performance were used in all further 
analyses (unless otherwise stated). The standardised residuals for the ASD and co-twin group 
are obtained from the regression line fit when fitting each cognitive measure as a dependent 
variable in a linear model with IQ as a predictor variable, according to the control group 
(Thomas, et al., 2009). 
Table 4.3 shows the mean performance (raw scores) for each CC, EF, and ToM measure by 
group. One-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) to investigate group differences (ASD, co-twins, 
controls) in cognitive task performance are reported in Table 4.3, with post-hoc comparisons 
using Tukey tests. Figure 4.1 shows the mean performance of the ASD group and the 
unaffected co-twin group relative to the control group on all cognitive measures.  
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Table 4.3. Performance on cognitive measures for ASD and comparison groups (raw scores) 
and group differences for cognitive measures (transformed scores) 
 




Figure 4.1. Performance on cognitive measures assessing a) central coherence, b) executive 
function, and c) theory of mind, for all groups after accounting for IQ.  
Scores are presented as z-scores relative to the control group. Error bars show standard error. 
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Due to the heterogeneity in cognitive performance within the ASD group, means may not fully 
reflect performance across the groups. To compare performance further, frequencies were 
calculated for atypical performance on each cognitive measure. Atypical performance was 
defined as one standard deviation above (EFT and Block Design Task only) or below (all other 
tasks) the control group mean. The number of cognitive tasks on which participants performed 
atypically is shown in Table 4.4. Results indicated that 63% of individuals with ASD performed 
atypically in three or more cognitive measures, compared to 31% of unaffected co-twins and 
23% of controls. The ASD group performed atypically on significantly more tasks than the 
unaffected co-twin and control groups; F(2,385) = 36.28, p < .001, η
2
 = .159; post-hoc Tukey 
tests ps < .001. The unaffected co-twin group and control group did not differ in the number of 
tasks performed atypically (p = .279). 
Table 4.4. Number (percentage) of individuals with ASD, their unaffected co-twins, and controls 




We examined how many individuals showed atypicalities across the cognitive domains, by 
totalling the number of participants performing one standard deviation above (EFT and Block 
Design only) or below the mean on at least one measure in each cognitive domain. Figure 4.2 
shows how many individuals with ASD, unaffected co-twins and controls had no cognitive 
atypicalities, single cognitive atypicality, dual cognitive atypicalities, or multiple cognitive 
CHAPTER 4: COGNITIVE FEATURES IN ASD AND TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
116 
atypicalities. The CC domain showed the highest proportion of individuals with atypical 
performance solely in that domain, perhaps due to more tasks assessing this aspect of 
cognition. The most frequently co-occurring cognitive atypicalities were in the CC and EF 
domains. Furthermore, there was a significant relationship between group (ASD, unaffected co-
twin, control) and presence of multiple cognitive atypicalities (Χ
2
 (2) = 41.20, p < .001); the ASD 
group showed the highest proportion of multiple cognitive atypicalities (32% of ASD group) 
compared to the unaffected co-twins (11%) and control groups (6%). 
  




Figure 4.2. Venn diagrams showing the number and percentage of participants a) in the ASD 
group, b) the unaffected co-twin group, and c) the typically-developing control group, with 
atypical performance (1 S.D. above/below control group mean) in the three cognitive domains.  
The central region indicates atypicalities in all three cognitive domains. 
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In the ASD group, correlation analyses indicated that the number of cognitive atypicalities was 
related to the severity of ASD symptoms (as measured by ADOS calibrated severity scales 
[ADOS-CSS]; (Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2009), r = .27, p = .001.  An ANOVA revealed a 
significant difference in the severity of ASD symptoms (ADOS-CSS) according to the number of 
cognitive atypicalities (none, single, dual, multiple), F(3,153) = 3.39, p = .020, η
2
 = .062, with 
Tukey post-hoc comparisons indicating significantly more severe symptoms in ASD individuals 
with  multiple atypicalities (M = 6.75) compared to ASD individuals with no cognitive atypicalities 
(M = 4.50, p = .026). 
4.6 Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the pattern of cognitive atypicalities in ASD in a 
population-based sample to clarify the mixed findings in the literature. Group differences on a 
cognitive battery devised to assess ToM, EF and CC and the prevalence of multiple cognitive 
atypicalities were reported for individuals with ASD, their unaffected co-twins, and comparison 
typically-developing individuals. The patterns of results from the group comparisons are 
discussed in this section. 
The ‘weak central coherence’ account of ASD suggests that individuals with ASD will be better 
at tasks where a local processing bias is beneficial, such as the EFT (Happé & Frith, 2006) and 
Block Design Task (Shah & Frith, 1993). However, in the current study the ASD group did not 
significantly outperform the unaffected co-twins or the control group on the EFT or on the Block 
Design Task. This finding is in contrast to previous studies findings of superior performance on 
the EFT and Block Design Task in adults with ASD (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Shah & Frith, 
1983) but in line with findings from White and Saldana (2011), who reported that children with 
ASD performed similarly to typically-developing children on the EFT.  
The ‘weak central coherence’ account of ASD also suggests that individuals with ASD will have 
poorer performance on tasks which place demands on global processing compared to typically-
developing children. In the current study the ASD group performed below the typically-
developing control group in all three CC tasks tapping global processing, in support of previous 
findings that individuals with ASD perform worse than typically-developing individuals on the 
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Homographs Reading Test (Happé, 1997), Planning Drawing Task (coherence score; Booth, et 
al., 2003) and the Sentence Completion Task (Booth & Happé, 2010). 
In support of the executive dysfunction account, the ASD group performed below the control 
group in two tasks measuring EF, specifically those purporting to measure cognitive set-shifting 
(IDED) and planning (Planning Drawing Task, Part B), and below both comparison groups on a 
test of inhibition (Luria Hand Game). Previous findings have also reported poor performance by 
children with ASD in the Luria Hand Game (Hughes, 1996), ID/ED (Ozonoff et al., 2004) and the 
Planning Drawing task (Booth, et al., 2003). No group differences were found for the test of 
generativity used in the present study (Letter Fluency Task).   
The ASD group performed significantly below both comparison groups in the Penny Hiding 
Game, Triangles Animation Task and the False-Belief Stories. These findings provide additional 
support for a ToM deficit in ASD. 
There was a mixed pattern of results regarding whether the unaffected co-twins of those with 
ASD shared cognitive features with their affected siblings. The unaffected co-twins 
outperformed the ASD group in the Sentence Completion Task (CC), Luria Hand Game (EF) 
and all three ToM tasks. However, on all other cognitive tasks (exception; Penny Hiding Game) 
the unaffected co-twins were not significantly better than the ASD group, nor significantly worse 
than the control group, even when significant differences were found between the ASD and 
control group. This may reflect an intermediate cognitive profile in siblings of those with ASD, or 
it could be due to a lack of statistical power to detect group differences; this group was 
approximately half the size of the other two groups. In contrast to the findings of Hughes, 
Russell, and Robbins (1994), we did not find evidence of EF deficits in siblings of children with 
ASD, nor did the siblings show weak CC on the present tasks. There was evidence that the 
broader autism phenotype included ToM deficits, but only in the Penny Hiding Task. It should be 
noted that the unaffected co-twins in fact performed substantially better in one mentalising task 
(Triangles Animation Task) than both the ASD and control groups, possibly indicating 
compensatory skills or protective factors. 
The ASD group had a greater number of cognitive deficits/differences overall than both of the 
other groups. This finding supplements Pellicano (2010a) study, in which children with ASD 
showed difficulties in false-belief understanding, higher-order planning and cognitive flexibility at 
CHAPTER 4: COGNITIVE FEATURES IN ASD AND TYPICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
120 
ages 4-7 years and 7-10 years old relative to typically-developing controls. Additionally, in the 
present study, nearly a third of the adolescents with ASD had multiple cognitive atypicalities, 
i.e., they had atypical performance in tasks across cognitive domains. Pellicano (2010a) also 
found that at age 4-7 years, over half of individuals with ASD had multiple cognitive atypicalities, 
which declined to 19% by age 7-10 years. However, multiple cognitive atypicalities were not 
exhibited by every individual with ASD, as might be predicted from a strong version of the 
fractionated triad/multiple deficit account proposed by Happé and Ronald (2008). Instead, 
multiple cognitive atypicalities seem to be characteristic, but not a universal feature, of ASD. 
In this study the individuals with ASD who had multiple cognitive atypicalities also had more 
severe ASD symptomatology than those with no cognitive atypicalities. As suggested by Happé, 
Ronald, et al. (2006), this highlights the need to move away from single cognitive accounts of 
ASD that reduce the behavioural symptoms of the condition to a single underlying cognitive 
deficit. Instead, a multiple cognitive account of ASD, incorporating several cognitive functions, 
could provide an explanation for the symptomatology of ASD (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Happé 
& Ronald, 2008; Happé, Ronald, et al., 2006). Previous work has attempted to address whether 
cognitive atypicalities, either alone or together, are related to the behavioural features of ASD 
(reviewed in Brunsdon and Happé, 2014). Only a handful of studies have specifically 
investigated the relationship between test performance in multiple cognitive tasks and the 
various symptom domains of ASD (Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano, 
et al., 2006). Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) reported that much of the relationship between 
ToM, EF and symptom severity in ASD could be accounted for by language ability. However, 
ToM ability and higher level EF were directly related to the severity of communication symptoms 
in ASD, but not to reciprocal social interaction and RRBIs. Contrary to Joseph and Tager-
Flusberg’s (2004) findings and their own predictions, Pellicano, et al. (2006) found that 
performance on CC, EF and ToM tasks failed to correlate with any of the three symptom 
domains in ASD (Pellicano, et al., 2006). In a longitudinal analysis, ToM ability was related to 
social-communication symptoms, and EF was related to both social-communication symptoms 
and RRBIs, and CC did not relate to any symptom domains (Pellicano, 2013). Future work is 
needed to resolve conflicting results and to investigate further whether cognitive atypicalities, 
either alone or together, are related to the behavioural features of ASD contemporaneously or 
developmentally. 
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The SR study has many strengths; it is a large population-based study, with an ASD group that 
covers the whole ASD spectrum from those with broader spectrum diagnoses through to those 
who are severely affected, along with a large typically-developing comparison group. As the 
sample contained siblings (i.e., the unaffected co-twins), it was possible to investigate whether 
cognitive deficits are part of the broader autism phenotype. The study included a wide range of 
cognitive tasks as well as IQ, allowing us to establish which group differences in ToM, EF or CC 
survive correction for differences in general intellectual functioning between the groups.  
Several limitations need to be considered when reflecting upon the results of the study. First, 
some potentially eligible families did not enrol in the SR study, and as such the sample, while 
population-based, is self-selected. Secondly, the adolescents were approximately 13 years of 
age when they were tested, but many of the tasks are more commonly used to assess younger 
children. The task battery was designed to assess a wide range of abilities, given the variability 
of IQ in the ASD group. However, as a result, many adolescents scored close to ceiling on the 
Luria Hand Game and False-Belief Stories and close to floor (in error scores) on the Planning 
Drawing Task and Penny Hiding Game. In principle, floor and ceiling effects constrict range and 
may therefore mask true group differences. In the present analyses, IQ was regressed out and 
a transformation applied prior to analysis to reduce skew-ness in the cognitive task data. Our 
results showed significant group differences even in cognitive tasks that showed some 
floor/ceiling effects. Thirdly, the tasks may not have fully encapsulated the cognitive ability that 
they purport to measure, and may not have been equally discriminating across domains. For 
example, there is no single task/battery that can exhaustively measure all aspects of EF, and 
tests of individual EFs are rarely “process pure“. 
4.6.1 Conclusion 
The present results suggest that multiple cognitive atypicalities are characteristic, but not a 
universal feature, of ASD. Several group differences were found in cognitive tasks that are 
purported to test CC, EF, and ToM. Analysis of individual performance showed that no one 
deficit was universal in the ASD group. However, participants with ASD had more cognitive 
atypicalities overall than either unaffected co-twins or typically-developing control participants. 
Furthermore, nearly a third of the ASD group had multiple cognitive atypicalities, i.e., they 
showed atypical performance in CC, EF and ToM. The next step will be to investigate in this 
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large, population-based sample whether specific cognitive atypicalities, either alone or in 
combination, are related to specific behaviours characteristic of ASD. 
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Chapter 5 One or Many: Examining the Relationship Between 
Different Cognitive Characteristics of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder 
Chapter 5 focuses on one of the predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD posited in 
Chapter 2; that performance on social and non-social cognitive tasks should be relatively 
independent. This study investigated the relative in/dependence of three cognitive domains 
relevant to ASD, using data from 181 adolescents with ASD, 73 of their unaffected co-twins, 
and 160 controls. 
5.1 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is diagnosed based on deficits in social communication and 
social interaction, and restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviours and interests (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The various cognitive theories proposed to explain these 
behavioural symptoms can be broadly divided into domain-specific and domain-general 
theories. Domain-specific theories situate the primary deficit in social processing, for example 
the ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) deficit account (Frith, et al., 1991b). Domain-general accounts of 
ASD propose that the primary deficit/difference is not specifically in social cognition but lies in, 
for example, ‘executive functions’ (EF; Hill, 2004) or superior processing or differences in 
cognitive style, such as weak central coherence (CC; Happé & Booth, 2008; Happé & Frith, 
2006) ‘enhanced perceptual processing’ (Mottron, et al., 2006), ‘systemising’ (Baron-Cohen, 
2009) and enhanced discrimination (O'Riordan & Plaisted, 2001). This study focuses on the 
relationship between task performance on cognitive measures purported to assess the three 
most established cognitive theories; ToM, EF, and CC. 
A robust link between ToM and EF in ASD has been widely reported. Positive correlations have 
been reported between false-belief tasks investigating ToM in children with ASD and tasks 
measuring various aspects of EF (e.g., Ozonoff, et al., 1991). In addition, Pellicano (2007) 
reported a significant correlation in an ASD group between a ToM composite and several 
components of EF (planning, set-shifting, and inhibition), independent of age and IQ. Pellicano’s 
(2007; 2013) findings suggest a developmental relationship between EF and ToM; specifically 
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that EF is a prerequisite for the development of ToM. In contrast, White (2013) has suggested 
the ‘Triple I impairment’ (impairment in ‘Inferring Implicit Information’) to replace the EF account 
of ASD. The Triple I impairment suggests that individuals with ASD have difficulties in many 
experimental tests of EF due to difficulties inferring information about the experimenter’s 
expectations or intentions (i.e., due to poor ToM).  
The relationship between CC and cognitive deficits in ASD has been less widely studied and 
little consensus has emerged. Some studies have found no links between tasks measuring CC 
and ToM (Happé, 1994a, 1997; Pellicano, et al., 2006). Burnette, et al. (2005) found a link 
between verbal measures of CC and ToM, but this was no longer significant once IQ was taken 
into account. Similarly, Pellicano, et al. (2006) found that correlations between performance in 
ToM and CC measures disappeared once age, verbal ability, and nonverbal ability were 
accounted for. In contrast, Jarrold, et al. (2000) reported a significant relationship between ToM 
and CC task performance in ASD. 
EF and weak coherence appear to be dissociable (Booth & Happé, 2010; Pellicano, 2010b; 
Pellicano, et al., 2006). Pellicano, et al. (2006) found that good performance on CC measures 
was related to better performance on EF tasks in an ASD group, but that correlations were not 
significant once age and ability were taken into account. In addition, Booth, et al. (2003) 
compared boys with ASD and those with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) on a 
drawing task examining both cognitive processing style (CC) and planning ability (EF). Poor 
planning ability did not predict a detail-focussed cognitive style. Booth and Happé (2010) also 
reported results from a sentence completion test of coherence in the same ASD and ADHD 
groups. Performance on the CC test and EF test was not significantly correlated and only the 
ASD group showed a local response style. Research to date therefore suggests that weak 
coherence is independent of EF. 
Finally, Pellicano (2010a; 2010b) conducted the first prospective study to examine the 
development of multiple cognitive atypicalities in ASD over a three year period. Children with 
ASD showed difficulties in false-belief understanding, higher-order planning and cognitive 
flexibility at ages 4-7 years (time 1) and 7-10 years old (time 2) in comparison to typically-
developing controls. Principal components analysis at time 1 yielded four factors, with ToM, CC 
and EF measures falling on separate factors. The EF tasks loaded onto two separate factors; 
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one which could be interpreted as a ‘planning’ factor, and the second as a ‘shifting/working 
memory’ factor. At time 2, however, only two factors emerged, with the ToM and EF tasks 
loading together and only the CC measures remaining distinct. Examining predictors of change 
over time, the pattern of inter-relations indicated that EF and CC emerged as relatively distinct, 
and ToM and EF showed a significant concurrent (at time 2) and developmental relation.  
A relatively recent approach to understanding the deficits seen in ASD is that put forward by the 
fractionated triad account; a theory in which the social and non-social symptoms of ASD are 
suggested to have distinct causes at the genetic, neural, cognitive, and behavioural levels 
(Brunsdon & Happé, 2014; Happé & Ronald, 2008; Happé, Ronald, et al., 2006). This account 
makes two predictions at the cognitive level; (1) the three areas of cognitive deficits/differences 
(ToM, EF and CC) should be relatively independent from each other, and (2) the three areas of 
cognitive deficits/differences should relate differentially to distinct ASD symptoms (Brunsdon & 
Happé, 2014; Happé & Ronald, 2008). The existing literature pertinent to these two issues was 
comprehensively reviewed in Chapter 2.  
Recent theories that suggest a failure of Bayesian inference in ASD predict that cognitive 
features (and symptoms) should be inter-related since they attempt to explain all aspects of 
ASD with a single underlying processing perturbation (Pellicano & Burr, 2012). For example, 
Davis and Plaisted-Grant (2015) propose that low neural noise is the single cause of cognitive 
atypicalities in ASD. de Cruys, et al. (2014) postulates that cognitive atypicalities can be 
explained by an inflexible processing of predictive errors (i.e., violations to expectations) in 
ASD. In light of the re-emergence of these single deficit models, the current study investigated 
how much cognitive functions relate to each other, which could help refine these models. 
The main focus of the present study was to examine the relative independence of three 
cognitive functions relevant to ASD in a substantial population-based sample of ASD and 
comparison twins. The Social Relationships (SR) study provides a suitable basis to investigate 
the inter-relation between cognitive functions as it focuses on a subset of adolescent twins who 
meet diagnostic criteria for ASD from the Twins Early Developmental Study (TEDS), and a 
comparison control group with low ASD traits, obtained from TEDS. All twin pairs within the SR 
study were administered an extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, ToM ability (mentalising 
and false belief understanding), EF (planning, set-shifting, mental initiation, and inhibitory 
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control), and CC (local and global processing). The first aim was to investigate the underlying 
structure of this cognitive task battery to create data-driven composites using a factor analytical 
approach. It was predicted that measures assessing CC would contain two factors; a local 
processing factor and a global processing factor as Happé and Booth (2008) have suggested 
that weak CC may itself reflect two separable components that are often confounded in tests; 
increased local processing and decreased global processing. It was also predicted that there 
would be a separate EF factor and a separate ToM factor based on Pellicano’s (2010b) 
findings. The second aim was to establish the inter-relation between performance on task 
batteries devised to assess ToM ability, EF, and CC, in a population-based sample of 
adolescent twins with ASD, their co-twins, and control twin pairs. The relationship between 
performance on cognitive composites created from the factor analysis were examined. Based 
on the prediction from the fractionated account of ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008), it was 
expected that performance on composite measures of CC, EF, and ToM would be relatively 
independent in individuals with ASD once IQ was taken into account. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited as part of the SR study (described in Chapter 3). The sample for the 
current analyses consisted of an ASD group with 158 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 133 
males), the unaffected co-twin group with 71 adolescents (13 years 6 months; 27 males) and 
the control group with 160 adolescents (12 years, 10 months; 110 males). Table 4.1 provides 
further information regarding the age, IQ, gender, zygosity, ADI and ADOS scores of the ASD, 
co-twin, and control group. Information regarding the diagnostic classification procedure can be 
found in Chapter 3. In brief, participants were diagnosed with ASD using diagnostic instruments; 
the ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994) and the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000).  
5.2.2 Measures 
5.2.2.1 Intellectual Ability. 
Intellectual ability was assessed using the WASI (Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an estimated score 
for IQ. The current study used the Block Design subtest as a measure of CC. Therefore, the 
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two-subtest version of the WASI (includes Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary) was used as an 
estimate of IQ. 
5.2.2.2 Cognitive Task Battery 
The measures in the cognitive task battery (with the targeted components), key variables, 
number of trials, and reference to procedure are described in Chapter 3 and are presented in 
Table 5.1. The cognitive task battery was designed to assess ability across cognitive domains, 
including CC, EF, and ToM. 
  




Table 5.1. Battery of cognitive measures used in Social Relationship Study (SR) by cognitive 
domain with references to studies describing task procedure. 
Cognitive Measure  Key Variable Reference for task 
procedure 
Central Coherence   
Embedded Figures Test (EFT) Accuracy Shah and Frith (1983) 
Block Design Task Accuracy Shah and Frith (1993) 
Homographs Reading Test Context effect Happé (1997) 
Planning Drawing Task, Part A  Coherence score Booth, et al. (2003) 
Sentence Completion Task Error score Booth and Happé (2010) 
Executive Function   
Letter Fluency Task (FAS) Number of correct 
responses 
Turner (1999) 
Luria Hand Game Conflict score Hughes (1996) 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional 
Task (ID/ED) 
Reversal errors Hughes, et al. (1994) 
Planning Drawing Task, Part B  Planning score Booth, et al. (2003) 
Theory of Mind   
Penny Hiding Game Error score Baron-Cohen (1992) 
Triangles Animation Task Mentalising score Abell, et al. (2000) 
False-Belief Stories First- and second-order 
false-belief score 
Perner, et al. (1989) 




Home visits were made to all families by two trained researchers. The ASD families completed 
two home visits, which lasted approximately six hours in total. Twins in the ASD sample 
completed diagnostic assessments; the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) and the ADI (Lord, et al., 
1994). The control families completed one home visit, which lasted for approximately two hours. 
Both the ASD and control families completed an extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, 
language ability, CC, EF and ToM ability. The batteries were administered in a counterbalanced 
order with two fixed orders of tasks. A different experimenter assessed each participant within 
the twin pair in order to reduce possible experimenter bias.  
5.3 Results 
All twins were treated as singletons in the analyses to allow comparisons between groups of 
adolescents with ASD (termed ASD group), unaffected co-twins, and a control group. Reaction 
time in EFT, total error score in the Sentence Completion Task, the coherence score and 
planning score from the Planning Drawing Task, reversal errors in ID/ED, and error score for the 
Penny Hiding Game were reflected so that a higher score indicated better performance in all 
tasks. The cognitive task data did not meet assumptions of a normal distribution, with skew and 
kurtosis present in most of the cognitive variables. All variables were normalised using a Van 
der Waerden transformation. To account for IQ, standardised residuals for the ASD and co-twin 
group were obtained from the regression line fit when fitting each factor score as a dependent 
variable in a linear model with IQ as a predictor variable, according to the control group 
(Thomas et al., 2009). 
5.3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
A principal axis factor (PAF) was used to examine the underlying constructs in the cognitive 
data using an oblique rotation as it permits correlations between factors. Twelve transformed 
variables were analysed (EFT score was excluded as it was non-orthogonal, related, and 
dependent on EFT reaction time. Results were the same for either variable). The two scores 
from Planning Drawing Task (Part A& B) were entered together as the two scores are 
orthogonal, independent measures. The correlation matrix was analysed and an oblimin rotation 
was applied to obtain oblique (correlated) factors. An examination of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
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(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy suggested that the sample was factorable (KMO = .66) 
(Hair, Anderson, Black, & Tatham, 1984). Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant; χ
2
(66) = 
234.23, p < .001. Kaiser (1960) criterion and Cattell (1966) “scree test” were used to determine 
the number of factors to extract. An eigenvalue of 1 indicated that four factors were to be 
retained (see Appendix 2).  
Only items with a loading above .30 were considered relevant to the factor loadings. The results 
of the oblique rotation of the solution are shown in Table 5.2. Together, these four factors 
explained a total of 47% of the variance for the entire set of variables. The first factor contained 
three items with the highest loadings from two cognitive measures designed to measure the 
ability to process stimuli locally and so was termed ‘local processing factor’ and explained 16% 
of the variance. The second factor contained three items with the highest loadings from 
cognitive tasks designed to measure EF and so was termed ‘EF factor’ and explained a further 
13% of the variance. The third and fourth factors were each composed of a single measure. The 
third factor explained a further 9% of the variance and was composed of a ToM measure and so 
was termed ‘ToM factor’. The fourth factor was composed of a measure designed to assess the 
ability to process stimuli globally and so was termed ‘global processing factor’. This factor 
explained a further 9% of the variance. 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on the 4 factor solution separately for ASD 
and control groups to test the relative model fit. The CFA for the control group showed 
acceptable model fit (χ
2
 = 21.18, df = 18, p = .271, RMSEA = .033, CFI = .952, AIC = 3490.062). 
The CFA for the ASD group did not show acceptable model fit (χ
2
 = 36.23, df = 18, p = .007, 
RMSEA = .081, CFI = .727, AIC = 3738.612). The Tucker’s coefficient of congruence across the 
ASD and control groups ranged from high for the first factor (.90), medium for the second and 
fourth factor (.61/.54), and low for the third factor (.13). This indicates that the factor structure is 
largely different between the ASD and control group, and there is high factor similarity for the 
first factor across the two groups.  
 
 




The factor loadings were then used to create overall factor scores. A factor score was saved for 
each participant in relation to each identified factor (Table 5.2). Four separate factor scores 
were calculated by multiplying the factor loading by the item score for each item identified to be 
relevant to each factor before averaging to gain unit-weighted factors. Figure 5.1 shows the 
means for the factor scores across groups, including significant mean differences between 
groups (ASD, unaffected co-twins, controls).  
Table 5.2. Cognitive measures loading on four factors extracted using principal axis factoring with 
an oblimin rotation. 
Factor 1 






Global processing factor 
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Abbreviations: 
CC
=central coherence measure, 
EF
=executive function measure, 
ToM
=theory of mind 
measure, †reversed scored 




Figure 5.1. Means and group differences for unit-weighted factor scores (adjusted for IQ) for 
ASD and unaffected co-twins, relative to the control group.  
Note: Error bars show standard error. Group differences were conducted using ANOVA and 
Tukey post-hoc analyses test with alpha of .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The relationship between the factor scores was then examined using Pearson’s correlational 
analyses, with the correlation coefficients presented in Table 5.3. All correlations between the 
factor scores were non-significant in the unaffected co-twin group (highest r = -.22, lowest p = 
.073). There was a significant negative correlation between the EF and global processing 
factors in the control group. The correlation coefficients were not statistically different across the 
co-twin and control comparison groups (Zs < 1.89, ps > .059). In the ASD group, the local 
processing factor was not correlated with any other factor, but the ToM factor was correlated 
with the EF and the global processing factors. In addition, these significant correlation 
coefficients were significantly different to the control group (all Zs > 3.01, all ps < .003), but not 
significantly different to the co-twin group. In addition, the correlation between EF and the global 
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Table 5.3. Pearson’s correlations between unit-weighted factor scores (adjusted for IQ) for 
ASD, unaffected co-twins, and control groups. 
Group Factors 1 2 3 4 
ASD 1. Local Processing Factor -    
 2. EF Factor .06 -   
 3. ToM Factor .07 .22* -  
 4. Global Processing Factor .15 .15 .29*** - 
Controls 1. Local Processing Factor -    
 2. EF Factor .01 -   
 3. ToM Factor .08 -.03 -  
 4. Global Processing Factor .03 -.15 -.07 - 
Unaffected Co-
twins 
1. Local Processing Factor 
-    
 2. EF Factor -.01 -   
 3. ToM Factor .06 -.05 -  
 4. Global Processing Factor .02 -.19* -.07 - 
Note:*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Summary of Findings 
The main aim of the current chapter was to establish the inter-relation between performance on 
task batteries devised to assess CC, EF and ToM. A factor analytical approach was used to 
investigate the underlying structure of the cognitive tasks to create data-driven composites. This 
suggested that the cognitive battery could be reduced to four factors; two factors relating most 
closely to the concept of CC, one factor relating to ToM, and one factor relating mostly to EF. 
The relationship between these four factors was investigated and it was found that in the ASD 
group; (1) ToM and EF factors were correlated, and (2) ToM and global processing factors were 
correlated. No significant relationships between factors were found in the typically-developing 
control group or the co-twin group. Thus only partial support was given to the fractionated triad 
account. 
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The study revealed a two-factor structure to the CC measures; a local processing factor and a 
global factor emerged. The local-processing factor contained performance on the EFT, Block 
Design Task and the Triangles Animation Task; as such it may reflect individuals’ local 
processing abilities or more general visuo-spatial abilities. The CC measures designed to 
capture global or contextual processing did not load together on a single factor. Instead, the 
global processing factor contained only performance on the Planning Drawing Task, Part A – a 
measure of coherence. It could be suggested that these tasks did not optimally tap the CC 
ability they were purported to measure. For example, the Homographs Reading Test and the 
Sentence Completion Task require integrative processing but also, arguably, inhibitory control, 
i.e., participants needs to inhibit the more frequent pronunciation to produce an accurate 
response. In the present analyses, however, these tasks did not load clearly on global CC or 
EF. Pellicano, Maybery, and Durkin (2005) investigated the convergent validity of visuo-spatial 
coherence tasks in typically-developing young children. As in the current study, the CC tasks 
were not highly inter-correlated. Overall, it seems that performance on the three measures of 
global processing was not driven by a single underlying global processing factor in the present 
sample. 
Van der Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den Noortgate, and Wagemans (2015) conducted the 
first meta-analysis of studies of local-global processing in ASD. The meta-analysis examined 56 
studies including 1,000 ASD individuals and found preserved local processing in ASD, in line 
with the current study. In addition, there were no reliable group differences for global processing 
ability, although there was evidence of slow global processing in ASD. This is in contrast to the 
current study in which a deficit in global processing was found. The present global processing 
factor was composed of the coherence score from the Planning and Drawing Task, which would 
not obviously be influenced by temporal effects. Overall, the meta-analysis seriously challenged 
the local-global processing concept. In contrast to Van der Hallen, et al. (2015) proposals, we 
did find evidence of a differentiation between performance in tasks purporting to assess local or 
global processing. However, not all of the tasks purported to measure global processing loaded 
together in the factor analysis, which is perhaps problematic for the construct validity of local-
global processing. This emphasises the issue highlighted by the meta-analysis that ‘local’ and 
‘global’ processing need to be more thoroughly conceptualised. 
CHAPTER 5: RELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
135 
In addition, the factor analysis suggested an EF factor and a ToM factor. The EF factor 
contained three out of the four tasks designed to tap EF; Luria Hand Game, ID/ED, Planning 
Drawing, Part B (planning). The ToM factor only contained the False-Belief Stories, suggesting 
that the tasks designed to tap ToM may investigate different aspects of ToM. However, it needs 
to be pointed out that the four factors identified only explained 48% of the variance in the data. 
This could suggest that the cognitive battery was not comprehensive enough and future work 
should include other factors, such as attention and memory, to account for this unexplained 
variance. 
The current study tested the hypothesis that CC, EF, and ToM would be largely independent. 
This hypothesis was supported within the control group and the unaffected co-twin group, where 
there were no significant correlations between cognitive factors, suggesting that cognitive 
functions are fractionated by adolescence in typical development. Furthermore, the factor 
analysis specified four factors that could be attributed largely to distinct cognitive functions. 
However, two significant correlations were reported in the ASD group; 1) ToM and EF, and 2) 
ToM and global processing. This raises the possibility that the differentiation of specific 
cognitive functions does not apply in ASD as it does in typical development. Consequently, 
certain cognitive functions may remain or become inter-dependent in adolescents with ASD. 
The fractionated autism triad account at the cognitive level predicts that cognitive functions will 
be fractionated in ASD (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). Brunsdon and Happé (2014) reviewed the 
literature and found that, contrary to predictions of the account, ToM and EF appear to be linked 
in ASD, although CC seems to be independent. With regards to the first correlation, a link 
between ToM and EF may reflect similar demands across the tasks. For example, false-belief 
tasks may require inhibitory control to resist answering with what they currently know to be true 
to reason about another’s belief. In addition, the Luria Hand Game may reflect an aspect of ToM 
as the child must understand another person’s intentions to produce the opposite action to that 
person. (Pellicano, 2007) suggested that developments in EF are essential for ToM 
understanding. Therefore, impairment in EF in ASD may hinder false-belief understanding. Due 
to the nature of the current results, it is only possible to suggest that features of EF, such as 
inhibition, set-shifting, and planning, are related to performance on tasks assessing false-belief 
understanding. 
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As previously mentioned, the fractionated autism triad account predicts that CC will be distinct 
from other cognitive functions (Chapter 2). However, this study found a relationship between 
global processing and ToM. In the review of the literature, Chapter 2 found that many studies 
have not considered that weak CC reflects two separable components when investigating the 
relationship between cognitive functions. In regards to the results of the current study, a 
relationship between global processing and ToM raises the possibility that superior eye for 
detail (as assessed in the local processing factor) is unrelated to ToM, but reduced integration 
of information in context (as assessed in the global processing factor) may have a detrimental 
impact on understanding social situations and accurately ascribing mental states in ASD, as 
suggested in Chapter 2. 
The fractionated triad account proposes that cognitive functions should be fractionated in ASD; 
a prediction that was not entirely supported in the current study. However, the fractionable 
theory also recognises that any relationships between cognitive functions may also reflect an 
individual’s compensatory skills, which could involve measurable factors (e.g., IQ and 
language), but they may also reflect differences in environment, intervention, memory, or 
attention (Chapter 2). This might provide one explanation for the associations found between 
ToM and EF and global processing and ToM. Further work to disentangle the confounding 
effects that are found across cognitive functions is needed to provide additional support for the 
fractionated triad theory of ASD. The current study did account for IQ, but could not account for 
the effects of memory and attention as the SR study did not include measures of these abilities. 
In addition, these correlations may not reflect a causal relationship between different aspects of 
cognition in ASD, but may instead indicate a co-occurrence of deficits as shown in the pattern of 
prevalence of cognitive deficits (Chapter 4). This would be predicted by the accounts that 
predict failure of Bayesian inference in ASD (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015; de Cruys, et al., 
2014; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). The correlations could also reflect similar demands across tasks 
as cognitive tests are rarely ‘process pure’. Another explanation of the correlations may be that 
there are true associations between these cognitive factors, but it is difficult to imply causation 
or direction of the relationship from correlational analyses (Rutter, 2007). 
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5.4.2 Strengths and Limitations 
The SR study has many strengths; it is a large population-based study, with an ASD group that 
covers the whole ASD spectrum from those with broader spectrum diagnoses through to those 
who are severely affected, along with a large typically-developing comparison group. A few 
limitations of the current study warrant discussion. Firstly, some potentially eligible families did 
not enrol in the SR study, and as such the sample, while population-based, is self-selected. 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, the findings cannot imply the direction of causation in the 
correlational analyses. Thirdly, the children were approximately 13 years of age when they were 
tested, which is considerably older than previous studies assessing the relationship between 
cognitive functions in ASD making it difficult to compare our findings directly. Also, the cognitive 
tasks used in the battery are more commonly used to test much younger children. The task 
battery was designed to assess a wide range of abilities, given the variability of IQ in the ASD 
group. As a result, many adolescents scored close to ceiling on the Luria Hand Game and 
False-Belief Stories and close to floor (in error scores) on the Planning Drawing Task and 
Penny Hiding Game. In the present analyses, IQ was regressed out and a transformation 
applied prior to analysis to reduce skewness in the cognitive task data. Finally, the cognitive 
tasks may not have assessed the cognitive ability they were selected to measure. For example, 
it should be noted that EF is an umbrella term, covering a diverse set of abilities, and as such, 
no battery can fully encapsulate all aspects of EF.  
5.4.3 Conclusion 
This exploratory study aimed to investigate the underlying structure of several cognitive tasks 
and to explore the inter-relationship between cognitive factors. The factor analysis indicated that 
the cognitive task battery consisted of four underlying structures; two relating to the concept of 
CC, one relating to ToM, and one relating to EF. In addition, ToM and EF, and ToM and global 
processing may be linked at the phenotypic level in ASD, in contrast to the fractionated account 
of ASD. In typically-developing individuals and unaffected co-twins, the cognitive domains were 
not significantly related, supporting the fractionated triad account. However, this study was 
conducted at one time point in adolescence, and so neither the developmental effects of 
cognitive functions, nor the causal relations, could be examined. Further research is required to 
examine the relative fractionation of the cognitive functions across development.  
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Chapter 6 Relations Between Cognitive Deficits and 
Behavioural Symptoms in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
The fractionated triad theory of autism suggests that different cognitive functions may underlie 
the distinct symptom domains of ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008). Chapter 2 introduced two 
predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD at the cognitive level. The prediction that the three 
areas of cognitive deficit/difference should be relatively independent was investigated in 
Chapter 5. The present chapter explores the second prediction of the fractionated triad; that the 
three areas of cognitive deficit/difference should relate differentially to distinct ASD symptoms. 
The relationship between cognitive task performance and ASD symptomatology is examined in 
181 adolescents with a diagnosis of ASD using a structural equation modelling approach which 
takes the factor structure found in Chapter 5 as a starting point. 
6.1 Introduction 
Autism has for many years been behaviourally diagnosed on the basis of the characteristic 
‘triad’ of impairments; social impairments, communicative impairments, and restricted and 
repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) (World Health Organisation, 1992). Although the 
latest edition of DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) collapses social and 
communication symptoms into one domain, impairments across the three areas of the triad are 
still required for a diagnosis of ‘Autism Spectrum Disorder’. It has been suggested that the three 
impairments of the autism triad are ‘fractionable’, with largely independent causes at the 
cognitive level (Happé & Ronald, 2008). The current chapter investigates this proposal by 
investigating the relationship between specific cognitive deficits/differences and the behavioural 
symptoms of ASD. 
A range of cognitive accounts have been proposed to explain the symptoms of ASD, with much 
focus on three key cognitive theories; a deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM), executive dysfunction 
(see Hill, 2004, for a review), and weak CC (Frith, 1989; Happé & Booth, 2008). The ToM deficit 
account suggests that individuals with ASD are unable to reflect on their own and other peoples’ 
thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions, and has been proposed as a core and universal 
abnormality in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1995). The executive dysfunction account of ASD involves 
CHAPTER 6: RELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITION AND BEHAVIOURAL SYMPTOMS 
 
139 
difficulties in planning, inhibition, mental flexibility, and initiation and monitoring of tasks (Hill, 
2004). The weak CC account of ASD proposes that individuals with ASD have a processing 
bias for local details and fail to perceive the global picture (Frith, 1989). The CC account has 
more recently been modified with an emphasis on a different cognitive style, rather than a 
deficit, in which individuals with ASD have superior processing of details and a decreased 
tendency to integrate information (Happé & Booth, 2008). 
It is questionable whether any of these cognitive theories can account for the full triad of 
diagnostic impairments of ASD, let alone the associated features such as raised incidence of 
talents and uneven cognitive profile. For example, the ToM deficit account posits a primary 
deficit in the social domain and offers a good explanation for the social interaction deficits in 
ASD as an impaired ability to represent mental states of oneself and others’ could limit social 
interactions. Furthermore, the ToM account can provide an explanation of the social 
communication impairments in ASD as successful communication involves recognising the 
communicator’s intended meaning. However, the ToM deficit account struggles to explain the 
non-social features of ASD, such as RRBIs, motor difficulties, sensory abnormalities and savant 
skills. Conversely, non-social cognitive accounts of ASD, such as executive dysfunction and 
weak CC, provide a good explanation for the non-social characteristics of ASD. For example, 
executive dysfunction in ASD may underlie RRBIs due to a failure to generate new behaviours 
or shift set. Additionally, a detail-focused cognitive style (as suggested by the weak CC account) 
may provide an explanation for a specific set of non-social features, such as ‘insistence on 
sameness’, narrow special interests and high rates of talent in ASD.  
The fractionated triad theory of autism suggests that different cognitive functions may underlie 
the distinct symptom domains of ASD (Happé & Ronald, 2008). The fractionated theory predicts 
that performance on, for example, ToM tests should relate most strongly to social-
communicative symptoms, while executive dysfunction tests may relate most strongly to RRBIs, 
and CC tests may relate specifically to uneven cognitive profile, talents and narrow interests. 
However, surprisingly few studies have considered different cognitive deficits and their relation 
to the behavioural symptoms of ASD. Studies examining the links between cognition and 
behaviour in ASD, and specifically those relevant to the differential links prediction of the 
fractionable triad hypothesis, were reviewed in Chapter 2 and are briefly summarised here. 
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Only a handful of studies have specifically investigated the relation between test performance in 
tasks assessing all three cognitive domains (ToM, EF, and CC), and distinct symptom domains 
in individuals with ASD. Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) used the ADOS to measure 
symptom severity in children with ASD, and a battery of cognitive tasks to measure ToM and 
EF. Limited relationships were found between the two cognitive domains and symptom severity 
in ASD, and relationships could largely be accounted for by language ability. However, ToM 
ability and higher-level EF were significantly related to the severity of communication symptoms, 
but not social interaction and RRBIs, in ASD. Pellicano, et al. (2006) used the ADI-R as a 
measure of symptom severity, and administered a battery of cognitive tasks to measure ToM, 
EF, and CC in children with ASD. Contrary to Joseph and Tager-Flusberg’s (2004) findings and 
their own predictions, the three cognitive accounts failed to correlate with any of the three 
symptom domains of ASD.  
Taking a longitudinal approach, Pellicano (2013) examined whether early cognitive atypicalities 
at age 4 to 7 years could predict later behavioural symptoms of ASD, as measured by the 
ADOS and Repetitive Behaviour Questionnaire at a 3-year follow-up. ToM ability (specifically 
false-belief understanding) was related to social-communication symptoms, and EF (planning 
ability, cognitive flexibility, inhibitory control) was strongly related to both social-communication 
symptoms and repetitive behaviours. Specifically, early EF but not ToM ability predicted the 
degree of social-communication impairments and repetitive behaviours, highlighting the critical 
role of early EF development in influencing the behavioural symptoms of ASD. There was no 
correlation between early CC (local processing) and later behavioural symptoms of ASD, nor 
predictive relationship between early CC and later insistence on sameness. This recent study 
conflicts with the fractionable triad account as different cognitive functions were not found to be 
uniquely related to the distinct symptom domains of ASD. 
The current study investigated the prediction from the fractionated triad account that specific 
cognitive deficits will relate differentially to specific symptom domains in ASD. The Social 
Relationship (SR) study provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship between 
cognitive functions and behavioural symptoms in a population-based sample of adolescent 
twins who meet diagnostic criteria for ASD. All twin pairs within SR study were administered an 
extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, language ability, ToM ability (mentalising and false 
belief), EF (planning, mental flexibility, mental initiation, and inhibitory control), and CC (local 
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and global processing). The twins suspected of having ASD were also behaviourally assessed 
for ASD symptomatology in the three symptom domains using parent report of past and current 
functioning (ADI-R) and direct observation (ADOS). 
The main aim of the current analyses was to investigate the differential relationship of test 
performance on CC, EF, and ToM tasks with the symptom domains of ASD using a structural 
equation modelling approach. Analyses relevant to this aim were based on data from the ASD 
participants only, since the control group (selected for low ASD traits; see Chapter 3) did not 
complete symptom measures. In addition, the unaffected co-twins of those with ASD were not 
included in the analyses due to relatively small numbers and hence limited statistical power.  
The inter-relationship among cognitive tasks designed to assess EF, CC and ToM in the SR 
study sample was explored in Chapter 5. The exploratory factor analysis revealed a four factor 
solution to the cognitive measures; two factors relating most closely to the concept of central 
coherence (CC), one factor relating to theory of mind (ToM), and one factor relating mainly to 
executive function (EF). The results of the exploratory factor analysis informed the confirmatory 
factor analysis and structural equation models that were used here to investigate the 
relationship between cognitive domains and ASD symptomatology. The ADI-R and ADOS 
domain scores based on diagnostic algorithms were used as measures of the level of 
impairment on each part of the autism triad with a higher score indicating increased symptom 
severity. It was predicted that test performance on a ToM factor would relate to social and 
communication symptoms and test performance on an EF factor would relate to RRBI 
symptoms. Since we distinguish local and global processing, it was predicted that global 
processing would impact on communication (Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2004; Noens & 
van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005) and good local processing would not be disadvantageous to ASD 
symptoms given previous findings (e.g., Burnette, et al., 2005; Drake, et al., 2010; Loth, et al., 
2010; Pellicano, 2013; South, et al., 2007)  
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
The individuals with ASD were recruited as part of the SR study (described in Chapter 3). In the 
current analyses, the ASD group contained 181 adolescents diagnosed with ASD based on 
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information from the ADOS and ADI-R, with consensus diagnosis reached between trained 
clinicians. Individuals were between 12 and 16 years old (M = 13.5-years-old) and the group 
comprised 150 males and 31 females. Participant characteristics are shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Participant characteristics 
 ASD 
 N M (SD) Range 
Age (years) 181 13.49 (0.69) 12.08-16.25 
IQ (WASI 2-subtest) 153 94.07 (16.91) 55-128 
IQ (imputed score) 181 90.02 (20.34) 49-128 
ADOS total (raw)† 174 11.38 (6.14) 0-26 
ADI total† 177 37.64 (16.19) 3-70 
Gender 150 Males/31 Females 
Zygosity 51MZ/130DZ 
Note: †higher score = more severe 
Abbreviations: ASD = autism spectrum disorder; DZ = dizygotic twin pairs; M = mean average; MZ = 




The measures used in the current analyses are described fully in Chapter 3. All participants 
completed a cognitive task battery shown in Table 6.2. The cognitive task battery was designed 
to assess ability across cognitive domains, including CC, EF, and ToM. 
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Table 6.2. Battery of cognitive measures used in Social Relationship Study (SR) by cognitive 
domain with references to studies describing task procedure. 
Cognitive Measure  Key Variable Reference for task 
procedure 
Central Coherence   
Embedded Figures Test (EFT) Accuracy Shah and Frith (1983) 
Block Design Task Accuracy Shah and Frith (1993) 
Homographs Reading Test Context effect Happé (1997) 
Planning Drawing Task, Part A  Coherence score Booth, et al. (2003) 
Sentence Completion Task Error score Booth and Happé (2010) 
Executive Function   
Letter Fluency Task (FAS) Number of correct 
responses 
Turner (1999) 
Luria Hand Game Conflict score Hughes (1996) 
Intradimensional/Extradimensional 
Task (ID/ED) 
Reversal errors Hughes, et al. (1994) 
Planning Drawing Task, Part B  Planning score Booth, et al. (2003) 
Theory of Mind   
Penny Hiding Game Error score Baron-Cohen (1992) 
Triangles Animation Task Mentalising score Abell, et al. (2000) 
False-Belief Stories First- and second-order 
false-belief score 
Perner, et al. (1989) 
6.2.3 Diagnostic Assessments 
6.2.3.1 Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)  
The ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) is a semi-structured observational assessment and is considered 
a gold-standardised diagnostic tool for assessing ASD. A trained examiner observed the child’s 
behaviour in a series of social events. The behaviour was then coded and the dependent 
variables used were the communication total score and the social interaction score from the 
diagnostic algorithm. The communication total score was calculated from four items with a 
potential score of 0 – 8, the social interaction total score was calculated from seven items with a 
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potential score of 0 – 14. A RRBI score was calculated from four repetitive behaviour items, with 
a potential score of 0 – 8. 
6.2.3.2 Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) 
 The ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994) is a standardised assessment tool conducted as a semi-
structured parent interview and provides a thorough assessment for ASD. It assesses the 
developmental history and current behaviour of the individual being evaluated and focuses on 
three main aspects; language/communication, reciprocal social interaction, and RRBIs. The 
items were scored from 0 (no impairment) to 3 (severe impairment) and scoring algorithms were 
used to create three different totals in communication, social interaction and RRBIs. 
6.2.4 Procedure 
Home visits were made to all families by two trained researchers. The ASD families completed 
two home visits, which lasted approximately six hours in total. Participants completed gold 
standard diagnostic assessments; the ADOS (Lord et al. 2000) and the ADI-R (Lord, Rutter and 
Lecouteur 1994). The participants also completed an extensive cognitive battery to measure IQ, 
language ability, CC, EF and ToM ability. One of two fixed orders of tasks was completed. A 
different experimenter assessed each participant within the twin pair in order to reduce possible 
experimenter bias.  
6.2.5 Analyses 
The coherence score and planning score from the Planning Drawing Task, reversal errors in 
ID/ED, and error score in Penny Hiding Game were reflected so that a higher score indicated 
better performance in all tasks. Furthermore, IQ was found to be related to performance on all 
of the cognitive measures (all rs .16 - .74, all ps < .023) and so covariate-adjusted residuals for 
IQ were used in all further analyses to correct for the effects of IQ. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modelling (SEM) was conducted for 
those diagnosed with ASD only using Mplus version 7 with maximum likelihood robust 
estimation (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2011). This type of estimation produces robust standard 
errors with non-normal data. Model fit was evaluated using Brown (2006) three recommended 
criteria: comparative fit index (CFI) ≥ .90, Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) ≥ .90, and root mean square 
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error of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .08. CFA was used to index cognitive domains. SEM was 
used to assess whether there was a relationship between individual differences in performance 
in cognitive domains and on symptom domains for individuals with a diagnosis of ASD. The 
models accounted for the non-independence of the twin data by specifying the clustering 
command, and so adjusted the standard errors accordingly. Two models are reported; the first 
SEM model for symptoms measured by the ADI-R and the second SEM model for symptoms 
measured by the ADOS. Based on power calculations (Westland, 2010), the recommended 
number of individuals is 152 to detect an effect (effect size = 0.1, statistical power level = 0.8, 
latent variables = 2, observed variables = 5, alpha = .05). 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
To inform SEM models, CFA was conducted to examine the hypothesis that performance in 
EFT, Block Design and Triangles Animation task belong to a single factor (termed ‘local 
processing’), and performance in Luria’s Hand Game, ID/ED, and Planning score on the 
Planning/Drawing Task belong to a second factor (termed ‘executive function’) (based on 
previous analyses conducted on this data set; see Chapter 5). The chi-square goodness-of-fit 
was not significant, Χ
2
(8) = 10.36, p = .241, indicating that the proposed model fitted the data. 
Furthermore, the model fit indices indicated good model fit, CFI = .99, TFI = .98, RMSEA = .04. 
Table 6.3 shows the results of the CFA. Individual item loadings ranged from .75 to .92 (all ps < 
.001). The observed variables explained significant variance in the latent factors (R2 = .56 - .85, 
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Table 6.3. Standardised coefficients for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) for cognitive 
measures 





EFT Local processing 0.87 .05 .76 
Block Design Task Local processing 0.91 .04 .83 
Triangles Animation Task Local processing 0.75 .06 .56 
Luria Hand Game Executive function 0.75 .06 .68 
ID/ED Executive function 0.82 .07 .85 
Planning Drawing B (planning) Executive function 0.92 .04 .56 
Abbreviations:
 a
all significant at p< .001. β= standardised coefficient; CFA = confirmatory factor 
analysis; S.E. = robust standard errors. 




significant at p < .001 for all variables. 
6.3.2 Structural Equation Models 
The ADI-R and ADOS symptom domains were used to index the behavioural symptoms of ASD. 
The equivalent domain (social, communication, RRBI) and total scores were significantly 
correlated across the ADI-R and ADOS (lowest r = .31-.47, highest p < .001).  
6.3.2.1 ADI-R Model 
An SEM analysis was performed based on the 181 individuals with ASD. Included in the model 
were two latent factors and two observed variables to index the cognitive domains. The two 
latent factors were based on the CFA model described above. Covariance between the two 
latent factors was specified. The two observed variables (single tasks falling on the other 
‘factors’, named ‘Global’ and ‘ToM’) were the Planning Drawing A (coherence) and False-Belief 
Stories. The symptom domains as measured using the diagnostic algorithms from the ADI-R 
were regressed onto the indices of the cognitive domains. The covariance between the 
symptom domains was specified. The covariance between all cognitive domains was specified. 
The chi-square goodness-of-fit was significant, Χ
2
(28) = 42.72, p = .037, indicating that the 
proposed model did not fit the data. Modification indices specified that a covariance between 
EFT and ID/ED be added to the model. The chi-square goodness-of-fit was not significant, 





(27) = 34.55, p = .151, indicating that the proposed model did fit the data. The model fit 
indices indicated good model fit, CFI = .98, TFI = .98, RMSEA = .04. 
Figure 6.1 shows the results of the final hypothesised SEM model and Table 6.4 presents the 
path coefficients for the model. The two latent factors were correlated, r = .46, p = .013. False-
Belief Stories performance was significantly related to the EF latent factor, r = .51, p< .001, but 
was not correlated with the local processing factor, r = .18, p = .243. Planning Drawing A 
(coherence) was related to False-Belief Stories performance, r = .36, p< .001, and both the EF 
latent factor, r = .39, p = .008, and the local processing factor, r = .29, p = .010. Furthermore, 
significant correlations between all symptom domains were found, all rs > .62, all ps < .001. 
The relationship between cognitive and symptom domains was explored (Table 6.4). Both the 
EF and local processing factors were related to ADI-R communication symptoms and the local 
processing factor was related to ADI-R social symptoms. All other relationships between 
cognitive domains and symptom domains were not significant (all ps > .084). The model 
explained significant variation in ADI-R communication (R
2
 = .27, p = .007) and ADI-R social (R
2
 
= .27, p = .028), but not ADI-R RRBIs (R
2
 = .12, p = .138). 
6.3.2.2 ADOS Model 
An SEM analysis was performed based on 174 individuals with ASD. The model was the same 
as the previously described SEM, with the exception that the symptom domains were measured 
by the ADOS (based on the diagnostic algorithm). 
The chi-square goodness-of-fit was significant, Χ
2
(30) = 61.87, p < .001, indicating that the 
proposed model did not fit the data. The modification indices specified that covariance between 
EFT and ID/ED, and between the planning score and coherence score on the Planning Drawing 
task be added to the model. The resulting chi-square goodness-of-fit was not significant, Χ
2
(27) 
= 41.01, p = .051, indicating that the modified model did fit the data. The model fit indices 
indicated good model fit, CFI = .94, TFI = .90, RMSEA = .06.  
Figure 6.1 shows the results of the final hypothesised SEM model and Table 6.4 presents the 
path coefficients for the model. The two latent factors were correlated, r = .46, p = .011. False-
Belief Stories performance was correlated with the EF latent factor, r = .46, p = .001, but was 
not correlated with the local processing factor, r = .21, p = .174. Planning Drawing A 
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(coherence) was significantly correlated with False-Belief stories performance, r = .35, p < .001, 
and the local processing factor, r = .26, p = .041, but was not correlated with the EF factor, r = 
.24, p = .083. Furthermore, significant correlations between all symptom domains were found, 
all rs > .30, all ps < .008. 
The relationship between cognitive and symptom domains was explored. EF was negatively 
related to ADOS communication and RRBI symptoms, and False-Belief Stories score was 
negatively related to ADOS social symptoms. All other relationships between cognitive domains 
and symptoms domains were not significant (all ps > .119). The model explained significant 
variation in all symptom domains; ADOS communication: R
2
 = .26, p = .024; ADOS social: R
2
 = 
.22, p = .025; ADOS RRBIs: R
2
 = .29, p = .042. 
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Table 6.4. Path coefficients, standard error, and p-values for Structural Equation Models 
(SEMs) to investigate the relationship between cognitive domains and ASD symptoms. 
 ADI SEM  ADOS SEM 
Structural model β S.E. p-value
 
 β S.E. p-value
 
Local processing  
Communication 
.39 .18 .031  .009 .21 .966 
Local processing  Social .41 .18 .021  -.02 .18 .937 
Local processing  RRBIs .11 .17 .512  .23 .20 .255 
EF  Communication -.42 .20 .036  -.46 .20 .024 
EF  Social -.40 .23 .084  -28 .18 .119 
EF  RRBIs -.26 .22 .246  -.55 .24 .025 
False Belief  Communication -.17 .14 .218  -.10 .13 .423 
False Belief  Social -.21 .15 .166  -.28 .13 .024 
False Belief  RRBIs -.21 .14 .142  -.07 .16 .647 
Planning Drawing (coherence)  
Communication 
-.04 .11 .694  .005 .11 .965 
Planning Drawing (coherence)  
Social 
.05 .11 .672  .09 .10 .358 
Planning Drawing (coherence)  
RRBI 
.13 .10 .189  -.06 .11 .557 
Abbreviations: ADI-R = Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised; ADOS = Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule; β= standardised coefficient; EF = executive function; S.E. = standard 
error, SEM = structural equation model 
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b) ADOS Model 
 
Figure 6.1. Results for the structural equation models to investigate the relationship between 
cognitive domains and symptoms using a) ADI-R and b) ADOS.  
Note: Covariances between cognitive factors and between symptom measures are not 
displayed for clarity of diagram. 
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Higher scores for the cognitive measures and factors indicate better performance and higher 
scores for ADI and ADOS symptom domains indicate more severe symptoms. Dotted lines 
represent statistically non-significant paths. Circles represent latent variables. Squares 
represent observed variables. *p < .05. 
Abbreviations: ADI-R = Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised; ADOS = Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule; EF = executive function; EFT = Embedded Figures Test; RRBIs = 
restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests 
6.4 Discussion 
The major aim of the current study was to investigate the relationship between performance on 
cognitive tasks and the symptoms domains of ASD. It was predicted that ToM performance 
would relate to social and communication symptoms and EF would relate to RRBIs. It was 
predicted that global processing would relate to communication symptoms and good local 
processing would not be impact on ASD symptoms. Using the ADOS as a measure of current 
symptom severity in ASD revealed that ToM was related to the social symptoms and EF was 
related to communication and RRBI symptoms of ASD. Using the ADI-R as a measure of past 
and current symptom severity in ASD, it was revealed that local processing was related to 
communication and social symptoms, and EF was related to communication symptoms in this 
ASD sample.  
The findings partially support the predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD as the results 
from the ADOS model suggest that distinct cognitive features uniquely influence the current 
behavioural symptoms of ASD. However, the ADI model presents a different pattern of results 
that somewhat challenges the predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD, as distinct cognitive 
domains did not relate to specific behavioural symptoms. The disparate associations dependent 
on the diagnostic measure used may be due to differences in the way that symptoms are 
assessed in the ADI-R and ADOS. The ADOS is an observational assessment carried out by a 
trained researcher and measures current ASD behaviours. In contrast, the ADI-R is a parent-
informant developmental history interview, which largely relies on retrospective data. It could 
therefore be considered that the ADI-R provides a lifespan perspective on ASD symptoms and 
so these findings may provide a suggestion of a longitudinal relationship between cognition and 
behavioural domains. It is also possible that parents’ memory of early symptoms is coloured by 
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current difficulties or changes in functioning. Using both diagnostic measures obtains more 
comprehensive information on the individuals’ symptomatology and so may provide a more 
valid representation of the individual’s symptom profile. 
The hypothesis that was tested in this study and the one suggested by the fractionable triad 
postulates a direct effect between cognition and behaviour. In relation to the current findings for 
example, aspects of EF may be needed for effective communication, such as inhibition of 
inappropriate dialogue, keeping what the other speaker has said in working memory, flexibility in 
providing a response, attention to communicative cues, and initiation of communicative 
behaviour. Furthermore, deficits in EF may contribute to RRBIs through difficulties in inhibiting 
inappropriate behaviour, shifting between behaviours, and generating appropriate new 
behaviours. Local-processing or good attention to details may alleviate social and 
communication symptoms as individuals may be able to use this skill to help in social 
interactions and for social communication. In addition, an impaired ability to represent mental 
states (ToM) could limit social interactions. However, the fractionable triad account does not 
consider indirect effects in the link between a cognitive domain and a symptom domain, such as 
the role of mediating factors, a combination of factors, such as multiple cognitive domains 
together, or bidirectional effects between cognition and behaviour, which could also be 
important.  
Considering the current results in relation to past findings, a link between EF and 
communication has not been widely reported (e.g., Joseph & Tager-Flusberg, 2004). However, 
Pellicano (2013) found that EF was related to both social-communication symptoms and RRBIs, 
with the conclusion that EF has a more extensive role in influencing the behavioural symptoms 
of ASD than has been considered. Aspects of EF, such as difficulties in inhibiting inappropriate 
behaviour, shifting set, and generating appropriate new behaviours, have been hypothesised to 
underlie RRBIs (Turner, 1997). In addition, empirical evidence that inhibition of prepotent 
responses (Mosconi, et al., 2009), generativity (Turner, 1995), set-shifting (Yerys, et al., 2009), 
and cognitive flexibility (South, et al., 2007) relate to RRBIs in ASD has been reported, in line 
with the present finding of a link between EF and RRBIs as measured by the ADOS. In addition, 
previous findings favour a link between ToM and social skills in ASD in line with the present 
finding that poorer false-belief understanding was predictive of more severe social-interaction 
symptoms on ADOS.  
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Regarding local/global processing, previous studies have not reported an association between 
local processing and symptom domains (Loth, et al., 2010; Teunisse, et al., 2001; White & 
Saldana, 2011). By contrast, our data suggested that better performance on local processing 
tasks was associated with fewer social and communication symptoms on ADOS. This may 
indicate that increased local processing ability may be a compensatory skill in ASD that could 
alleviate some symptom impairments. Our factor analysis suggested separate factors for local 
and global processing, and performance on the latter did not relate to any symptom domains in 
our study. This finding fits with those reported by Pellicano (2013), but stand in contrast to 
predictions that integrative, contextual processing is necessary for social adaptation or 
communication (Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2004; Noens & van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005). 
Our findings may indicate that aspects of processing style described by ‘weak coherence’ are 
not relevant to diagnostic symptoms of ASD, or that their impact is on aspects of behaviour not 
measured here (e.g., uneven cognitive profile, talents, narrow interests). For example, Vital, 
Ronald, Wallace, and Happé (2009) found that special abilities were more strongly associated 
with RRBIs (specifically an eye for detail) than with social or communication symptoms, in 
TEDS. 
The findings of this study are somewhat problematic for the predictions of the fractionable triad. 
On the one hand, distinct cognitive functions were found to underlie the symptom domains of 
ASD when measured using the ADOS. However, the ADI model presents a different pattern of 
results that somewhat challenges the predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD. In addition, 
there were significant correlations between cognitive factors and also between symptom 
domains. These findings do not appear to fit a strong form of the fractionated triad account – 
although it should be noted that the present sample comprised only diagnosed ASD individuals, 
who are selected to show all three parts of the triad; different findings might emerge in a 
population sample unselected for the ASD symptom triad. In contrast to a strong ‘fractionated’ 
account, the multiple cognitive deficit model of ASD would instead predict inter-relation amongst 
cognitive functions due to overlapping developmental pathways and interactive processes 
(Pennington, 2006). Additionally, this model proposes that it is this interaction between multiple 
cognitive deficits in ASD that influences symptom severity. There are also likely to be multiple 
pathways from cognition to symptoms due to the heterogeneity inherent in ASD. The current 
results do strongly suggest the need to move away from single deficit models of ASD, which 
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have recently become popular again with the implication that ASD is caused by a failure of 
Bayesian inference (e.g., Pellicano & Burr, 2012). However, there are challenges to overcome 
in the move to multiple deficit models of ASD, such as how to test these models. Overall, it 
seems that multiple cognitive deficits are characteristic of ASD, and these influence symptom 
severity. 
6.4.1 Limitations 
Limitations of the current study should be taken into account when considering the results. 
Firstly, the cognitive tasks were used to predict ASD symptomatology but there is no 
experimental evidence of direction of causation: the severity of symptoms could impact the 
development or manifestation of cognitive abilities. Secondly, the cognitive measures may not 
have fully encapsulated the cognitive ability that they were purported to measure. For example, 
ToM was based solely on false-belief understanding. Finally, there were some inherent issues 
within the sample used in the current study. Although the SR study sample was population-
based, the sample was not chosen at random and so may be subject to sampling bias. There 
were power issues in the current study; for example, it was not possible to conduct SEM models 
using the unaffected co-twins due to the sample size being too small. However, the current 
study has some advantages over previous studies in that it is based on a large population-
based study, with an ASD group that covered the whole ASD spectrum. The study also included 
a measure of IQ to ensure that the effect of IQ could be accounted for in the results. 
6.4.2 Conclusion 
The results were dependent on which diagnostic measure was used. Using the ADOS as a 
measure of current ASD symptomatology indicated that ToM was associated with social 
symptoms in ASD and EF was associated with communication symptoms and RRBIs in ASD. 
Using the ADI as a parent-reported measure of past and present ASD symptomatology 
indicated that local processing was associated with social and communication symptoms, and 
EF was associated with communication symptoms of ASD. It may be useful to explore the 
cognitive features of ASD symptomatology at different ages in development as links between 
cognitive features of ASD and symptoms may alter throughout development. The findings 
suggest the need to move away from single cognitive deficit accounts of ASD and consider that 
multiple cognitive deficits could underlie the symptoms of ASD. 
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The results of this study suggest that specific cognitive atypicalities are related to specific ASD 
symptoms. Therefore, it would be valuable to investigate the magnitude of genetic associations 
between these cognitive atypicalities and specific ASD symptoms. However, it is not possible in 
the scope of this thesis due to the nature of the selected sample, as the ASD symptoms could 
not be estimated separately within a twin model. However, the next chapter investigates the 
genetic overlap between cognitive atypicalities and ASD as a whole. 
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Chapter 7 Genetic and Environmental Overlap Between 
Cognitive Atypicalities and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that cognitive atypicalities in central coherence, executive function 
and theory of mind are highly prevalent in ASD, with nearly a third of those with ASD exhibiting 
multiple cognitive atypicalities. These cognitive atypicalities across the three main cognitive 
domains could potentially be cognitive endophenotypes of ASD. Chapter 6 indicated that these 
cognitive atypicalities underlie certain ASD symptoms. However, there have been few twin 
studies into the heritability of these cognitive atypicalities, with no studies conducted in the ASD 
population. The aim of Chapter 7 is therefore to examine the heritability of these cognitive 
atypicalities and the genetic and environmental overlap between cognitive atypicalities and ASD 
using the twin sample in the Social Relationships (SR) study.  
7.1 Introduction 
Autism spectrum disorder is a highly heritable neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by 
social-interaction and social-communication impairments and restricted and repetitive 
behaviours and interests (RRBIs). Previous twin studies have provided compelling evidence 
that ASD has a large genetic component, typically demonstrating high heritability estimates (60-
90%) and indicating low contributions of the shared environment. In addition, previous analyses 
using the sample from the Social Relationship (SR) study have also estimated the heritability of 
ASD to be between 56-95%, dependent on the diagnostic assessment used (Colvert, et al., 
2015).  Underlying the symptoms of ASD are postulated cognitive atypicalities in the domains of 
central coherence, executive function and theory of mind. However, there have been no studies 
to quantify the extent to which liability to ASD overlaps genetically with these cognitive 
atypicalities. This chapter sought to examine the genetic and environmental contributions to the 
variance of these cognitive domains and their covariance with ASD.  
Cognitive atypicalities appear to be highly prevalent in ASD. Atypical performance across tasks 
assessing the three cognitive domains of central coherence, executive function, and theory of 
mind has been reported in ASD twins (Chapter 4). In ASD, 19% of adolescents had a cognitive 
atypicality (defined as performing 1 SD below the SR study sample of typically-developing 
controls) in at least one cognitive domain, 40% had co-occurring cognitive atypicalities, and 
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32% had multiple cognitive atypicalities (Chapter 4). The issue of whether these cognitive 
atypicalities are heritable and share common influences with ASD is important for informing 
theories of ASD. These cognitive atypicalities may be viable cognitive endophenotypes of ASD 
if they are heritable and in addition show evidence of shared genetic influences with ASD (Doyle 
et al., 2005). To date, no such studies have been conducted in a clinically ascertained ASD twin 
sample. 
7.1.1 Twin Studies in Typical Development 
There have been a handful of twin studies within the typically-developing population 
investigating the heritability of cognitive domains associated with ASD.  
7.1.1.1 Executive Function 
Twin studies into the aetiology of executive functions have found moderate genetic (40-60%), 
no shared environment, and moderate non-shared environmental influences on cognitive task 
performance measuring different aspects of executive function (e.g., Ando, Ono, & Wright, 
2001; Malone & Iacono, 2002; Wright et al., 2001). The sample size in these studies ranged 
from small (143 MZ and 93 DZ pairs, Ando et al., 2001) to large (900 MZ and 800 DZ pairs, 
Wright et al., 2001). One twin study with a sample of 316 MZ and 266 DZ twin pairs found that 
individual differences in executive function were almost entirely genetic, with a highly heritable 
common executive function factor (99%) made up of inhibition, shifting, and updating (Friedman 
et al., 2008).  
7.1.1.2 Theory of Mind 
The first twin study in the aetiology of theory of mind found that performance in 61 MZ and 58 
DZ 3-year-old twin pairs was 67% heritable (95% confidence interval; CI: 26-79%), with no 
influence of the shared environment, and moderate influence of the non-shared environment 
(32%; CI: 21-49%), which were independent of verbal IQ (Hughes & Cutting, 1999). In contrast, 
Hughes et al. (2005) found that environmental factors (both shared and non-shared) explained 
the majority of the variance in theory of mind performance in 312 MZ and 246 DZ 5-year-old 
twin pairs. The difference in results between the two studies was largely concluded to be due to 
insufficient power in the earlier study, but could also point to a longitudinal model in which 
individual differences in early theory of mind development are largely influenced by genes and 
later theory of mind ability is influenced by environmental effects. A third study with a much 
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larger sample of approximately 4000 twin pairs found results that fell in-between these two 
studies, with theory of mind performance between the ages of 2 and 4 showing modest genetic 
influences (25-57%), low to modest shared environmental influences (17-43%) and modest non-
shared environmental influences (24-46%) (Ronald, Happé, Hughes, & Plomin, 2005).  
Reviewing the limited twin studies into the heritability of the cognitive domains associated with 
ASD, executive function appears to be largely genetic, with age-dependent results for the 
heritability of theory of mind. There are no twin studies exploring the concept of central 
coherence in typical development. 
7.1.2 Twin Studies in Clinical Populations 
There have also been limited twin studies into the heritability of some of these cognitive 
domains and their (genetic) association with clinical disorders.  
7.1.2.1 Executive Function 
Coolidge, Thede, and Young (2000) investigated the heritability and comorbidity of ADHD with 
behavioural disorders and executive function deficits. Executive function deficits were largely 
due to genetic factors (.77) with no evidence for shared environmental influences. There was 
also a substantial genetic overlap between ADHD and executive function deficits (phenotypic 
correlation = .83; genetic correlation = .79). In schizophrenia, common genetic factors 
accounted for a large portion of the variance between schizophrenia and executive function test 
performance (Owens et al., 2011). In bipolar disorder, the additive heritability of executive 
functions was estimated to be between 52-60% (Antila et al., 2007).  
7.1.2.2 Central Coherence 
For eating disorders, central coherence has suggested to have a genetic basis, with an 
environmental basis suggested for set-shifting (an aspect of executive function) (Kanakam, 
Raoult, Collier, & Treasure, 2013).  
7.1.3 Family Studies in ASD Populations 
Even though there have been limited twin studies, the genetic liability for specific cognitive 
deficits has been investigated in family studies of the broader autism phenotype (BAP). Happé, 
et al. (2001) found that fathers of boys with ASD showed enhanced local processing, indicating 
that local processing may be part of the BAP. Nyden, Hagberg, Gousse, and Rastam (2011) 
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investigated central coherence, executive function, theory of mind, and intellectual ability as 
intermediate cognitive phenotypes of ASD using ASD probands and their affected and 
unaffected relatives. Findings suggested that weak central coherence and theory of mind 
deficits were not part of the broader autism phenotype. However, all family members showed 
affected planning ability, but preserved set-shifting. This finding suggests that executive 
functions characterise the broader autism phenotype. However, Losh et al. (2009) found that 
only theory of mind, not executive function or central coherence, was part of the BAP. In 
addition, Sucksmith, et al. (2011) reviewed the existing research findings and found that the 
broader autism phenotype was characterised by cognitive deficits (including theory of mind 
deficits, deficits in executive function, and local processing).  
7.1.3.1 Present Study 
To date, no study in a clinically ascertained ASD twin sample has investigated the genetic and 
environmental contributions to the variance of cognitive domains (central coherence, executive 
function or theory of mind) and their covariance with ASD. It was predicted that the cognitive 
atypicalities would be moderately genetic based on previous twin and family studies. It has been 
shown previously that cognitive atypicalities are a core characteristic of ASD (Chapter 4). The 
aim of the current study was to investigate to what extent these cognitive atypicalities are 
heritable and to what extent the association with ASD is genetically or environmentally driven. 
No specific predictions were made but showing significant heritability as well as genetic overlap 
would allow identifying the cognitive atypicalities that are most likely valid cognitive 
endophenotypes of ASD.  
The present study applied a bivariate twin model fitting approach on data from a population 
sample of adolescent twins with and without a diagnosis of ASD, as well as a control sample of 
twins, to investigate how much of the phenotypic association between cognitive domains and 
ASD is due to genetic and environmental factors. Furthermore, the relative contribution of 
genetic and environmental effects to individual differences in cognitive performance in central 
coherence, executive function and theory of mind was estimated.  
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7.2 Method  
7.2.1 Sample and Procedure 
Participants were part of the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS), a population-based 
longitudinal study of all twins born in the UK between 1994 and 1996. The 12,054 families 
involved at the start of TEDS were reported to be representative of UK families (Haworth, et al., 
2013). Zygosity was assessed using a standard zygosity questionnaire (Goldsmith, 1991), 
which proved to be accurate in 95% of the cases (Price et al., 2000). For the remaining pairs, 
zygosity was assessed on the basis of full DNA tests. 
The analyses presented in this chapter used the SR study sample, as described in Chapter 3. 
The SR study focused on those TEDS families with one or both twins meeting diagnostic criteria 
for ASD. Participants were diagnosed with ASD using gold-standard diagnostic instruments; the 
ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994) and the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000). Additional cut-offs devised by the 
Autism Genetic Resource Exchange (AGRE) were implemented to identify individuals with more 
subtle ASD symptoms and assigned cases to ‘ASD’ (AGRE categories Autism and ‘Not Quite 
Autism’), ‘Broad Spectrum Disorder’, and ‘unaffected’. The ASD group consisted of 27 
monozygotic (MZ) and 100 dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs. The control group consisted of 28 MZ and 
52 DZ twin pairs. Table 7.1 shows the number of twin pairs who were concordant and 
discordant for a diagnosis of broad spectrum and ASD (combined) in the SR study. Mean age of 
the ASD twin pairs was 13.50 years (SD = 0.68) and the control twin pairs was 12.79 years (SD 
= 1.10). 
Table 7.1. Number of twin pairs within the SR study 
 ASD concordant ASD discordant Controls 
MZ twin pairs (55) 24 3 28 
DZ twin pairs (152) 30 70 52 
Total twin pairs (207) 54 73 80 
 
Home visits were made to all ASD and control families by two trained researchers. The ASD 
families completed two home visits, which lasted approximately six hours in total. The ASD 
families completed gold standard diagnostic assessments; the ADOS (Lord, et al., 2000) and 
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the ADI-R (Lord, et al., 1994). The control families completed one home visit, which lasted 
approximately two hours. Both the ASD and control families completed an extensive cognitive 
battery (see Chapter 3). The batteries were administered in a counterbalanced order with two 
fixed orders of tasks. A different experimenter assessed each participant within the twin pair in 
order to reduce possible experimenter bias.  
7.2.2 Measures 
7.2.2.1 Intellectual Ability 
Intellectual ability was assessed using the WASI (Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an estimated score 
for IQ. The current study used the Block Design subtest as a measure of CC. Therefore, the 
two-subtest version of the WASI (Matrix Reasoning and Vocabulary) was used to estimate full-
scale IQ. 
7.2.2.2 Cognitive Factors 
The cognitive task battery is described in Chapter 3. Briefly, the cognitive task battery contained 
twelve cognitive tasks and was designed to assess ability across cognitive domains, including 
central coherence, executive function, and theory of mind.  
Four cognitive factors were created based on exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory 
factor analysis carried out in Chapter 5 using cognitive task performance in the battery (see 
Table 7.2). A factor score was saved for each participant in relation to each identified factor. 
Four separate factor scores were calculated by multiplying the factor loading (from EFA; Table 
5.2) by the item score for each item identified to be relevant to each factor before summing to 
gain unit-weighted factors.  
Table 7.2. Cognitive tasks comprising cognitive factors 
Cognitive Factor Cognitive Tasks 
Local Processing Factor EFT, Block Design Task, Triangles Animation Task 
Executive Functioning Factor Luria Hand Game, ID/ED, Planning Drawing Task, Part B 
(planning score) 
Theory of Mind False-Belief Stories 
Global Processing Factor Planning Drawing Task, Part A (coherence score) 
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7.2.2.3 Best Estimate Consensus Diagnosis (CD) 
Best-estimate diagnoses were assigned, blind to zygosity and co-twin diagnostic status, 
following review of all available information (ADI-R, ADOS, DAWBA, clinical reports). When all 
available sources of information were in agreement, cases were assigned to that category. In 89 
cases the diagnostic classifications across instruments were inconsistent. In these cases all 
available data were assessed by clinical experts and consensus best-estimate diagnoses were 
assigned on the basis of this review. A Consensus Diagnosis (CD) was used in analyses as a 
three-category measure of ASD: 0 = no ASD/controls, 1 = Broad Spectrum, 2 = ASD. 
7.2.3 Analyses 
7.2.3.1 Preparation of Data Prior to Model Fitting 
Prior to model fitting, the effects of age, sex, and IQ were regressed out of the performance in 
the cognitive factors to account for sources of variation in performance in cognitive variables (a 
standard twin model procedure to prevent over-inflation of C-estimates; McGue & Bouchard, 
1984). The residuals were then normalised using a log-transformation. ASD status (consensus 
diagnosis; CD) was used as an ordinal variable (0 = no ASD/control, 1 = Broad Spectrum, 2 = 
ASD).  
7.2.3.2 Background to Twin Model-Fitting 
Univariate genetic models partition twin-pair correlations into genetic and environmental effects 
by comparing MZ twins and DZ twins on a particular trait as MZ twins share 100% of their genes 
compared to 50% for DZ twins. The phenotypic variance of measures can be partitioned into 
genetic (A), shared environment (C) and non-shared environment (E) effects. Any possible 
measurement error is also included in E. If the phenotypic similarity of MZ twin pairs is more 
than twice that of DZ twin pairs, then it suggests the presence of A for the trait. If the phenotypic 
similarity of DZ twin pairs is greater than half the MZ twin correlation, then it suggests the 
presence of C for the trait. The extent to which MZ twins are different from each other reflects E 
(Rijsdijk & Sham, 2002). 
7.2.3.3 Twin Correlations 
Using full information maximum likelihood estimation, continuous (cognitive factor scores) and 
ordinal measures (CD) were analysed jointly assuming a liability threshold model for ASD. To 
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correct for ascertainment, ASD thresholds were fixed to known population prevalence: Broad 
Spectrum; 5% = 1.94, ASD; 1% = 2.33 (z-values). The joint continuous-ordinal liability threshold 
model estimates the MZ and DZ twin correlations both within and across ASD and cognitive 
factor scores. The constrained model estimates the phenotypic correlation between the 
variables (e.g., executive function with liability to ASD), regardless of zygosity or birth order. 
This model also calculates twin correlations for each variable individually (cross-twin within-
trait), as well as one set of cross-twin cross-trait correlations for MZ and DZ pairs. Significant 
cross-twin within-trait covariances suggest aetiological influences for ASD and cognitive factors. 
Significant cross-twin, cross-trait covariances suggest that these common aetiological 
influences between ASD and the cognitive factor score are familial (Rijsdijk & Sham, 2002). If 
the MZ/DZ ratio of the cross-trait cross-twin correlations is 2:1, it further suggests that the 
overlap is due to genetic influences; whereas a ratio of 1:1 suggests that the overlap is due to 
shared environmental influences. Non-significant cross-twin cross-trait correlations would 
suggest that the shared aetiological influences between ASD and the cognitive factors are due 
to non-shared environmental influences.  
7.2.3.4 Bivariate Twin Model 
Bivariate genetic model-fitting analysis was performed to estimate the heritability of cognitive 
factors as well as the genetic and environmental overlap (covariance) between ASD and 
cognitive factors in the current sample of twin pairs. The bivariate model was fitted separately 
for each cognitive factor score and ASD combination.  
A Cholesky decomposition was fitted to the data (Figure 7.1). A Cholesky decomposition uses a 
triangular decomposition to assess the extent to which the genetic and environmental factors 
covary, and is preferred for optimisation reasons. However, since the Cholesky decomposition 
gives precedence to the first selected variable, the correlated factor solution (Loehlin, 1996) was 
interpreted so that the order of traits is arbitrary. Figure 7.2 shows the correlated factors model 
with estimates of genetic (rA), shared environmental (rC) and non-shared environmental 
correlations (rE) between the variables. These correlations are estimated between 0 (no overlap 
between factors influencing traits) and 1 (complete overlap in factors influencing the traits). For 
example, a genetic correlation (rA) of 1 would indicate that the same genetic factors influence 
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both ASD and the cognitive factor, whereas a correlation of 0 would indicate that ASD and the 
cognitive factor are influenced by independent genetic factors.  
7.2.3.5 Structural Equation Model Fitting 
The (genetic) models were fitted in the structural equation modelling program OpenMx (Boker et 
al., 2011). This program is designed to interpret predictions of the variances and covariances of 
the variables using specified parameters and matrix algebra. These predictions are linked back 
to the observations of the real data in order to estimate the most likely values of the free 
parameters (see Appendix 3 for annotated script for current analyses). Maximum-likelihood 
estimation was used on raw data, accounting for missing-ness of observations. Estimates are 
provided with 95% confidence intervals (the inclusion of zero indicating non-significance). Model 
fit is indicated by minus twice the log-likelihood of the data (-2LL), which is a relative measure of 
fit, meaning that the difference in -2LL of nested models is distributed as Chi-square with 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) equivalent to the difference in DF of the nested models. Model 
comparison for non-nested models are made using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), a 
goodness-of-fit index that penalises models for increasing complexity and accounts for sample 
size, with increasingly negative values corresponding to increasingly better fitting models. There 
are no statistical tests to compare two AIC values, but guidelines suggest that a difference of 3-
7 can be considered good support for model selection (Burnham & Anderson, 2002). 
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Figure 7.1. Path diagram for the bivariate ACE twin model: Cholesky decomposition. 
 
Figure 7.2. Path diagram for the bivariate ACE twin model: Correlated factors solution. 
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7.3 Results 
Means and standard deviations of participant characteristics and cognitive factors are given in 
Table 7.3. 
7.3.1 Phenotypic Correlations 
Model fitting estimates of the phenotypic correlations between cognitive factors and ASD (CD) 
are presented in the Table 7.4. Three of the cognitive factors showed modest correlations with 
ASD (CD). The local processing factor did not show a significant association with ASD (CD). 
  
Table 7.3. Participant characteristics with IQ-adjusted cognitive factors 
 ASD Concordant ASD Discordant Controls 
 MZ       
(N = 48) 
DZ        
(N = 60) 
MZ         
(N = 6) 
DZ          
(N = 140) 
MZ      
(N = 56) 
DZ         
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7.3.2 Twin Correlations 
Cross-twin within-trait correlations for ASD (CD) and cognitive factors as well as the cross-twin 
cross-trait correlations for cognitive factors and ASD (CD) are reported in Table 7.5. The DZ 
cross-twin within-trait correlations were less than half that of the MZ correlations for the local 
and global processing factors, indicating genetic influence for central coherence in the present 
sample. However, the cross-twin within-trait MZ correlation for global processing was non-
significant. The DZ correlation was higher than the MZ correlations for the executive function 
and theory of mind factors, indicating a large role for the non-shared environment.  
None of the cognitive factors that had a significant phenotypic correlation with ASD showed 
heritable influences, and therefore are unlikely to be potential cognitive endophenotypes. This 
will be further tested in the genetic models. The twin correlations for both global processing and 
ToM suggest that they are not possible endophenotypes for ASD and that the significant 
correlation with ASD is mostly determined by non-shared environmental effects. The 
correlations for EF are not easy to interpret, but there are most likely effects of shared and non-
shared environment.  
  
Table 7.4. Phenotypic correlations between cognitive factors and ASD (CD) 
 Phenotypic Correlations 
Cognitive Factor rph with ASD (95% CI) 
Local Processing -.03 (-.06/.13) 
Executive Functioning -.25* (-.33/-.17) 
Theory of Mind -.16* (-.24/-.07) 
Global Processing -.12* (-.20/-.04) 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
*significant estimates (the 95% CIs excluding 0 indicate statistical significance) 
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7.3.3 Bivariate Genetic Model-Fitting Results 
To investigate how much of the phenotypic correlation between the cognitive factors and ASD 
(CD) is due to shared genetic or environmental factors, a series of bivariate genetic model-fitting 
analyses were carried out, separately for each cognitive factor. In each, ACE model estimates 
of the genetic and environmental influences (A = genetic effects; C = shared environment, E = 
non-shared environment) on the cognitive factor, as well as the genetic (rG) and environmental 
(rE) correlations between the cognitive factor and ASD (CD) were obtained. Table 7.6 provides 
the fit statistics of these models, including those of the correlation models. 
  
Table 7.5. Cross-twin within-trait and cross-twin cross-trait correlations for cognitive factors 
and ASD (CD) 
Cognitive 
Factor 
Cross-Twin Within-Trait Correlations 
r (95% CI) 
Cross-twin Cross-Trait Correlations 
r (95% CI) 







































Note: Cross-twin, within-trait correlations for consensus diagnosis for ASD across all cognitive 
factors were: rMZ = .91-.92, rDZ = .46-.47. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.  
*significant estimates (95% CIs excluding 0 indicate statistical significance)  
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Table 7.6. Fit statistics 
Cognitive Factor Model Model ep -2LL df AIC 
Local Processing 1. Cor 9 929.07 750 -570.93 
2. BivACE 9 932.37 750 -567.63 
Executive Functioning 1. Cor 9 1170.00 745 -320.00 
2. BivACE 9 1170.65 745 -319.35 
Theory of Mind 1. Cor 9 1149.73 761 -372.27 
2. BivACE 9 1149.77 761 -372.23 
Global Processing 1. ConSat 9 1157.48 790 -422.52 
2. BivACE 9 1162.91 790 -417.09 
Abbreviations: -2LL = likelihood of the data; AIC = Akaike’s Information Criteria; BivACE = 
bivariate genetic model; Cor = correlation model; df = degrees of freedom; ep = estimated 
parameters  
 
Table 7.7 shows parameter estimates for the ACE model for each cognitive factor, indicating the 
proportion of variation explained by genetic effects (h
2
), shared environmental effects (c
2
), and 
non-shared environmental effects (e
2
). ASD (CD) showed strong genetic effects (.82-.89), low 
shared environmental effects (.03-.08) and weak non-shared environmental effects (.08-.10). 
The local processing factor showed strong genetic influence (.61). All other cognitive factors 
showed low genetic influence (.01-.06). The local processing factor showed moderate non-
shared environmental influence (.36). All other cognitive factors showed substantial non-shared 
environmental influence (.80-.95). All cognitive factors showed low, non-significant shared 
environmental influence (.03-.15).  
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Table 7.7. Genetic, shared, and non-shared environmental estimates of the full ACE genetic 
model for each cognitive factor 





































Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Significance is indicated by confidence intervals 
that exclude zero. 
Abbreviations: c
2 







Table 7.8 shows the contribution of genetic (rph-A) and shared (rph-C) and non-shared 
environmental (rph-E) factors to the phenotypic correlations (rph-E) between cognitive factors and 
ASD (CD), as well as the genetic (rA) and shared (rC) and non-shared (rE) environmental 
correlations between cognitive factors and ASD (CD). These results are also presented as path 
diagrams in Figure 7.3. All genetic correlations were non-significant. Local processing showed a 
modest (non-significant) genetic correlation with ASD, and a moderate (non-significant) 
environmental correlation with ASD. Most of the phenotypic correlation between ASD and 
executive functioning was explained by (non-significant) shared genetic effects. Theory of mind 
showed a modest (non-significant) environmental correlation with ASD. Results indicated that 
half of the phenotypic correlation between ASD and theory of mind was explained by 
overlapping non-shared environmental effects. Global processing showed a (non-significant) 
strong genetic correlation with ASD. Results also indicated that most of the phenotypic 
correlation between ASD and global processing was explained by shared genetic effects. 
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Table 7.8. Phenotypic correlations between cognitive factors and ASD (CD) and the contribution 
of genetic and environmental factors as predicted by the full ACE models and A, C, and E 
correlation estimates 
Cognitive Factor rph-A rph-C rph-E rph rA rC rE 






























































Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Significance is indicated by confidence intervals 
that exclude zero. 
Abbreviations: rA = genetic correlation; rC = shared environment correlation; rE = non-shared 
environment correlation; rph = phenotypic correlation; rph-a = phenotypic correlation due to genetic 
effects; rph-c = phenotypic correlation due to shared environment; rph-e = phenotypic correlation 
due to non-shared environment 
 
 




Figure 7.3. Path diagrams indicating the results from the bivariate ACE models for ASD and 
each cognitive factor. 
Notes: Rectangular boxes indicate observed variables, circles indicate latent factors (A, C, E), 
double-headed arrows indicate correlations, single-headed arrows indicate causal pathways, 
dotted lines represent non-significance 
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7.4 Discussion 
7.4.1 Summary of Findings 
The current chapter examined the genetic and environmental contributions to variance in the 
cognitive domains of central coherence, executive function and theory of mind, and their 
covariance with ASD. This is the first twin study to examine the heritability of the cognitive 
domains of central coherence, executive function and theory of mind in adolescence, and the 
genetic and environmental correlations between these cognitive domains and ASD.  
There were significant associations between cognitive domains and ASD, with poorer global 
processing, executive function and theory of mind being related to an increased liability to ASD.  
Local processing was not associated with ASD. Executive function showed the highest 
phenotypic correlation with ASD.  
Findings showed strong genetic influences on individual differences in local processing. All 
other cognitive factors showed low genetic influences. In addition, substantial non-shared 
environmental influences on individual differences were found for all cognitive factors, with 
variation in theory of mind ability being almost exclusively due to the non-shared environment.  
There was also limited support that there is genetic overlap between cognitive domains and 
ASD. There was a modest genetic contribution to the covariance of global processing and ASD, 
with the phenotypic correlation derived from shared genetic effects. The negative correlation 
suggests that some genetic factors that decrease global processing ability also tend to increase 
liability to ASD. In addition, most of the phenotypic correlation between executive function and 
ASD could be explained by shared genetic effects. However, both of these results were not 
significant.  
There has been one twin study of central coherence previously investigating whether certain 
cognitive abilities are endophenotypes of eating disorders in adult females, although the study 
did not use structural equation modelling (Kanakam, et al., 2013). The current results were 
similar to Kanakam, et al. (2013) as both studies found that within-pair correlations for MZ twins 
were double that of DZ twin for both local and global processing. Kanakam, et al. (2013) used 
this result to suggest a genetic basis to central coherence. Previous studies into the BAP have 
also suggested that local processing may have a genetic basis (Happé, et al., 2001). The 
CHAPTER 7: GENETIC/ENVIRONMENTAL OVERLAP BETWEEN COGNITION & ASD 
175 
current study used structural equation modelling to support these previous findings and showed 
that the majority of the variance in local processing was due to genetic effects and one-third of 
the variance in local processing was due to the non-shared environment. However, only 6% of 
the variance in global processing was due to genetic effects, with 88% of the variance due to 
non-shared environmental effects. Kanakam et al (2013) preliminary conclusions that central 
coherence has a genetic basis were supported in the current sample for local processing only.  
Previous studies into the aetiology of executive functions have suggested a moderate influence 
of the non-shared environment. Malone and Iacono (2002) investigated the aetiology of an 
aspect of executive function (inhibitory control) in a typically-developing group and found similar 
results with a higher influence of genetic effects than the current study (.57), but a significant 
moderate effect of the non-shared environment (.43). Conversely, Friedman, et al. (2008) 
investigated three executive functions (inhibition, working memory and set-shifting) in a 
typically-developing group and found that executive functions were influenced by a common 
genetic factor, which is highly heritable (99%). Set-shifting did have small but significant (13%) 
non-shared environmental influences. Looking at their model in more depth, it appears that non-
executive variance in individual tasks had significant non-shared environmental effects (37-
69%). All but one of the individual tasks showed no genetic influence (0-19%). These results are 
in line with the current results that there is no genetic influence (.05) but large non-shared 
environmental effects (.80) for executive function. This suggests that there is a need to account 
for the non-executive variances inherent within cognitive tasks to ensure that tasks measure 
what they are purported to measure since the variance attributed to non-shared environmental 
twin models includes the error component. The large effect of the non-shared environment in 
variance in the cognitive domains could be due to measurement error, such as not 
understanding the experimental instructions. 
In addition, nearly all of the variance in theory of mind was due to non-shared environment 
effects (95%). In contrast, Hughes and Cutting (1999) found that two-thirds of the variance in 
theory of mind at age 3 was due to genetic effects, and only a third was due to the non-shared 
environment. A further study by Hughes, et al. (2005) suggested no genetic influence and 
moderate shared (.45) and non-shared (.66) environmental influences on theory of mind ability 
in 5-year-old children. The difference between the two studies was suggested to be due to the 
CHAPTER 7: GENETIC/ENVIRONMENTAL OVERLAP BETWEEN COGNITION & ASD 
176 
sample, as there was insufficient power to detect the influence of the shared environment and 
the children were from very low SES families in the first study (Hughes & Cutting, 1999). There 
is potentially insufficient power in the current study to detect shared environment influences 
also, which may account for the non-significant results for the shared environment. Together, 
the current study and Hughes, et al. (2005) suggest a large role for the non-shared environment 
in the aetiology of theory of mind ability. The non-shared environment includes child-specific life 
events, such as sibling, parent and peer relationships. In particular, the non-shared environment 
may influence theory of mind ability through the social environment, as theory of mind 
development has previously been found to be linked to social abilities (Watson, Nixon, Wilson, 
& Capage, 1999). Furthermore, the negative correlation suggests that some environmental 
factors that decrease theory of mind ability also tend to increase liability to ASD. This supports 
the notion of a link between ASD and theory of mind ability that is perhaps mediated by the 
social environment as individuals with ASD have impairments in social interaction and social 
communication. 
It was predicted that there would be genetic overlap between cognitive domains and ASD. 
Contrary to this prediction, local processing does not appear to be related to liability to ASD as 
there was no phenotypic correlation. This finding is contrary to past studies in which superior 
local processing has been found to be a characteristic of ASD.  However, this finding is in line 
with Chapter 4 and 5 that found no significant difference between individuals with ASD and 
typically-developing controls in performance on measures of local processing and no difference 
on an overall local processing factor. In addition, Losh, et al. (2009) found no association 
between local processing and ASD. As already discussed, half of the phenotypic correlation 
between theory of mind and ASD could be explained by the common non-shared environment. 
In support of the prediction, most of the phenotypic correlation between executive functioning 
and ASD was due to common genetic effects (although non-significant). In addition, there was a 
strong (but non-significant) genetic correlation between global processing and ASD. The 
phenotypic correlation between global processing and ASD was also largely due to common 
genetic effects. A possible proposal from these results is that the same genes influence global 
processing/executive function and ASD, but there is not sufficient power within the current study 
to obtain significant results. However, global processing and executive functioning showed low 
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and non-significant genetic influence and so there would have been limited variance to partition 
into common and individual genetic effects.  
One of the aims of the current study was to investigate if cognitive atypicalities could be 
possible cognitive endophenotypes in ASD. Previous studies have found that deficits in 
executive function characterised the endophenotype in ASD, particularly planning ability, but 
weak central coherence (local processing ability) and theory of mind deficits did not appear to 
be part of the cognitive phenotype (Nyden, et al., 2011). The current results support this 
previous study, with no phenotypic association between local processing, and no genetic 
overlap between theory of mind ability and ASD. Executive function did show a (non-significant) 
genetic overlap with ASD. Likewise, global processing showed a genetic overlap with ASD; a 
cognitive domain that was not investigated in Nyden, et al. (2011). However, cognitive 
atypicalities should show evidence of heritability to be useful endophenotypes (Doyle, et al., 
2005), and neither executive function, nor global processing, showed genetic influences in the 
present analyses.  
7.4.2 Strengths and Limitations 
The SR study has many strengths; it is a large population-based study, with two stages of 
systematic screening and the inclusion of those across the whole ASD spectrum to gain a more 
complete picture of ASD. There are also a large number of ASD twins in comparison to previous 
studies. In addition, the SR study conducted in-person assessments to measure the three 
cognitive domains and so does not rely merely on parental questionnaire data.  
Several limitations need to be considered when reflecting upon the results of the study. First, 
some potentially eligible families did not enrol in the SR study. Second, a main limitation of the 
current study is that of statistical power. The SR study attempted to recruit a sufficient number 
of MZ and DZ twin pairs concordant and discordant for ASD and a large number of MZ and DZ 
control twins, to be able to detect significant parameter estimates using genetic model-fitting. 
The 95% confidence intervals around estimates are large, reflecting that the number of twin 
pairs available for analysis may be less than the number needed to apply the bivariate statistical 
approaches. Although it would be difficult to increase the clinical sample of twins, one possibility 
to enhance power is to add data from a larger sample of typically-developing control twin pairs. 
Thirdly, the tasks may not have fully encapsulated the cognitive ability that they purport to 
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measure. For example, there is no single task/battery that can exhaustively measure all aspects 
of executive function, and tests of individual executive functions are rarely “process pure“. This 
could have led to the higher estimates of non-shared environment across the cognitive 
domains, which highlights potential measurement error. Other issues within the cognitive tasks 
used to assess the three cognitive domains could affect performance, such as not 
understanding the cognitive task, poor task instruction, poor motor execution (a deficit 
characteristic of ASD) and issues with response selection. 
7.4.2.1 Assumptions and Limitations of the Twin Design 
Five issues that affect twin modelling should be considered. Firstly, one of the main 
assumptions of the twin design is that the environment of MZ and DZ twins is equal – known as 
the ‘equal environments assumption’. This assumes that MZ twins are more similar than DZ 
twins for a certain trait because they share more genetic effects, not because MZ twins 
experience more similar environments than DZ twins. The validity of the equal environments 
assumption has been supported in previous studies (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 
1993). 
Pre-natal factors may increase the similarity between MZ twins compared to DZ twins, 
independent of genetic effects. 70% of MZ twin pregnancies are monochorionic; the foetuses 
share both a placenta and a chorionic membrane (the outer membrane enclosing the foetus), 
but all DZ twin pregnancies and 30% of MZ twin pregnancies are dichorionic; the foetuses 
develop two separate chorions with half of dichorionic pregnancies sharing placentas and the 
other half having separate placentas. Monochorionic twins are at increased risk of pre- and 
post-natal complications. However, the effects of chorionicity on estimates of heritability of 
cognitive abilities are likely to be small. 
The results from the twin sample need to be generalisable to the singleton population. A key 
difference between twins and singletons is the pre-natal environment. Twins have increased risk 
of pregnancy and birth complications, including foetal growth restriction, twin-to-twin transfusion 
syndrome, prematurity and low birth weights. For example, it has been found that low birth 
weight increases the risk for ASD (Schendel & Bhasin, 2008). Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that twinning itself may be a risk factor for ASD with a higher prevalence of ASD in 
twins (Greenberg, Hodge, Sowinski, & Nicoll, 2001). However, other studies demonstrate that 
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being a twin does not increase the risk of ASD (Curran et al., 2011; Hallmayer, et al., 2011; 
Hultman, Sparen, & Cnattingius, 2002). 
An assumption of the twin design is that there is no effect of assortative mating on a trait. 
Assortative mating involves the process of non-random selection when choosing a mate, which 
occurs when an individual chooses a partner who has more traits in common with them. This 
would lead to an increased similarity between parents and offspring, as well as between DZ 
twins. Assortative mating would conceal non-additive genetic effects and inflate shared 
environment estimates because due to increased similarity of DZ twins. Assortative mating has 
been implicated in ASD (Constantino & Todd, 2005). However this result was based on spouse 
reports and a large population-based sample found no evidence of assortative mating for ASD 
(Hoekstra, et al., 2007). 
Lastly, gene-environment correlation refers to the influence that genetic factors have on an 
individual’s environment. The twin design assumes independence of genes and environment. It 
may therefore inflate heritability estimates because the genetics of MZ twins may influence their 
environment and therefore increase their similarity. Gene-environment interactions occur when 
the expression of an individual’s genotype is dependent on their environment, and vice versa. If 
gene-environment correlations or interactions exist, then estimates of both genetic and 
environmental influences may be inflated. 
7.4.3 Future Directions 
Future studies should investigate age-related changes in genetic and environmental influences 
on individual differences in cognitive measures. The current study examined cognitive 
atypicalities in adolescence. However, it may be the case that genetic influences on cognitive 
atypicalities are more evident in earlier development, and environmental influences may be 
more important in later development. Therefore, longitudinal studies will be needed to examine 
the developmental pathways involved in cognitive atypicalities in ASD. 
Further research could examine if the three cognitive domains that characterise ASD (theory of 
mind, weak central coherence, and executive function) share genetic influences or are largely 
genetically independent from one another. If phenotypic and genetic correlations between 
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different cognitive domains of ASD were low then this would support the claim that different 
cognitive substrates underlie different symptoms/features of ASD. 
Lastly, the current study highlights the need to investigate what specific non-shared 
environmental influences might affect the development of individual differences in central 
coherence, executive functions, and theory of mind in ASD.  
7.4.4 Conclusions 
To summarise, this study explored the heritability of three cognitive domains (weak central 
coherence, executive function and theory of mind) that characterise ASD, and examined the 
genetic and environmental overlap between these cognitive domains and ASD using a twin 
sample. Global processing, executive function and theory of mind were modestly associated 
with ASD. Local processing showed strong genetic influence. All other cognitive domains 
showed low genetic influence and substantial non-shared environmental influences. Overall, 
there was limited support for the proposal that these cognitive atypicalities are useful 
endophenotypes of ASD.  
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Chapter 8 Trying to Make Sense of a Heterogeneous Disorder: 
A Factor Mixture Modelling Approach to Autism Spectrum 
Disorder 
The clinical phenotype of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by considerable 
heterogeneity, with individuals presenting with different patterns and severity of symptoms. 
Heterogeneity presents a challenge to research on aetiology and treatment; studies may be 
mixing ‘apples and oranges’. This chapter therefore examined if more homogeneous 
behavioural subtypes of ASD could be identified as the fractionated theory recognises that this 
heterogeneity may be the unavoidable consequence of variation along different dimensions of 
impairment (Happé & Ronald, 2008).  
8.1 Introduction 
Despite sharing the diagnostic core features of impaired social-communication and 
restricted/repetitive behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), individuals with ASD 
show a wide manifestation of symptoms, varying in pattern and severity. This heterogeneity is 
considered a major hindrance in the study of the aetiology and treatment of ASD. Therefore, 
this study attempted to identify more homogeneous subgroups in ASD using a statistical 
modelling approach and to characterise these subgroups in terms of their patterns of comorbid 
difficulties. 
Several studies have attempted to identify homogeneous subgroups of individuals with ASD 
using two different approaches to subgrouping; using clinical features or using statistical 
methods. With regards to clinical features, studies have tried to subgroup ASD using either a 
categorical or dimensional approach to ASD (see Beglinger & Smith, 2001, for a review on 
subgrouping in ASD). 
Several studies have used statistical methods to identify homogeneous subgroups of individuals 
with ASD. Cluster analytic studies have derived up to four subgroups for ASD (see Wiggins, 
Robins, Adamson, Bakeman, & Henrich, 2012). These have largely distinguished subgroups by 
symptom severity, i.e., the degree of impairment on social and communication deficits, and 
restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests (RRBIs). Latent class analysis has also been 
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used. For example, Munson et al. (2008) used IQ to create subgroups and identified four 
classes within ASD; (1) low IQ, (2) low verbal/medium nonverbal IQ, (3) medium IQ, and (4) 
high IQ. Machine learning approaches have also been utilised. For example, Bruining et al. 
(2014) identified ASD behavioural signatures that were related to the genetic cause of ASD and 
found that signature phenotypes were familial and might be used to stratify cases of ASD. 
Factor mixture modelling is an extension of latent class analysis and allows for severity variation 
within class. It allows for the integration of both categories (latent class analysis) and 
dimensions (confirmatory factor analysis) to identify more homogeneous subgroups. It has 
previously been used in two recent studies of ASD. Frazier, et al. (2012) examined 
approximately 15,000 siblings (9,000 ASD; 6,000 non-ASD) and identified a two-factor/two-
class solution. The two classes corresponded to diagnosis, i.e., individuals with ASD were 
assigned to one class and those without an ASD diagnosis were assigned to a second class. 
Georgiades, et al. (2013) examined 391 children who had recently been diagnosed with ASD 
(aged 3- to 4-years-old) and identified a two-factor/three-class solution. The three classes were 
based on differential severity gradients on symptom dimensions. In addition to having different 
symptom severity levels, Georgiades and colleagues (2013) found that children from the 
subgroups were diagnosed at different ages and were functioning at different adaptive, 
language, and cognitive levels. In both studies, the two factors corresponded to a 
social/communication factor and an RRBI factor, supporting the structure of diagnostic criteria in 
DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Thus far, there has been a dearth of research exploring another source of heterogeneity within 
ASD, specifically that of associated features and comorbidity with other psychiatric conditions. 
Recent studies suggest high rates of comorbidity; for example, Simonoff, et al. (2008) reported 
that 71% of children with ASD met criteria for at least one current psychiatric disorder in their 
population-based sample. It was reported that 42% of children with ASD met criteria for an 
anxiety disorder, 30% met criteria for an oppositional or conduct disorder, and 1.4% met criteria 
for a depressive disorder. Furthermore, ASD and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
co-occur at high rates (Tureck, Matson, May, Davis, & Whiting, 2013), with 28% of children with 
a diagnosis of ASD also meeting diagnostic criteria for ADHD (Simonoff et al., 2008). Only one 
previous study has used latent class analysis (LCA) to investigate comorbidity within ASD (van 
der Meer et al., 2012). Due to the reported high comorbidity between ASD and ADHD, van der 
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Meer, et al. (2012) examined whether different ASD/ADHD symptom classes exist. The LCA 
analysis produced five classes; ADHD only, ADHD [+ASD], ASD [+ADHD], and two ‘normal’ 
classes.  
The current study investigated the behavioural heterogeneity present within ASD and attempted 
to identify more homogeneous subgroups, examining heterogeneity in a population-based ASD 
twin sample. A considerable degree of heterogeneity was present within this sample as the 
twins diagnosed with ASD and their unaffected co-twin pairs covered the complete autism 
spectrum. The first aim was to identify homogeneous subgroups by employing a factor mixture 
approach using the diagnostic items from the ADI-R. It was predicted that the subgroups would 
be distinguished by symptom severity. Based on the work of Georgiades and colleagues (2013), 
it was also expected that a two-factor solution would fit the data best; one factor corresponding 
to social/communication deficits, and a second factor corresponding to RRBIs. 
The second aim was to explore the similarities and differences between individuals assigned to 
each subgroup in terms of age, gender, diagnosis, co-occurring behavioural and emotional 
symptoms (including depression, anxiety, hyperactivity, and conduct problems), sensory 
abnormalities and cognitive abilities. It was predicted that the subgroups would differ in terms of 
symptom severity; with subgroups ranging from few impairments through to those with severe 
impairments. Due to this prediction, it was expected that subgroups would differ in terms of 
gender and diagnostic status. It was predicted that subgroups would differ in cognitive 
functioning. Furthermore, it was predicted that certain subgroups would show higher rates of 
concurrent behavioural and emotional symptoms. 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants 
The study sample for these analyses was taken from the Social Relationships (SR) Study 
(Chapter 3), and consisted of 254 individuals (mean age 13.50 years; 177 males); 141 
participants had a diagnosis of ASD (mean age 13.52 years; 120 males), 41 had a diagnosis of 
broad spectrum autism (mean age 13.40 years; 30 males), 73 were unaffected co-twins (mean 
age 13.50 years; 27 males). Four individuals with ASD, 1 with broad spectrum autism, and 1 co-
twin did not complete the ADI-R, and were not included in the analyses. 




8.2.2.1 Diagnostic Measures  
The ADI-R (Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994) is a gold-standard assessment tool for ASD and is 
conducted as a structured parent interview. The diagnostic algorithm for children aged 4 and 
above was used. A subset of 37 items is used to create a diagnostic algorithm with items scored 
from 0 (not present) to 2 (definitely present). Some items can be coded as a 3 and are recoded 
as a 2 for the algorithm scores. The algorithm scores were used for the FMM. 
The ADOS (Lord et al., 2000) is a semi-structured observational gold-standard assessment for 
ASD. The current study used the total score from the three ADOS domains (social, 
communication and RRBI domains) as a severity measure. 
8.2.2.2 IQ 
General cognitive ability was assessed using the WASI (WASI) (Wechsler, 1999) to obtain an 
estimated score for verbal and performance IQ and a full IQ score. To include the low IQ 
individuals in the analyses, the 14 nonverbal children were given a provisional WASI full-scale 
IQ score of 49 (1 point below the lowest possible score on the WASI). 
8.2.2.3 Cognitive Tasks 
The full description of the cognitive tasks can be found in Chapter 3. Briefly, participants 
completed an extensive cognitive battery to measure central coherence, executive function and 
theory of mind ability, lasting approximately 2 hours and administered in a counterbalanced 
order. The cognitive tasks were chosen as they were deemed appropriate for the age range and 
ability level of the participants. The cognitive tasks provided a comprehensive assessment of a 
full range of cognitive abilities in individuals and are sensitive to cognitive deficits which have 
previously been described in individuals with ASD. The cognitive factors created in Chapter 5 
were used for the present analyses. 
8.2.3 Questionnaire Measures 
Parents and the twin pairs were asked to complete a questionnaire booklet and the measures 
are described in Chapter 3. The same parent completed the questionnaire booklet for both 
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twins. The SDQ (Goodman, 1997) was used to index behavioural problems, and the subscales 
were used to index emotional symptoms, conduct problems, hyperactivity, peer problems, and 
pro-social behaviours. The SMFQ (Sharp, et al 2006) was used to index depression and the 
RCADS (Chorpita, et al 2000) was used to index anxiety. In addition, sensory abnormalities 
were identified using the SSP (McIntosh, Miller, Shyu, & Dunn, 1999). 
8.2.4 Analyses 
In this chapter, all twins were treated as singletons in the analyses. However, as the participants 
are twin pairs, adjustments needed to be made for non-independence of the data. The cluster 
command in MPlus was used to account for the non-independence of the data. Analyses were 
carried out in MPlus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2011), IBM SPSS 20 and STATA 10.1 
(StataCorp, 2007). 
8.2.4.1 Factor Mixture Modelling 
A series of latent class analyses and confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to inform 
factor mixture models. Factor mixture models are an extension of latent class analysis and are a 
relatively novel method used to investigate unknown population heterogeneity (see Lubke & 
Muthén, 2005, for a detailed description of FMMs). The factor mixture model (FMM) combines 
the latent class model and common factor model to stratify individuals into relatively more 
homogeneous subgroups. The latent class model clusters participants based on the observed 
items to model the unobserved population heterogeneity within the FMM. The latent class 
model produces a categorical outcome by clustering participants into classes. For FMMs, the 
number of latent classes is specified in advance. Within FMM, the common factor model 
investigates the common influences of the observed items by creating continuous latent 
variables called factors. The covariance between participants within a class for the observed 
items is modelled by specifying the regression path between the observed items and the 
underlying continuous latent factors. An advantage of FMMs is that the factor structure of a 
questionnaire is modelled using the common factor model so that the observed scores are 
separated into factor scores and a residual such that measurement error is taken into account.  
During the model estimation, posterior class probabilities were calculated for each participant. 
For the best fitting model, factor scores and class membership were calculated for each 
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individual. Factor scores were calculated based on the mean of the items that loaded on to each 
factor. On the basis of their highest probability, participants were assigned to their most likely 
class membership. Individuals could only belong to one class. The most likely class 
membership was then used for post-hoc analyses due to the recommendations of Clarke and 
Muthén (2009) that using most likely class membership is the best performing method (over 
other techniques, such as weighted-regression) when the entropy of the model is 0.80 or 
greater. It is suggested to use a more stringent criterion than the 5% level, and so a p-value of 
.01 was used. The post-hoc analyses used a series of multinomial logistic regressions to 
characterise classes (see Appendix 4), as parametric tests could not be used due to class 
membership being a discrete variable. 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Statistical Models 
A total of four FMMs were tested using the raw subscale scores of the 37 ADI-R items. To guide 
the choice of the number of classes and factors for the FMM, six LCA models (one-to-six 
classes) and three CFA models (one-to-three factors) were also carried out. The two-factor CFA 
and the two-factor FMM forced the 29 ADI-R items that measure abnormalities in reciprocal 
social interaction and communication to load only on to a social-communication (SC) factor, and 
eight ADI-R items that measure restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behaviours to 
load only on to an RRBI factor. Similarly, the three-factor CFA and the three-factor FMM forced 
the 16 ADI-R items that measure abnormalities in reciprocal social interaction to load on to a 
social factor, 13 ADI-R items that measure abnormalities in communication to load on to a 
communication factor, and the eight ADI-R items to load on to an RRBI factor. The LCA and 
CFA were also compared to the final FMM to assess whether the final FMM was a better overall 
fit to the data. The fit of all models was tested using established goodness-of-fit criteria such as 
Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC), Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), and the Sample Size 
Adjusted Bayesian Information Criteria (SSA BIC) (Table 8.1). Lower values of AIC, BIC and 
SSA BIC indicate better model fit, with preference given to SSA BIC based on suggestions by 
Nylund, Asparouhov, and Muthén (2008). Furthermore, the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin Likelihood 
Ratio Test is reported, which examines if an additional class significantly improves the model 
(Lo, Mendell, & Rubin, 2001). 
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The LCA was based on fit and revealed a solution with five classes. Five classes had the best 
fitting adjusted BIC. Based on this outcome, the FMMs contained five classes. Direct statistical 
comparisons based on goodness-of-fit criteria revealed a “one-factor, five class” FMM solution 
to best fit the data. However, the Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin Likelihood Ratio Test revealed that a 
two-class solution was preferred to a one-class solution (p = .044). In addition, the best-fitting 
CFA model revealed a two factor solution indicating that two factors may be more consistent 
with the data. Furthermore, previous research has also demonstrated a two-factor solution to 
ADI-R data, using a social-communication factor and an RRBI factor (Georgiades, et al., 2013). 
Taking this into consideration, a “two-factor, five-class” FMM was decided upon as the most 
comprehensive fit to the data. According to this FMM, individuals could be classified into five 
relatively homogeneous classes (Class 1: 23%, Class 2: 18%, Class 3: 17%, Class 4: 29%, 
Class 5: 13%, of the sample)
1
.  
                                                     
1
 It is worth noting that the SSA BIC is marginally better for the five-class LCA compared to 
the two-factor/five-class FMM model. However, the free parameters for the five-class LCA was 
considerably more than for the two-factor/five-class FMM model (374 vs. 121), therefore 
implying that the two-factor/five-class FMM model is a more parsimonious fit to the data 
compared to the five-class LCA. 
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Table 8.1. LCA, CFA and FMM models, model fit indices, and class percentages (N = 249) 
 
Classes (c) or 
factors (f) Log Likelihood 
Number of Free 
Parameters Entropy AIC BIC SSA BIC 
VLMR (p-
value) Class Percentages 
LCA models 1c -8782.889 74 - 17713.78 17975.25 17740.66 - 100% 
 2c -7035.352 149 .99 14368.71 14895.18 14422.82 < .001 44%, 54% 
 3c -6595.719 224 .99 13639.44 14430.92 13720.80 .760 16%, 44%, 40% 
 4c -6403.369 299 .99 13404.74 14461.22 13513.34 .760 22%, 32%, 12%, 34% 
 5c -6294.293 374 .97 13336.59 14658.07 13472.43 .696 12%, 24%, 22%, 17%, 25% 
 6c -6241.33 449 .98 13380.66 14967.15 13543.74 .800 11%, 5%, 15%, 21%, 16%, 32% 
CFA models 1f -9091.37 111 - 18404.74 18796.95 18445.06 -  
 2f -9069.979 112 - 18363.96 18759.7 18404.64 -  
 3f -9068.574 114 - 18365.15 18767.95 18406.55 -  
FMMs 1f 5c -6597.342 118  13430.68 13847.62 13473.54 - 13%, 18%, 22%, 27%, 19% 
 
2f 5c -6595.219 121  13432.44 13859.98 13476.39 .044 18%, 23%, 13% 17%, 29% 
 
3f 5c -6616.183 124  13480.37 13918.51 13525.40 .256 12%, 32%, 32%, 4%, 20% 
 
4f 5c -6478.108 129  13214.22 13670.02 13261.07 .175 22%, 32%, 11%, 3%, 32% 
Notes: The best fitting models from a direct comparison across all goodness-of-fit criteria is presented in bold. AIC = Akaike Information Criteria; BIC = Bayesian 
Information Criteria; c = class; CFA = confirmatory factor analysis; f = factor; FMM = factor mixture model; LCA = latent class analysis; SSA BIC = Sample Size Adjusted 
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8.3.2 Symptom Profile of Classes 
To assess qualitative differences between classes, mean scores for each ADI-R item were 
computed and these symptom profiles of the classes are shown in Figure 8.1. Additionally, 
Figure 8.2 represents the between- and within-class variability for ASD symptoms in a two-
dimensional convex hull plot. It is notable that individuals in Class 4 had severe social-
communication impairments, but a varying degree of RRBI impairments.  
Table 8.2 shows the mean symptoms scores across classes for symptom factors, and the 
ADOS. Mean factor sum scores for social-communication factor and RRBI factor were 
computed using the appropriate ADI-R items, corresponding to the two factors used in the 
FMM. The social-communication factor and RRBI factor were significantly correlated in the 
participants with a broad spectrum diagnosis (r = .57, p < .001) and ASD (r = .66, p < .001), but 
were not correlated for the unaffected co-twins (r = .07, p = .577). Additionally, the SC and RRBI 
factors were only correlated in Class 5 (r = .37, p < .05; all other classes: r < .20, p > .091). A 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation was used to test if the correlation for Class 5 was significantly 
different to the other classes. The correlation between Class 2 and 5 was marginally significant 
(z = 1.57, p = .058) and all other comparisons were not significant (p > .131). A series of 
multinomial logistic regressions comparing severity of ASD symptoms across class membership 
revealed that the five classes differed significantly on both the SC factor (all ps < .001) and the 
RRBI factor (all ps < .008), with one exception: no significant difference between RRBIs factor 
score for Class 1 and Class 2 (p = .135). Overall, the severity of ASD symptoms (as measured 
by the ADOS) differed across most classes (all ps < .001), with one exception: Class 2 and 
Class 3 (p = .141) did not differ in overall symptom severity. ADOS social impairments did not 
differ significantly when comparing Class 3 with Class 2 (p = .040) or Class 4 (p = .023). All 
other class comparisons for ADOS social symptoms were significant (all ps < .01). ADOS 
communication impairments did not differ significantly when comparing Class 2 with Class 3 (p 
= .108). All other class comparisons for ADOS communication symptoms were significant (all ps 
< .001). Class 5 had significantly higher ADOS RRBI scores than all other classes (all ps < 
.001). Furthermore, Class 4 had significantly higher ADOS RRBI scores than Class 1 (p < .001), 
and marginally significantly higher than Class 2 (p = .011) and Class 3 (p = .015). 




Figure 8.1. Symptom profiles for the five classes for the factor mixture model with “two factors, 
five classes” (N = 249).  
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the diagnostic algorithm items from the ADI-R. The 
vertical axis represents the average item score (minimum = 0, maximum = 2) with a higher 
score reflecting more severe deficits. The line indicates the distinction between the items 
loading on to the SC factor (left) and the items loading on to the RRBI factor (right). 





Figure 8.2. Social-communication (SC) factor by RRBI factor two-dimensional convex hull plot 
for the five classes (N = 249). 
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Table 8.2. Characterisation of classes based on age, gender, diagnosis, IQ, and symptom 
scores 
Mean (SD) Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Group 
Differences 
N (%) 56 45 43 73 32  











Gender 22M; 34F 23M; 
22F 
9F; 34M 3F; 70M 7F; 25M 1 = 2, 3 = 5 
4 M> 1, 2, 3, 5 
1, 2 F> 3, 4, 5 
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5 > 4 > 3 > 2, 
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5 > 4 > 3, 2 > 
1 
Notes: ADOS = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; ASD = autism spectrum disorder; 
BSP = broad spectrum; CT = unaffected co-twin; F = female; FIQ = full scale intelligence 
quotient; M = male; N = number of participants; PIQ = performance intelligence quotient; SC = 
social-communication; VIQ = verbal intelligence quotient 
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8.3.3 Characterisation of Classes 
The distribution of all individuals across the distinct classes, as well as the age, gender, 
diagnosis, and IQ characteristics of each class are provided in Table 8.2. The series of 
multinomial logistic regressions comparing age across class membership revealed that age did 
not differ significantly between classes (all ps > .031). Class 1 and 2 (p = .236), and Class 3 and 
5 (p = .921) had similar proportions of males and females. However, there were a significantly 
higher proportion of females in Classes 1 and 2 compared to Class 3, 4 and 5 (2 vs. 5 
marginally significant p = .018). Furthermore, Class 4 had a significantly higher proportion of 
males than all other classes (all ps < .01). 
In terms of diagnostic status across class membership, there was a significant difference in 
distribution by diagnosis (i.e., unaffected co-twin, broad-spectrum, or ASD diagnosis) across the 
five classes (all ps < .001). Class 1 contained proportionally more individuals without a 
diagnosis of ASD (i.e., unaffected co-twin; 89%). Class 5 comprised only individuals with an 
ASD diagnosis. The greatest proportion of broad-spectrum diagnoses was within Class 2 (38%) 
and Class 3 (33%).  
Class 1 had a significantly higher VIQ than Class 4 (p = .008) and Class 5 (p < .001). Class 2 
had a significantly higher VIQ than Class 4 (p = .003) and Class 5 (p < .001). Overall, Class 5 
had a significantly lower VIQ than all other classes (all ps ≤ .001). PIQ did not differ significantly 
across Class 1 to 4 (all ps > .269). However, Class 5 had a significantly lower PIQ than all other 
classes (all ps ≤ .001). Class 5 had a significantly lower full-scale IQ than all other classes (all 
ps < .001). 
In addition, the class concordance rate was 48% for monozygotic twins compared to only a 5% 
concordance rate for dizygotic twins. 
8.3.4 Cognitive Profiles 
The cognitive factors created in Chapter 5 were used for these analyses. To reiterate, all 
cognitive tasks were subject to an exploratory factor analysis, with a four factor solution fitting 
the data the best. These results were used to create four cognitive composites, each reflecting 
a different aspect of cognition. These cognitive composite scores were then standardised to 
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create the final factor scores. A series of multinomial regressions were then used to 
characterise classes by cognitive factor. 
Figure 8.3 presents the cognitive profiles of the five classes. Class 4 (M = -1.13) and Class 5 (M 
= -1.14) performed worse than Class 1 on the executive function factor (M = -0.33, p < .01). On 
the theory of mind factor, Class 4 (M = -1.04) performed significantly poorer than Class 1 (M = -
0.04, p = .002), Class 2 (M = 0.19, p = .001), and marginally poorer than Class 3 (M = -0.26, p = 
.026). On the global processing factor, Class 3 (M = -0.64) and Class 4 (M = -0.59) performed 
significantly poorer than Class 1 (M = 0.08, ps < .005). All other class comparisons were non-
significant (all ps > .054). 
 
Figure 8.3. Performance on cognitive factors by five classes, after accounting for IQ (N = 153).  
Note: Scores are presented as z-scores (relative to a control group). Error bars are standard 
errors. Numbers above bars indicate class numbers (i.e., 1 = Class 1). A number above a bar 
indicates a significant difference between the class that the bar represents and the class 
indicated by the number above the bar (p < .01). 
8.3.5 Concurrent Behavioural Symptom Profiles of Classes 
8.3.5.1 Rater Agreement 
The correlations between the parent and child ratings for each questionnaire are shown in Table 
8.3. Table 8.3 indicates that across all participants, the parent and child reports are significantly 
correlated. However, a varying pattern of results emerged when considering the cross-rater 
correlations separated by most likely class membership. For correlations between parent and 
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child report for SDQ Total Difficulties, cross-rater correlations were significant for Class 1, 2 and 
3 only, with non-significant correlations for Class 4 and 5. A differing pattern of cross-rater 
correlations emerged across SDQ subscales. For correlations between parent and child reports 
for SMFQ Depression, cross-rater correlations were significant for Class 2 and 3, with non-
significant correlations for Class 1, 4 and 5. For correlations between parent and child reports 
for RCADS Anxiety, cross-rater correlations were significant across all classes. 
8.3.5.2 Self-Report Measures 
Figure 8.4 shows the standardised mean scores across self-report measures in relation to the 
mean and standard deviation of Class 1. Class 5 rated their behavioural problems (SDQ total 
difficulties score) similarly to all other classes (all ps > .050). Class 4 (M = 15.27) rated their 
behavioural problems significantly higher than Class 1 (M = 10.80, p = .001) and Class 2 (M = 
11.19, p = .003). Class 3 (M = 0.77) rated their behavioural problems marginally higher than 
Class 1 (M = 10.80, p = .011). The ratings for SDQ subscales (hyperactivity, emotional 
problems, conduct problems, peer problems, pro-social behaviour) did not significantly differ 
across most likely class membership (all ps > .110). Furthermore, the ratings for anxiety and 
depression did not significantly differ across most likely class membership (all ps > .048). 
  
Table 8.3. Correlations between parent-report and child-report versions of questionnaires, by 
most likely class membership 
Questionnaire Measure All Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
SDQ Total Difficulties .55*** .42** .67*** .64*** .25 .42 
SDQ Emotional Symptoms .40*** .13 .70*** .52** .23 .26** 
SDQ Conduct Problems .47*** .33* .67*** .78*** .59*** .17 
SDQ Hyperactivity .49*** .57*** .48** .47** .24 .57*** 
SDQ Peer Problems .66*** .55*** .43* .33 .52*** .50*** 
SDQ Pro-social Behaviour .37*** .30 .32 .44* .35* .16 
SMFQ Depression .49*** .13 .81*** .57** .22 .10 
RCADS Anxiety .44*** .56*** .48*** .43* .53*** .33*** 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 




Figure 8.4. Concurrent behavioural symptom profiles across classes for self-report measures, 
relative to Class 1.  
Notes: Higher values indicate more severe symptoms (Prosocial subscale is reversed). 
Numbers above bars indicate class numbers (i.e., 1 = Class 1). A number above a bar indicates 
a significant difference between the class that the bar represents and the class indicated by the 
number above the bar (p < .01). MFQ = Mood and Feelings Questionnaire; RCADS = Revised 
Children’s Anxiety and Depression Scale; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
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8.3.5.3 Parent Report Measures 
Table 8.4 reports the mean scores across the parent-report measures for each class. Figure 8.5 
and Figure 8.6 show the standardised mean scores across parent-report measures in relation to 
the mean and standard deviation of Class 1 and indicates significant differences between 
classes. Figure 8.5 shows that Classes 3, 4, and 5 have significantly higher depression and 
anxiety ratings than Class 1, and significantly more overall behavioural problems and peer 
problems than Classes 1 and 2. In addition, Classes 2, 3, 4, and 5 have significantly more 
emotional problems and conduct problems than Class 1. Figure 8.6 indicates that Class 1 and 2 
have few sensory abnormalities, Class 3 has intermediary sensory abnormalities, and Class 4 
and 5 have significantly more overall sensory abnormalities than other classes.  
Table 8.4. Class means based on concurrent behavioural profiles 
  Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
SDQ  
      Emotional 
Symptoms 
1.32 3.12 4.48 4.16 3.32 
 Conduct Problems 0.78 1.73 2.26 2.44 2.15 
 Hyperactivity 2.43 3.25 4.75 6.31 6.81 
 Peer Problems 0.85 1.97 4.50 5.36 6.36 
 Prosocial 
Behaviour 
8.88 7.94 7.22 5.38 3.18 
 Total Difficulties 5.26 9.91 16.23 18.28 18.58 
Anxiety       
 RCADS Total 16.16 21.26 24.33 26.58 27.85 
Depression      
 MFQ Total 1.55 2.72 4.75 5.21 4.19 
Sensory Behaviours      
 SSP Total 15.01 22.58 31.15 45.97 62.50 
Note: Significant group differences are shown in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6 
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Table 8.5 shows the numbers and percentages of participants within each class who are 
below/above defined cut-offs for each parent-report measure. Table 8.5 shows that no 
individuals assigned to Class 1 had abnormal rates of behavioural difficulties. This percentage 
increased Class 2 (13%) with 42% of individuals in Class 3 showing abnormal rates of 
behavioural difficulties. Over half of individuals assigned to Classes 4 and 5 displayed abnormal 
rates of behavioural difficulties. Table 8.5 also indicates increasing rates of abnormal rates of 
hyperactivity from individuals assigned to Class 1 (0%) through to Class 4 (49%) and Class 5 
(57%). In addition, just 5% of Class 1 had abnormal rates of peer problems. The rates of peer 
problems increased to 21% for Class 2 and increased considerably to 81% for Class 3, with 
nearly all individuals in Class 5 (95%) showing abnormal rates of peer problems. Furthermore, 
according to Table 8.5, 29% of Class 1 met cut-off criteria for depression, which increased to 
41% of Class 5. 36% of Class 1 met cut-off criteria for anxiety, which increased to 56% of 
individuals in Class 3 and 53% of individuals in Class 5. 
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Table 8.5. Number and percentages of participants above and below cut-offs for concurrent 
behavioural symptoms, by class membership. 
Parent Report Measures Class 1  Class 2  Class 3  Class 4  Class 5 
N (%)  N (%)  N (%)  N (%)  N (%) 
SDQ Total Difficulties               
 Normal 38 (97)  26 (81)  11 (35)  12 (21)  3 (16) 
 Borderline 1 (3)  2 (6)  7 (23)  12 (21)  4 (21) 
 Abnormal 0 (0)  4 (13)  13 (42)  33 (58)  12 (63) 
SDQ Emotional Symptoms               
 Normal 38 (93)  15 (46)  16 (52)  25 (43)  11 (50) 
 Borderline 2 (7)  12 (36)  1 (3)  8 (14)  3 (14) 
 Abnormal 0 (0)  6 (18)  14 (45)  25 (43)  8 (36) 
SDQ Conduct Problems               
 Normal 39 (98)  24 (73)  23 (74)  34 (58)  13 (65) 
 Borderline 1 (2)  3 (9)  1 (3)  8 (13)  2 (10) 
 Abnormal 0 (0)  6 (18)  7 (23)  17 (29)  5 (25) 
SDQ Hyperactivity               
 Normal 35 (88)  26 (81)  19 (59)  23 (39)  5 (24) 
 Borderline 5 (12)  1 (3)  5 (16)  7 (12)  4 (19) 
 Abnormal 0 (0)  5 (16)  8 (25)  29 (49)  12 (57) 
SDQ Peer Problems               
 Normal 35 (85)  19 (58)  5 (16)  6 (10)  1 (5) 
 Borderline 4 (10)  7 (21)  1 (3)  8 (14)  0 (0) 
 Abnormal 2 (5)  7 (21)  26 (81)  44 (76)  21 (95) 
SDQ Pro-social Behaviours               
 Normal 38 (93)  30 (91)  26 (81)  27 (47)  4 (18) 
 Borderline 1 (2)  1 (3)  4 (13)  10 (17)  4 (18) 
 Abnormal 2 (5)  2 (6)  2 (6)  21 (36)  14 (64) 
SMFQ Depression               
 Below cut-off 40 (71)  30 (67)  26 (60)  45 (62)  19 (59) 
 Above cut-off 16 (29)  15 (33)  17 (40)  28 (38)  13 (41) 
RCADS Anxiety               
 Below cut-off 34 (61)  26 (58)  18 (42)  36 (50)  12 (38) 
 Subclinical 2 (3)  2 (4)  1 (2)  4 (5)  3 (9) 
 Above cut-off 20 (36)  17 (38)  24 (56)  33 (45)  17 (53) 
 




Figure 8.5. Concurrent behavioural symptom profiles across classes for parent-report 
measures, relative to Class 1.  
Notes: Higher values indicate more severe symptoms (Prosocial subscale is reversed). 
Numbers above bars indicate class numbers (i.e., 1 = Class 1). A number above a bar indicates 
a significant difference between the class that the bar represents and the class indicated by the 
number above the bar (p < .01). MFQ = Mood and Feelings Questionnaire; RCADS = Revised 
Children’s Anxiety and Depression Scale; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 





Figure 8.6. Sensory profiles across classes for the Short Sensory Profile (SSP), relative to Class 
1. 
Notes: Higher values indicate greater sensory abnormalities. A number above a bar indicates a 
significant difference between the class that the bar represents and the class indicated by the 
number above the bar (p < .01)  
 




8.4.1 Summary of Findings 
The first aim of this study was to identify more homogeneous subgroups within ASD by using a 
factor mixture approach using the diagnostic items from the ADI-R. This approach produced a 
“two-factor, five class” FMM model, as having the most comprehensive fit to the data. According 
to this model, twins from pairs with at least one diagnosed ASD individual could be assigned to 
one of five relatively homogeneous classes based on their social-communication and RRBI 
symptoms. Our FMM findings complement (Georgiades, et al., 2013), in which a two-factor, 
three-class FMM model fitted the ADI-R data. The lower number of classes compared to the 
current study may be due to the sample used, as Georgiades et al’s (2013) sample was 
younger (4-years-old) and all were diagnosed with ASD, whereas the current study also 
included unaffected co-twins and those with broader spectrum diagnoses. 
As predicted, the FMM model specified a two-factor solution to the ADI-R items; one factor 
corresponding to social/communication deficits and a second factor corresponding to RRBIs. 
This two-factor solution suggests that social-communication symptoms and RRBIs are distinct 
symptom dimensions in ASD. Frazier, et al. (2012) also obtained two separable, but highly 
correlated, social-communication and RRBIs factors, suggesting that these two dimensions are 
not necessarily independent of each other. 
The FMM model also suggests that social and communication impairments are not distinct 
symptom dimensions, corresponding with the recent DSM-5 changes from a three-symptom 
structure in the DSM-IV to a two-dimensional symptom structure for ASD: social-communication 
deficits and fixated interests and repetitive behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 
2013). The current results also support Snow, Lecavalier, and Houts’ (2009) findings that the 
ADI-R contained two factors corresponding to a social-communication factor and an RRBI 
factor, using both CFA and exploratory factor analysis. However, Duku et al. (2013) found that a 
two-factor model did not extend to comparisons of the two symptom dimensions between ASD 
subgroups that differed in terms of age, sex, or verbal ability. Instead, both Duku, et al. (2013) 
and Liu et al. (2011) found that a six-factor model was the most adequate explanation of the 
autism symptom phenotype. 
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The current study FMM model specified a five-class solution to the symptom heterogeneity 
present in the participants. When examining the symptom profile of these classes, the results 
largely suggest that the five classes are defined by symptom severity, incrementally increasing 
from Class 1 through to Class 5. Class 1 had the lowest social and communication impairments, 
with few RRBIs, and mainly comprised unaffected co-twins. Class 2 had slightly more social and 
communication impairments than Class 1, but few RRBIs (comparable to Class 1). The severity 
of social and communication impairments significantly increased through Class 3 to Class 5, 
with individuals assigned to Class 5 showing the most severe social and communication 
impairments. Likewise, RRBIs significantly increased through Class 3 to 5, with individuals 
assigned to Class 5 showing the most restricted and repetitive behaviours, although there was 
more class overlap in RRBIs than in social-communication symptoms, perhaps due in part to 
lower numbers of items addressing the former than the latter in ADI-R. 
Previous research has investigated the subgrouping of individuals within ASD using latent class 
analysis. For example, Frazier, et al. (2012) study reported just two classes, which could be 
distinguished as an ASD class versus a non-ASD class. Based on these findings, Frazier, et al. 
(2012) posited a categorical approach to ASD. The current study and previous empirical 
findings do not support a categorical distinction in ASD. Beuker et al. (2013) investigated ASD 
symptoms in a large sample of 11,332 mothers of 18-month-old infants. The LCA indicated four 
classes, with a distinction between social and communication symptoms, and stereotypies and 
rigidities. The classes were defined by (1) high symptom scores, (2) subclinical symptoms of 
ASD, (3) high RRBI scores, but low social-communication symptoms, and (4) low symptom 
scores across all domains. Comparable to the current study and that by Georgiades, et al. 
(2013), the classes were largely defined by symptom severity. 
The second aim of this chapter was to explore the similarities and differences between 
individuals assigned to each subgroup in terms of age, gender, diagnosis, current experimenter-
rated ASD symptomatology (on ADOS), cognition and co-occurring behavioural emotional, and 
sensory abnormalities. These analyses suggested that Class 1 contained an equal gender split 
with mostly unaffected individuals (non-diagnosed co-twins) with low ASD symptoms and low 
comorbid symptoms and few sensory abnormalities. Class 2 was similar to Class 1 in having an 
equal gender split, similar IQ, equally low RRBI scores and few sensory abnormalities, but 
contained more broad-spectrum diagnoses, more social-communication symptoms and more 
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behavioural problems than Class 1. Class 3 comprised three-quarter males, a third with a 
broad-spectrum diagnosis and two-thirds with ASD. Class 3 had a similar IQ to Class 1, 2, and 
4, with moderate ASD symptoms and sensory abnormalities and more comorbid symptoms than 
Class 2. Class 4 comprised mostly males with ASD, had a lower IQ than Class 1 and 2, and had 
more severe ASD impairments and high rates of comorbid symptoms and sensory 
abnormalities. Class 5 comprised three-quarter males, all with ASD diagnoses, severe ASD 
symptoms and a lower IQ than other classes, over half had abnormal rates of behavioural 
difficulties (as defined by the SDQ) with high rates of comorbid symptoms, and presented with 
high rates of sensory abnormalities. 
It appears that increased ASD symptoms may increase risk for concurrent behavioural 
symptoms. Lundstrom et al. (2011) found that even relatively mild autistic-like behaviours 
increased the risk for comorbid symptoms. In addition, Hallett et al. (2013) investigated anxiety 
and ASD within the SR sample and found that individuals with ASD and broader spectrum 
diagnoses had higher levels of anxiety than typically-developing individuals. Furthermore, some 
anxiety subscales were correlated with increased social and communicative impairments. This 
corresponds to Classes 4 and 5 who had higher anxiety and higher levels of social and 
communicative impairments compared to Classes 1 and 2. 
In addition, Class 5 had high rates of sensitivity across tactile, taste/smell and visual/auditory 
domains and high rates of sensation seeking and auditory filtering. Class 5’s sensory profile 
was very similar to the ‘taste/smell sensitive’ sensory group that Lane, Molloy, and Bishop 
(2014) indicated in a clustering-based study to identify sensory subgroups within ASD using the 
SSP. In contrast, Class 4 showed much lower rates in these domains, but had high rates of 
movement sensitivity and so their profile could reflect the ‘generalized sensory difference’ 
subgroup that Lane, et al. (2014) identified. 
8.4.2 Limitations 
Some limitations warrant consideration. Firstly, males were overrepresented in certain classes. 
Secondly, a typically-developing control group was not used in the present analyses as controls 
in SR study did not complete diagnostic assessments. Another limitation concerns statistical 
power; multiple comparisons were made across classes. This was taken into consideration with 
significance thresholds set at a stricter level. Furthermore, there was a large amount of missing 
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data in Class 5 as half of the group were nonverbal individuals with ASD. This meant that these 
individuals were unable to complete many of the cognitive tasks and so produced a 
considerable amount of missing data within this group. This small sample size within Class 5 
could mean that there was lack of statistical power to detect significant differences. Also of note 
is the IQ assessment for the nonverbal individuals with ASD. Although a nonverbal test of IQ 
was used, floor effects made it difficult to establish a reliable IQ score. Consequently these 
individuals were given an IQ score of 49, perhaps skewing Class 5’s average IQ score. On the 
other hand, an IQ score of 49 (one less than the lowest possible score on the WASI) may in fact 
be an overestimate of functioning for some of these individuals. 
A further limitation regards the questionnaire measures used within the study. Using 
questionnaires to measure behavioural symptoms has its own disadvantages, such as 
measurement error, rater bias, and item inclusion/exclusion. Within this study, the questionnaire 
measures used have been validated in typically developing samples, but not all have good 
psychometric information from the ASD population. Additionally, both parent and child reports of 
behavioural symptoms were used. Modest rater agreements on behavioural symptoms were 
observed, yet differing results were found when comparing classes when using parent or child 
report measures. 
There are further limitations in using the FMM approach, such as bias in choosing the best 
fitting model, which can lead to misspecification of the number of classes or misspecification of 
the factor structure. Additionally, FMM does not permit the investigation of different factor 
structures within different classes. It instead forces a common factor structure in each class. In 
the current study, a two factor structure was imposed in each class. It could be hypothesised 
that the factor structure differs across classes, but it is not possible to investigate this 
hypothesis using the FMM approach. Furthermore, fewer RRBI items were available from the 
ADI-R in the factor structure than social-communication symptoms. This means that some RRBI 
symptoms may not have been fully covered, which may have biased the outcome of the FMM. 
8.4.3 Future Directions 
The current study used only ASD symptoms to examine subgroups within ASD. However, the 
subgroups established within this study differed in their level of comorbid symptoms, with many 
showing abnormal levels of symptoms in other psychiatric disorders, such as anxiety, 
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hyperactivity, and conduct problems. Even though ASD is conceptualised as a single disorder, a 
large amount of heterogeneity within ASD may in fact be due to the frequently associated 
features and comorbid symptoms. Therefore, it may be beneficial to explore whether there are 
subgroups within ASD who have distinct comorbid symptom profiles, such as in van der Meer, 
et al. (2012) study in which ASD [+ADHD] and ADHD [+ASD] subgroups were found. This could 
involve an approach that includes social-communicative and RRBI items, plus items relating to 
comorbidities within the factor mixture model. 
Wardenaar and de Jonge (2013) proposed that for homogeneous diagnoses to occur, the three 
levels of heterogeneity (person, symptom, and time) need to be modelled. The current study 
used FMM to model person-level and symptom-level heterogeneity. To cover all three sources 
of variation, a statistical technique that also includes repeated symptom measures across time 
should be implemented according to Wardenaar and de Jonge (2013). For example, latent 
growth curve analysis could be used (Muthén, Asparouhov, & Rebollo, 2006). It could then be 
explored whether the classes identified in this study follow a different developmental trajectory.  
A quantitative genetic approach could be used to investigate genetic predispositions for the 
different ASD classes/subgroups. Also, Lundstrom, et al. (2011) study suggested that there are 
both common genetic and environmental predispositions between autistic-like traits and 
comorbid disorders. It would also be interesting to investigate whether common genetic and 
environmental predispositions can elucidate the co-occurrence of ASD symptomatology and 
concurrent behavioural problems within this sample. 
8.4.4 Conclusion 
In sum, a ‘two-factor, five-class’ FMM was chosen as showing the best fit to the present data; 
one factor corresponding to social-communication impairments, and a second factor 
corresponding to restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests. According to the final FMM, 
individuals could be classified into five relatively homogeneous subgroups. These five 
subgroups were largely based on severity of ASD symptoms. Across the subgroups, individuals 
received different diagnoses, had a differing IQ profile, and a differing symptom profile. In 
addition, subgroups with more severe ASD symptoms also had increased severity of concurrent 
behavioural symptoms and sensory abnormalities. This suggests that assessments for 
concurrent behavioural symptoms and sensory abnormalities should be conducted alongside 
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diagnostic assessments for ASD. Future work should endeavour to examine the developmental 
trajectories of potential subgroups in ASD and attempt to validate the categorisation using 
genetic, neurophysiological and cognitive biomarkers. 
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Chapter 9 General Discussion 
The primary aim of this thesis has been to explore the possible fractionation of ASD at the 
cognitive level. The following sections will serve to re-examine the research questions posed in 
this thesis and to summarise the main findings. General interpretations will be considered using 
the framework of the fractionated triad theory of ASD. The limitations of the current work and 
potential future research will then be considered.  
9.1 Summary of Results 
9.1.1 How Prevalent are Cognitive Deficits in ASD? 
To establish whether a multiple cognitive deficit model is a viable explanation of ASD, the 
prevalence of multiple cognitive deficits/differences in ASD should first be examined. 
Consequently, Chapter 4 investigated the prevalence of multiple cognitive atypicalities in 
adolescents with ASD, their unaffected co-twins and a control group. This approach was taken 
in Chapter 4 as there are many mixed findings in the literature regarding cognitive deficits in 
ASD, with data typically reported for just one area of cognition because of the predominance of 
single cognitive deficit accounts of ASD.  
Taking a group mean difference approach, it was reported in Chapter 4 that the ASD group 
performed significantly worse than the control group across individual cognitive tasks measuring 
CC, EF and ToM, except for tasks measuring local processing ability (EFT and Block Design 
Task). This finding was confirmed in Chapter 5; the ASD group performed significantly worse on 
the derived factors purported to measure EF, ToM and global processing than both the 
unaffected co-twin group and control group, but no differences were found for the local 
processing factor.  
However, due to the heterogeneity in cognitive performance within the ASD group, it was 
decided that means may not fully reflect performance across groups and so analyses reported 
in Chapter 4 examined how many individuals showed no cognitive atypicalities, a single 
cognitive atypicality, dual cognitive atypicalities, or multiple cognitive atypicalities. Overall, it was 
found that the ASD group had atypical performance on more cognitive tasks than either 
comparison group. Furthermore, nearly a third of adolescents with ASD had multiple cognitive 
atypicalities, i.e., they had atypical performance in tasks across the cognitive domains of CC, EF 
and ToM. This proportion was significantly higher than that in the unaffected co-twin (11%) and 
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control (6%) groups. However, multiple cognitive atypicalities were not exhibited by every 
individual with ASD, as might be predicted from a strong version of a multiple deficit account. 
Instead, multiple cognitive atypicalities seem to be characteristic, but not a universal feature, of 
ASD. 
The findings in Chapter 4 are supported by the results of Pellicano (2010a) and Vanegas and 
Davidson (2015). Both Pellicano (2010a) and Vanegas and Davidson (2015) investigated 
multiple cognitive deficits in ASD in a younger age range to the SR sample (7-11 years), with 
Pellicano (2010a) additionally using a longitudinal design. At a group level, both Pellicano 
(2010a) and Vanegas and Davidson (2015) also demonstrated that children with ASD had 
deficits across cognitive domains, which persisted over time, supporting our claim that there are 
multiple cognitive deficits in ASD. However, Pellicano (2010a) examined individual cognitive 
profiles, and found that multiple cognitive deficits were not universal in ASD and the cognitive 
deficits became less marked through mid- to late-childhood. However, it should be considered 
that in both Chapter 4 and in Pellicano (2010a) study, a somewhat arbitrary definition of a 
cognitive atypicality was used. In fact, when Pellicano (2010a) used a more lenient definition of 
atypicality, all of the children with ASD had multiple cognitive atypicalities. Therefore, there are 
challenges in defining what constitutes ‘atypical performance’ on cognitive tasks. Furthermore, 
both studies used a categorical approach to performance by defining whether individuals had 
typical or atypical performance in cognitive tasks. Instead, future work might usefully take a 
continuous approach to a/typical cognitive performance.  
Due to the prevalence of cognitive atypicalities in ASD, it could be suggested that the three 
main cognitive domains of CC, EF, and ToM that have been the focus of this thesis, may 
potentially be cognitive endophenotypes of ASD. Chapter 7 used a twin-modelling approach to 
investigate the heritability of these cognitive atypicalities, and examined the genetic and 
environmental overlap between these cognitive atypicalities and ASD. Using the cognitive 
factors derived in Chapter 5, it was found that global processing, executive function and theory 
of mind were modestly associated with ASD phenotypically. Local processing showed strong 
genetic influence. However, all other cognitive domains showed low genetic influence and 
substantial non-shared environmental influences. Overall, there was limited support for the 
proposal that cognitive atypicalities are viable endophenotypes of ASD. These results do not fit 
family studies of the broader autism phenotype that have suggested an intermediate cognitive 
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profile (to include deficits in CC, EF and ToM) in relatives, and which have used these findings 
to propose that these cognitive atypicalities may be part of the endophenotype of ASD (cf. 
Nyden, et al., 2011). Chapter 7 was the first study to investigate cognitive endophenotypes 
using a twin modelling approach. The results support Nyden, et al. (2011), who found that weak 
CC and ToM are not part of the endophenotype of ASD. However, Nyden, et al. (2011) did find 
evidence of deficits in planning ability in the relatives of those with an ASD, suggesting that this 
may be a cognitive endophenotype of ASD. This was not supported in Chapter 7, where the 
executive function factor showed low genetic influence. 
In addition to investigating the prevalence of cognitive atypicalities specifically in individuals with 
a diagnosis of ASD, it was possible to explore aspects of the broader autism phenotype in this 
thesis since the unaffected co-twins of twins with ASD may be expected to share some 
(subclinical) traits or cognitive characteristics. Overall, Chapter 4 reported a mixed pattern of 
results regarding whether the unaffected co-twins of those with ASD shared cognitive features 
with their affected siblings. It appeared that the unaffected co-twin group had an intermediary 
cognitive profile, with cognitive performance not as poor as those with ASD, nor as good as the 
control group. In addition, a higher proportion of the unaffected co-twins had multiple cognitive 
atypicalities as compared to the control group. However, taking the cognitive factor scores 
derived in Chapter 5, the unaffected co-twins had significantly higher scores than the ASD 
group across the EF, ToM and global processing factors, with no significant differences in 
cognitive factor scores when compared to the control group.  
9.1.2 Are Cognitive Deficits Distinct in ASD? 
The focus of Chapter 5 was to examine if the cognitive functions relevant to ASD are distinct 
and independent from one another. A factor analytical approach was used to investigate the 
underlying structure of a cognitive task battery to create data-driven cognitive factors. It was 
found that the cognitive battery could be reduced to four factors; two factors relating most 
closely to the concept of CC, one factor relating to ToM, and one factor relating mostly to EF. A 
comparison of the factor structure in the ASD group compared to the control group indicated 
that the factor structure differed between groups. However, the confirmatory factor analyses 
performed in Chapter 6 in the ASD group only supported the underlying factor structure 
specified in the exploratory factor analysis. 
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The relationship between the four factors was also investigated in Chapter 5 and it was found 
that in the ASD group; (1) ToM and EF factors were correlated, and (2) ToM and global 
processing factors were correlated. No significant relationships between factors were found in 
either of the comparison groups. Therefore, the hypothesis that cognitive features are 
independent was supported within unaffected co-twin and control groups only. This suggests 
that these cognitive features are distinct by adolescence in typical development. However, 
cognitive features may remain (or become) inter-related in ASD. This may be due to 
developmental cascades in ASD, i.e., an abnormal cognitive function may impact a separate 
cognitive function over development. For example, impaired executive functions may influence 
the (poor) development of theory of mind (found to be related in Chapter 5). To examine 
developmental cascades, longitudinal data are required, and so it was not possible to test this 
hypothesis using the current dataset. However, it will be important to examine in future work the 
cognitive risk factors that may lead to cascades of events influencing the development of the 
cognitive and behavioural features of ASD. Targeted interventions could then interrupt these 
cascades improving outcomes for individuals with ASD. 
9.1.3 What is the Link Between Cognitive Deficits and the Symptoms of ASD? 
In Chapter 4, correlation analyses within the ASD group indicated that the number of cognitive 
tasks that an individual displayed atypical performance in was related to the severity of their 
ASD symptoms. There was also a significant difference in the severity of ASD symptoms 
according to the number of cognitive domains in which an individual showed atypicality (none, 
single, dual, and multiple). In addition, those with ASD who were affected by multiple cognitive 
atypicalities also had more severe ASD symptoms compared to those with no cognitive 
atypicalities. This indicates that underlying cognitive phenotypes may increase the likelihood or 
severity of ASD impairments. The results of Chapter 4 also support Happé, Ronald, et al. (2006) 
proposal that we need to move away from single cognitive accounts of ASD as multiple 
cognitive deficits may provide a better explanation of the behavioural symptoms of the disorder. 
In Chapter 8, behavioural subtypes of ASD were distinguished, with more severe ASD 
symptoms characterising Classes 4 and 5. In addition, lower cognitive factor scores were found 
for Classes 4 and 5 in the EF factor, Class 4 in the ToM factor, and Classes 3 and 4 in the 
global processing factor, as compared to Class 1 (lowest ASD symptoms). 
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Chapter 6 specifically investigated the link between cognitive deficits and the symptoms of ASD 
based on the prediction from the fractionated triad account that specific cognitive deficits will 
relate differentially to specific symptom domains in ASD. Using the ADOS as a measure of 
current symptom severity in ASD revealed that ToM was related to the social symptoms and EF 
was related to communication and RRBI symptoms of ASD. Using the ADI-R as a measure of 
past and current symptom severity in ASD, it was revealed that local processing was related to 
communication and social symptoms, and EF was related to communication symptoms in this 
ASD sample. Therefore the only consistent finding was a link between executive function and 
communication symptoms in ASD.  
Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) also used an individual differences approach to examine the 
link between cognition and ASD symptomatology. A link was found between ToM and planning 
abilities (EF) and ADOS communication symptoms, independent of language ability. However, 
there were no relationships between cognition and social symptoms or RRBIs once language 
was accounted for. The findings of Chapter 6 did not control for language ability as Joseph and 
Tager-Flusberg (2004) did, but did control for IQ. Furthermore, Joseph and Tager-Flusberg 
(2004) study contained 30 participants with ASD, in contrast to a sample five times that size in 
the SR study. This means that Chapter 6 could use more complex analyses to extend Joseph 
and Tager-Flusberg (2004) analyses, with more power to detect significant associations. 
Therefore, the results of Chapter 6 provide empirical support for the hypothesis that ToM 
deficits underlie current and observable social symptoms of ASD and support Joseph and 
Tager-Flusberg (2004) finding that EF may underlie communication symptoms. 
9.1.4 Is It Possible to Identify More Homogeneous Subtypes of ASD? 
One of the most challenging aspects of this thesis was the substantial heterogeneity among 
cognitive and behavioural features in ASD. Therefore, the main aim of Chapter 8 was to identify 
homogeneous subgroups within ASD using a novel approach called factor mixture modelling. 
This method assigned individuals to one of five relatively homogeneous subgroups based on 
their social-communication and RRBI symptoms, supporting the work of Georgiades, et al. 
(2013). The severity of ASD symptoms incrementally increased through the subgroups. 
Expanding on the work of Georgiades, et al. (2013), those in subgroups with more severe ASD 
symptoms also had more concurrent behavioural symptoms, such as depression, anxiety, 
behavioural issues and sensory abnormalities. It therefore appears that increased ASD 
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symptoms may increase risk for concurrent behavioural symptoms. This suggests that 
assessments for concurrent behavioural symptoms and sensory abnormalities should be 
conducted alongside diagnostic assessments for ASD. It could also be hypothesised that 
individuals in different subgroups may have a differential response to treatment. However, the 
subgroups identified in Chapter 8 still had a wide variation in their symptom and concurrent 
behavioural profiles, which was also the case with Georgiades, et al. (2013) subgroups. The 
approach taken in Chapter 8 did confirm significant heterogeneity in the symptom and comorbid 
profiles of those with ASD by adolescence. In addition, studies should consider alternatives to 
grouping participants as ASD vs. non-ASD to overcome the obstacle of heterogeneity. Overall, 
reducing heterogeneity using these approaches to inform groups could be an important 
implication and a next step for future research, such as using cognitive level phenotypes (as 
discussed in Section 9.3). 
9.1.5 How Do the Results Inform the Fractionation of ASD at the Cognitive Level? 
The novel findings in this thesis help clarify our understanding of ASD at the cognitive level. The 
main theme of this thesis was to investigate the fractionated triad approach to ASD that was 
proposed by Happé and Ronald (2008). Chapter 2 extended Happé and Ronald (2008) original 
review by examining the literature that specifically related to the fractionation of ASD at the 
cognitive level. From the review in Chapter 2, it was determined that very few studies have 
considered multiple cognitive deficits as characterising ASD as suggested by the fractionated 
account of ASD, and also how these deficits may link to the behavioural symptoms of ASD. 
The findings in this thesis do not support a strong version of the fractionated account of ASD, in 
which distinct causes at the genetic and neural levels relate to distinct deficits at the cognitive 
level, and these are associated with distinct symptoms of ASD at the behavioural level (as 
described in Chapter 1). There were some selective relationships between cognitive deficits and 
the behavioural symptoms of ASD, but these differed depending on the diagnostic symptom 
measure used. The results from the ADOS model presented in Chapter 6 suggested that 
distinct cognitive features uniquely influence the current behavioural symptoms of ASD. 
However, the ADI model presented a different pattern of results that somewhat challenge the 
predictions of the fractionated theory of ASD, as distinct cognitive domains did not relate to 
specific behavioural symptoms. Therefore, a weaker version of the fractionated theory is 
supported in which multiple cognitive deficits characterise ASD, and these cognitive deficits 
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relate to distinct symptoms, as in the strong version, but a single cognitive deficit can explain 
more than one symptom domain, and more than one cognitive deficit can explain a single 
symptom domain. 
The hypothesis that was tested in Chapter 6 and the one suggested by the fractionable triad 
account postulates a direct effect between cognition and behaviour. However, the fractionable 
triad account does not consider indirect effects in the link between a cognitive domain and a 
symptom domain, such as the role of mediating factors, a combination of factors, such as 
multiple cognitive domains together, or bidirectional effects between cognition and behaviour, 
which could also be important. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the link between cognition 
and behaviour is interposed by compensatory skills. The current thesis accounted for IQ in 
analyses. Some of the additional compensatory skills that could be considered are verbal ability, 
working memory, attention and environmental aspects such as amount of social contact.  
Additionally, heterogeneity needs to be considered within the fractionated account of ASD. The 
fractionated theory model proposes that there is an interaction between multiple deficits at the 
cognitive level that influence symptomatology at the behavioural level in ASD. There are also 
likely to be multiple pathways from the cognitive to the behavioural level due to the 
heterogeneity inherent in ASD. There is also the possibility that a single cognitive model, even 
one that considers multiple cognitive deficits within its framework, may not be sufficient to 
explain the link between cognition and behaviour in ASD. For example, there may be different 
cognitive subtypes with differing behavioural profiles. Overall, the results of the thesis do 
strongly suggest the need to move away from single cognitive deficit models of ASD, which 
have recently become popular again with the implication that ASD is caused by a failure of 
Bayesian inference (e.g., Pellicano & Burr, 2012), and consider that multiple cognitive deficit 
models can provide a better explanation of ASD.  
One of the remaining challenges is how to test the fractionated account of ASD. For example, 
Ronald, Happé, and Plomin (2005) used twin modelling analyses to provide evidence of the 
fractionation of ASD at the behavioural level. Chapter 8 also suggested that social-
communication symptoms and RRBIs are distinct symptom dimensions in ASD. The challenge 
is how to extend this to the cognitive level.  




Limitations that were specific to the design or the analyses of each study are presented at the 
end of each chapter. Discussion here will focus on limitations that were more general or 
reoccurring throughout the thesis.  
TEDS is a large longitudinal twin study with a representative sample of the UK population. In 
addition, the SR study is the largest population-derived study of children with twins with ASD 
carried out to date. Despite these strengths, there are also limitations to consider, such as the 
low level of selective attrition from TEDS, particularly those with low IQ. 
In addition, there were not enough females within the SR sample to look at sex-specific models. 
To add, the selection procedure started with a population-based sample but still relied on ASD 
diagnosis and diagnostic assessments, which may be sex-biased. Therefore, the final SR 
sample may not be representative of the female ASD population. 
One of the limitations of the SR study is the cognitive tasks used to assess each cognitive 
domain. The relative sensitivity of each cognitive task is currently unknown and the tasks were 
unmatched for discriminative power and reliability. In addition, there is no norm data available 
for these cognitive tasks, with undetermined psychometric properties and test-retest reliability. 
Therefore, it is not known whether these tasks are of equivalent difficulty. It should be noted that 
this is a pervasive challenge in cognitive research. 
In addition, the cognitive tasks may not fully encompass the cognitive domains that the tasks 
are purported to measure. For example, theory of mind may comprise of not just social-cognitive 
reasoning (e.g., false-belief reasoning), but also social-perceptual skills utilising both explicit 
and implicit judgements (Yang, Rosenblau, Keifer, & Pelphrey, 2015).  
Finally, the thesis investigated the cognitive endophenotype of ASD. However, this could only 
be based on the broader autism phenotype as expressed in siblings as there was no parent 
data available. Instead, Szatmari, Zwaigenbaum, and Bryson (2004) have suggested that the 
broader autism phenotype may be more ‘dilute’ in siblings than in parents.  
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9.3 Directions for Future Research 
Some future research directions that were related to each study were proposed at the end of 
each chapter. Some additional research directions are proposed in this section after considering 
the whole thesis.  
Chapter 8 used factor mixture modelling (FMM) to identify more homogenous subgroups within 
ASD based on the behavioural symptoms of ASD in an attempt to distinguish ‘apples from 
oranges’. This approach could be expanded to include more than just the ASD symptoms 
characterised by the ADI-R items (conceivably just the ‘apples’). It would be insightful to 
conduct FMMs to encompass ASD symptoms (ADI-R and ADOS), IQ, cognitive atypicalities, 
comorbid symptoms and sensory abnormalities. This may reveal not only the ‘apples’ (ranging 
from small to large as in Chapter 8), but indeed sort the apples from the oranges to provide 
subtypes of ASD that will be informative both clinically and for research.  
In addition, Chapter 8 investigated behavioural subgroups within ASD. This design could be 
expanded to explore if there are cognitive subgroups within ASD. Chapter 4 found that cognitive 
atypicalities are highly prevalent in ASD. Using latent class analysis, it may be possible to 
identify more homogenous cognitive subgroups in typical development and ASD based on 
cognitive task performance. Preliminary analyses using the SR sample has identified four 
cognitive subgroups in ASD: (1) atypicalities across cognitive factors (17%); (2) poor CC, EF 
and ToM (68%); (3) weak CC (6%); and (4) no cognitive atypicalities (9%). Subgroup 1 and 2 
also had more severe ASD symptoms (Brunsdon et al. accepted conference abstract, 2015). 
The next step will be whether these subgroups have differing profiles. 
The families from the SR Study are currently involved in an 18-year-old follow-up study. 
Furthermore, the twins from the SR study are part of the TEDS, a longitudinal population-based 
study, and so data exists at various time points throughout the twins’ development. This 
provides the potential to conduct longitudinal analyses, building on Pellicano (2013) analyses. 
Analyses, such as latent growth modelling, could potentially be used to explore cognitive 
functioning across development and its altering relations with ASD symptoms. These analyses 
could help test the multiple cognitive deficit model of ASD and the fractionated triad theory of 
ASD. 
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One potential longitudinal research question that could be answered by the TEDS dataset is 
whether earlier social and non-social symptoms of ASD differentially predict later cognitive 
atypicalities. In Chapter 4, we found that nearly one third of the ASD group presented with 
multiple cognitive atypicalities, and many had single or dual cognitive atypicalities. As these 
results are based on TEDS twins, it is possible to investigate the earlier developmental 
trajectory of those with multiple cognitive deficits in adolescence. It could be hypothesised that 
those with multiple cognitive atypicalities will follow different developmental trajectories to those 
without cognitive atypicalities. This approach could potentially identify those at risk of 
developing multiple cognitive impairments.  
Furthermore, this thesis investigated the fractionated triad in a clinically diagnosed sample. It is 
also possible to explore the predictions proposed in Chapter 2 in the general population as ASD 
represents quantitative extremes of traits that are normally distributed in the general population. 
Using data from TEDS, it is possible to investigate if there is fractionation of social and non-
social cognitive abilities in the general population with the hypothesis that social and non-social 
cognitive abilities will be relatively independent from each other. It is also possible to investigate 
if social and non-social cognitive abilities relate differentially to autistic-like traits (social, 
communication, and non-social symptoms), as indicated by the CAST using bivariate and 
multivariate genetic modelling.  
In addition to expanding on the analyses presented in this thesis, new lines of research would 
also be beneficial. The SR study was conducted in adolescence and one of the main criticisms 
of the approach is that of the suitability of the cognitive tasks for this age range. In addition, the 
fractionated theory should be investigated at earlier developmental time points. Therefore, an 
experimental study utilising an age-appropriate cognitive task battery at younger time points in 
both typical development and children with ASD may be fruitful in informing a multiple cognitive 
account of ASD. In addition, previous research has not gained information about everyday 
cognitive abilities, which could be assessed using parental questionnaires. This may provide a 
more comprehensive account of cognition in both typical development and in ASD. For 
example, Vanegas and Davidson (2015) found that everyday executive functioning problems 
were more severe than perseverative issues on a card-sort task. The approach could 
investigate individual differences in performance across cognitive measures to examine their 
relationship to the symptoms of ASD, which would add to the findings of Chapter 6. It is 
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important to investigate this at younger time points to understand how the relationship between 
cognition and behaviour may alter throughout development.  
In addition to an experimental approach, it may also be informative to take a neuroimaging 
approach, such as using electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials (ERPs), to 
understand the associations between cognitive traits. EEG may be useful to measure the areas 
of brain activity associated with different cognitive atypicalities and to examine if there is overlap 
between areas of brain activity for cognitive features, therefore using a brain-based approach to 
examine if cognitive features are distinct. 
It was previously discussed that there may be possible cognitive subgroups within ASD. If 
cognitive subgroups were identified, then it may be beneficial to investigate the developmental 
trajectories of these cognitive subgroups within ASD and their interactions throughout 
developmental with the behavioural symptoms. A useful tool to investigate this proposal would 
be growth mixture modelling and would require cognitive testing at multiple time points. The 
identification of distinct cognitive trajectories in ASD would provide support for the fractionated 
account.  
Chapter 6 investigated the relationship between cognitive features of ASD and symptomatology. 
However, the association was only assessed in one direction and causation cannot be implied 
from the results. One way to examine causality is through intervention studies. For example, 
children with and without ASD could then be given cognitive training, such as ToM training. 
Chapter 6 found a link between ToM and social symptoms and so following intervention, it 
would be predicted that social symptoms would improve. A causal mechanism could then be 
implied to inform treatment approaches.  
9.4 Concluding Remarks 
The main focus of this thesis was to explore the potential for a multiple cognitive model of ASD 
using the predictions of the fractionated triad account. One of the strengths of the thesis was its 
attempt to utilise more complex statistical techniques to investigate the cognitive atypicalities 
within ASD. The findings highlight the prevalence of multiple cognitive deficits/differences in 
adolescents with ASD. A weaker version of the fractionated theory was supported, in which 
multiple cognitive deficits characterise ASD, and these cognitive deficits relate to distinct 
symptoms of ASD. One of the most challenging aspects of this thesis was the substantial 
CHAPTER 9: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
219 
heterogeneity among cognitive and behavioural features of ASD. Studies should consider 
alternatives to grouping participants as ASD vs. non-ASD to overcome the obstacle of 
heterogeneity. Additionally, this heterogeneity needs to be considered within the fractionated 
triad account of ASD. Overall, the results of the thesis do strongly suggest the need to move 
away from single cognitive deficit models of ASD and consider that multiple cognitive deficit 





Appendix 1. A list of measures used in the SR Study (Chapter 3). 
Diagnostic Measures 
Questionnaire Child Autism Spectrum Test (CAST) 
Telephone 
Interview 
Development and Wellbeing Assessment (DAWBA) 
Parent Interview Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) 
Child Observation Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) 




Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
Anxiety Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scale (RCADS) 
Depression Mood and Feelings Questionnaire (MFQ) 
Health Questions about twins’ past and present health 
Alexithymia Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
Sensory 
Behaviours 
Short Sensory Profile (SSP), Adolescent/Adult Sensory Profile  
Medical History Questions about family’s medical history 








IQ Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), Raven’s Coloured 
Progressive Matrices, British Picture Vocabulary Scales-Revised (BPVS) 
Baseline Tasks Reaction Time, Inspection Time, How I Feel Questionnaire 
Language Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-2 (CELF-2) subtests, 
Nonsense Word Repetition 
Central Coherence Embedded Figures Task, Fragmented Pictures, Homographs Reading 
Test, Planning Drawing Task - Part A, Sentence Completion Task 
Executive Function Letter Fluency (FAS), Intra-/Extra-dimensional Task, Luria Hand Game, 
Planning Drawing Task - Part B 
Social Cognition Penny Hiding Game, Triangles Animation Task, False-Belief Stories, 




Obstetric Enquiry Schedule (OES) 











Appendix 3. Example of bivariate twin analysis model to estimate causes of variation 
(ACE) for joint analyses of ordinal and continuous data (Chapter 7) 
## --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
## Bivariate model fitting  
##Executive Functioning = cognitive factor (EF), continuous 
##ASD = consensus diagnosis (CD), ordinal - three category, 2 thresholds = 0,1,2 
## --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
### Run a model with 2 thresholds for CD 
 
maxth   <- 2     # max number of thresholds 
TH1  <- 1.64     # prevalence 5%, fix, Broad Spectrum 
TH2  <- 2.33     # prevalence 1%, fix, Autism  
 
nv   <- 2     # number of variables per twin 
ntv   <- nv*2     # number of variables per pair 
 
# change CD to be mxfactors with 2 thresholds 
CogCD[,c(3,4)] <- mxFactor(CogCD[,c(3,4)], c(0 : 2)) 
 
names (CogCD); describe(CogCD)   # names and descriptives of variables 
selVars  <- c('EF1', 'CD1', 'EF2', 'CD2')  # select EF and CD for twin 1 and 2 
Vars  <- c('EF','CD')    # select variables 
mzData  <- subset(CogCD, zyg==1, selVars) # select MZ twin data 
dzData  <- subset(CogCD, zyg==2, selVars) # select DZ twin data 
 
# (1) Specify Bivariate Correlation Model: Executive Functioning (Cognitive Factor, continuous) - 
Consensus Diagnosis (Selection Variable, ordinal) 
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
# Expected means for EF, fixed for CD 
Mean <- mxMatrix(type="Full", nrow=1, ncol=ntv, free=c(T,F,T,F), labels=c("meanEF", 
NA, "meanEF", NA), values=c(-1,0,-1,0), name="ExpMean") 
 
# Expected thresholds 
Thres  <-mxMatrix(type="Full", nrow=maxth, ncol=nv, free=F, 








# Standard deviations, fixed at 1 for EF       
SD <-mxMatrix( type="Diag", nrow=ntv, ncol=ntv, free=c(T,F,T,F), 
values=c(1,1,1,1), labels=c("sdCD", "sdEF", "sdCD", "sdEF"), lbound=0, 
name="sd" ) 
 
# MZ correlation matrix with starting values 
# Rph = phenotypic correlation, RefMZ = EF correlation between twins 
# xtrxtwMZ = cross-twin, cross-trait correlation, RcdMZ = CD correlation between twins 
MZCor <- mxMatrix( type="Stand", nrow=ntv, ncol=ntv, free=c(T,T,T,T,T,T), values=c(-
.3,.2,-.2,-.2,.9,-.3), labels=c("Rph", "RefMZ", "xtrxtwMZ", "xtrxtwMZ", "RcdMZ", 
"Rph"), lbound=-.999, ubound=.999, name="Rmz"  ) 
 
# MZ covariance matrix  
MZCov  <- mxAlgebra( expression=sd %&% Rmz, name="ExpCovMZ" ) 
 
# DZ correlation and covariance matrices with starting values 
DZCor <- mxMatrix( type="Stand", nrow=ntv, ncol=ntv, free=c(T,T,T,T,T,T), values=c(-
.3,.1,-.1,-.1,.45,-.3), labels=c("Rph", "RefDZ", "xtrxtwDZ", "xtrxtwDZ", "RcdDZ", 
"Rph"), lbound=-.999, ubound=.999, name="Rdz"  ) 
DZCov  <- mxAlgebra( expression=sd %&% Rdz, name="ExpCovDZ" ) 
 
 
# Data objects  
DataMZ <- mxData(observed=mzData, type="raw") #MZ data to use 
DataDZ  <- mxData(observed=dzData, type="raw") #DZ data to use 
 
# Objective objects for Multiple Groups 
objmz  <- mxFIMLObjective( covariance="ExpCovMZ", means="ExpMean",  
  dimnames=selVars, thresholds="Expthres", threshnames=c("CD1","CD2")) 
objdz <- mxFIMLObjective ( covariance="ExpCovDZ", means="ExpMean", 
dimnames=selVars, thresholds="Expthres", threshnames=c("CD1","CD2")) 
 
# Combine Groups 
modelMZ <- mxModel(Mean, Thres, MZCor, SD, MZCov, DataMZ, objmz, name="MZ" ) 
modelDZ <- mxModel(Mean, Thres, DZCor, SD, DZCov, DataDZ, objdz, name="DZ" ) 
minus2ll <- mxAlgebra( expression=MZ.objective + DZ.objective, name="m2LL" ) 
obj  <- mxAlgebraObjective("m2LL" ) 
 
# Confidence intervals for MZ & DZ correlations 
Conf1  <- mxCI (c  ('MZ.Rmz[1,2]', 'MZ.Rmz[1,3]', 'MZ.Rmz[2,3]', 'MZ.Rmz[2,4]' )  ) 





# Correlation model 
CorModel <- mxModel( "Cor", modelMZ, modelDZ, minus2ll, obj, Conf1, Conf2)  
 
# RUN Correlation MODEL  
CorFit  <- mxRun(CorModel, intervals=T)  
(CorSumm <- summary(CorFit))             #Means & descriptives for model 
round(CorFit@output$estimate,4) 
 
# (2) Specify Constrained Bivariate ACE Model using Cholesky Decomposition 
# # -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
# Matrix for expected Means and thresholds  
Mean <- mxMatrix(type="Full", nrow=1, ncol=ntv, free=c(T,F,T,F), labels=c("meanEF", 
NA, "meanEF", NA), values=c(-.35,0,-.35,0), name="ExpMean") 
Thres <- mxMatrix(type="Full", nrow=maxth, ncol=nv, free=F, 
values=c(TH1,TH2,TH1,TH2), name="Expthres" ) 
 
# Matrices to store a, c, and e Path Coefficients 
pathA <- mxMatrix( type="Lower", nrow=nv, ncol=nv, free=TRUE, values=c(.1,-.5,.9),    
labels=c("a11", "a21", "a22"), name="a" )  
pathC <- mxMatrix( type="Lower", nrow=nv, ncol=nv, free=TRUE, values=c(.01,-
.01,.01),  labels=c("c11", "c21", "c22"), name="c" ) 
pathE <- mxMatrix( type="Lower", nrow=nv, ncol=nv, free=TRUE, values=c(.9,-.05,.3),     
labels=c("e11", "e21", "e22"), name="e" ) 
 
# Matrices generated to hold A, C, and E computed Variance Components 
covA  <- mxAlgebra( expression=a %*% t(a), name="A" ) 
covC  <- mxAlgebra( expression=c %*% t(c), name="C" )  
covE  <- mxAlgebra( expression=e %*% t(e), name="E" ) 
 
# Algebra to compute standardised variance components 
covP  <- mxAlgebra( expression=A+C+E, name="V" ) 
StA  <- mxAlgebra( expression=A/V, name="h2") 
StC  <- mxAlgebra( expression=C/V, name="c2") 
StE  <- mxAlgebra( expression=E/V, name="e2") 
 
# Algebra to compute Phenotypic, A, C & E correlations 
matI  <- mxMatrix( type="Iden", nrow=nv, ncol=nv, name="I") 
rph <- mxAlgebra( expression= solve(sqrt(I*V)) %*% V %*% solve(sqrt(I*V)), 
name="Rph") 





rC <- mxAlgebra( expression= solve(sqrt(I*C)) %*% C %*% solve(sqrt(I*C)), 
name="Rc" ) 
rE <- mxAlgebra( expression= solve(sqrt(I*E)) %*% E %*% solve(sqrt(I*E)), 
name="Re" ) 
 
# Algebras to put Standardised Parameter Estimates in a Matrix with col and row labels  
rowVars <- rep('Vars',nv) 
colVars  <- rep(c('h2','c2','e2'),each=nv) 
estVars <- mxAlgebra( expression=cbind(h2,c2,e2), name="Est", dimnames = 
list(rowVars,colVars)) 
 
# Algebra to compute Rph-A, Rph-C & Rph-E for Cont and ASD  
rph21 <- mxAlgebra( expression = cbind ( (sqrt (h2[1,1])*Ra [2,1]*sqrt (h2[2,2])),  (sqrt 
(c2[1,1])*Rc [2,1]*sqrt (c2[2,2])), (sqrt (e2[1,1])*Re[2,1]*sqrt(e2[2,2])) ), 
name="Rph21" ) 
 
# Algebra for expected Variance/Covariance Matrices in MZ & DZ twins 
covMZ  <- mxAlgebra( expression= rbind( cbind(A+C+E , A+C), 
                                          cbind(A+C  , A+C+E))  , name="expCovMZ" ) 
covDZ  <- mxAlgebra( expression= rbind( cbind(A+C+E      , 0.5%x%A+C), 
                                          cbind(0.5%x%A+C , A+C+E)), name="expCovDZ" ) 
 
# Constrain total variance of Consensus Diagnosis (cd) to unity 
con1  <- mxConstraint( expression= V[2,2]==1, name="C1" ) 
 
# Data objects for Multiple Groups 
dataMZ    <- mxData( observed=mzData, type="raw" ) 
dataDZ   <- mxData( observed=dzData, type="raw" ) 
 
# Objective objects for Multiple Groups 
objmz <- mxFIMLObjective( covariance="expCovMZ", means="ExpMean", dimnames 
= selVars, thresholds="Expthres", threshnames=c("CD1","CD2") ) 
objdz <- mxFIMLObjective( covariance="expCovDZ", means="ExpMean", dimnames 
= selVars, thresholds="Expthres", threshnames=c("CD1","CD2") ) 
 
# Combine Groups 
pars <- list( Mean, Thres, pathA, pathC, pathE, covA, covC, covE, covP, StA, StC, 
StE, matI, rph, rA, rC, rE, estVars, rph21 ) 
modelMZ <- mxModel( pars, covMZ, dataMZ, objmz, name="MZ" ) 
modelDZ <- mxModel( pars, covDZ, dataDZ, objdz, name="DZ" ) 
minus2ll <- mxAlgebra( expression=MZ.objective + DZ.objective, name="m2LL" ) 




Conf1  <- mxCI (c ('h2[1,1]', 'h2[2,2]', 'c2[1,1]', 'c2[2,2]', 'e2[1,1]', 'e2[2,2]') ) 
Conf2  <- mxCI (c ('Rph[2,1]', 'Ra[2,1]', 'Rc[2,1]', 'Re[2,1]' ) ) 
Conf3  <- mxCI (c ('Rph21[1,1]', 'Rph21[1,2]', 'Rph21[1,3]') ) 




# RUN Constrained Bivariate ACE Model 
 
AceFit    <- mxRun(AceModel, intervals=T) 








Appendix 4. Series of multinomial logistic regressions to compare classes on age, gender, IQ, ASD symptoms, concurrent behavioural symptoms, 
sensory abnormalities and cognition (Chapter 8) 
Group 
Comparison 
Age Gender ASD diagnosis VIQ PIQ IQ 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 -.04 .129 0.48 .236 2.34 <.001 .006 .608 .007 .497 .008 .525 
1 3 .02 .423 1.76 <.001 5.14 <.001 -.02 .146 -.004 .636 -.01 .286 
1 4 -.004 .852 3.58 <.001 23.38 <.001 -.03 .008 -.008 .269 -.02 .038 
1 5 -.03 .284 1.71 .001 23.38 <.001 -.04 <.001 -.03 <.001 -.03 <.001 
2 1 .04 .129 -0.48 .236 -2.34 <.001 -.006 .608 -.007 .497 -.008 .525 
2 3 .06 .031 1.28 .007 2.80 <.001 -.02 .063 -.01 .293 -.02 .115 
2 4 .04 .154 3.11 <.001 21.04 <.001 -.03 .003 -.01 .123 -.03 .016 
2 5 .009 .769 1.23 .018 21.04 <.001 -.05 <.001 -.03 .001 -.04 <.001 
3 1 -.02 .423 -1.76 <.001 -5.14 <.001 .02 .146 .004 .636 .01 .286 
3 2 -.06 .031 -1.28 .007 -2.80 <.001 .02 .063 .01 .293 .02 .115 
3 4 -.02 .308 1.82 .009 18.24 <.001 -.01 .195 -.004 .559 -.008 .239 
3 5 -.05 .093 -0.06 .921 18.24 <.001 -.03 .001 -.02 <.001 -.02 <.001 
4 1 .004 .852 -3.59 <.001 -24.38 <.001 .03 .008 .008 .269 .02 .038 
4 2 -.04 .154 -3.11 <.001 -22.04 <.001 .03 .003 .01 .123 .03 .016 
4 3 .02 .308 -1.82 .009 -19.24 <.001 .01 .195 .004 .559 .008 .239 
4 5 -.03 .335 -1.88 .010 43.40 <.001 -.02 <.001 -.02 <.001 -.02 <.001 
5 1 .03 .284 -1.71 .001 -24.38 <.001 .04 <.001 .03 <.001 .03 <.001 
5 2 -.009 .769 -1.23 .018 -22.04 <.001 .05 <.001 .03 .001 .04 <.001 
5 3 .05 .093 0.06 .921 -19.24 <.001 .03 .001 .02 <.001 .02 <.001 











Local Processing Global Processing Executive 
Functioning 
Theory of Mind Alexithymia (TAS 
total) 
Alexithymia dx 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 -.08 .725 -.20 .272 -.17 .299 .26 .289 -.0004 .983 .18 .517 
1 3 -.19 .378 -.51 .005 -.32 .058 -.15 .389 .007 .724 .14 .631 
1 4 -.14 .463 -.48 .003 -.46 .003 -.48 .002 .03 .159 .47 .069 
1 5 -.25 .407 -.43 .056 -.46 .036 -.41 .054 -.03 .378 -.32 .471 
2 1 .08 .725 .20 .272 .17 .299 -.26 .289 .0004 .983 -.18 .517 
2 3 -.12 .620 -.31 .091 -.14 .410 -.42 .089 .008 .727 -.05 .880 
2 4 -.07 .754 -.28 .093 -.28 .073 -.74 .001 .03 .186 .29 .306 
2 5 -.17 .583 -.22 .322 -.29 .200 -.67 .010 -.03 .401 -.51 .271 
3 1 .19 .378 .51 .005 .32 .058 .15 .389 -.007 .724 -.14 .631 
3 2 .12 .620 .31 .091 .14 .410 .42 .089 -.008 .727 .05 .880 
3 4 .05 .814 .03 .835 -.14 .368 -.32 .026 .019 .352 .33 .239 
3 5 -.05 .863 .09 .690 -.14 .516 -.25 .222 -.03 .281 -.46 .319 
4 1 .14 .463 .48 .003 .46 .003 .48 .002 -.03 .159 -.47 .069 
4 2 .07 .754 .28 .093 .28 .073 .74 .001 -.03 .186 -.29 .306 
4 3 -.05 .814 -.03 .835 .14 .368 .32 .026 -.02 .352 -.33 .239 
4 5 -.10 .724 .06 .789 -.006 .977 .07 .694 -.05 .082 -.79 .075 
5 1 .25 .507 .43 .056 .46 .036 .41 .054 .03 .378 .32 .471 
5 2 .17 .583 .22 .322 .29 .200 .67 .010 .03 .401 .51 .271 
5 3 .05 .863 -.09 .690 .14 .516 .25 .222 .03 .281 .46 .319 












ADOS total ADOS Social ADOS 
Communication 
ADOS RRBIs SC Factor RRBI Factor 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 .21 <.001 0.61 .007 .30 <.001  0.44 .019 6.58 <.001 0.85 .135 
1 3 .28 <.001 0.96 <.001 .41 <.001 0.45 .016 11.85 <.001 3.91 <.001 
1 4 .41 <.001 1.26 <.001 .60 <.001 0.75 <.001 18.00 <.001 4.64 <.001 
1 5 .57 <.001 1.81 <.001 .83 <.001 1.16 <.001 31.53 <.001 6.32 <.001 
2 1 -.21 <.001 -0.61 .007 -.30 <.001 -0.44 .019 -6.58 <.001 -0.85 .135 
2 3 .07 .141 0.35 .040 .11 .108 0.01 .920 5.27 <.001 3.06 <.001 
2 4 .20 <.001 0.65 <.001 .30 <.001 0.32 .011 11.42 <.001 3.80 <.001 
2 5 .36 <.001 1.20 <.001 .54 <.001 0.72 <.001 24.93 <.001 5.47 <.001 
3 1 -.28 <.001 -0.96 <.001 -.41 <.001 -0.45 .016 -11.84 <.001 -3.91 <.001 
3 2 -.07 .141 -0.35 .040 -.11 .108 -0.01 .920 5.27 <.001 -3.06 <.001 
3 4 .13 .001 0.29 .023 .19 .001 0.30 .015 6.15 <.001 0.74 .008 
3 5 .30 <.001 0.84 <.001 .43 <.001 0.71 <.001 19.68 <.001 2.41 <.001 
4 1 -.41 <.001 -1.25 <.001 -.60 <.001 -0.75 <.001 -18.00 <.001 -4.65 <.001 
4 2 -.20 <.001 -0.65 <.001 -.30 <.001 -0.32 .011 -11.41 <.001 -3.80 <.001 
4 3 -.13 .001 -0.29 .023 -.19 .001 -0.30 .015 -6.15 <.001 -0.74 .008 
4 5 .17 <.001 0.55 <.001 .24 <.001 0.40 <.001 13.52 <.001 1.67 <.001 
5 1 -.57 <.001 -1.81 <.001 -.84 <.001 -1.15 <.001 -31.53 <.001 -6.32 <.001 
5 2 -.36 <.001 -1.20 <.001 -.54 <.001 -0.72 <.001 -24.94 <.001 -5.47 <.001 
5 3 -.30 <.001 -0.84 <.001 -.43 <.001 -0.71 <.001 -19.68 <.001 -2.41 <.001 
















SDQ Hyperactivity SDQ Peer 
Problems 
SDQ Prosocial 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 .01 .760 .04 .709 .03 .823 .009 .932 .03 .823 .03 .823 
1 3 .11 .011 .22 .055 .20 .172 .14 .169 .20 .172 .20 .172 
1 4 .14 .001 .17 .095 .25 .053 .22 .017 .25 .053 .25 .053 
1 5 .12 .050 .26 .110 .10 .654 .05 .757 .10 .654 .10 .654 
2 1 -.01 .760 -.04 .709 -.03 .823 -.009 .932 -.03 .823 -.03 .823 
2 3 .10 .033 .16 .144 .16 .283 .13 .226 .16 .283 .16 .283 
2 4 .13 .003 .13 .245 .22 .117 .21 .033 .22 .117 .22 .117 
2 5 .11 .087 .22 .195 .06 .776 .04 .806 .06 .776 .06 .776 
3 1 -.11 .011 -.22 .055 -.20 .172 -.14 .169 -.20 .172 -.20 .172 
3 2 -.10 .033 -.18 .144 -.16 .283 -.13 .226 -.16 .283 -.16 .283 
3 4 .03 .492 -.05 .637 .05 .677 .08 .409 .05 .677 .05 .677 
3 5 .01 .863 .04 .806 -.10 .643 -.09 .550 -.10 .643 -.10 .643 
4 1 -.14 .001 -.17 .095 -.25 .053 -.22 .017 -.25 .053 -.25 .053 
4 2 -.13 .003 -.13 .245 -.22 .117 -.21 .033 -.22 .117 -.22 .117 
4 3 -.03 .492 .05 .637 -.05 .677 -.08 .409 -.05 .677 -.05 .677 
4 5 -.02 .779 .09 .565 -.15 .459 -.17 .247 -.15 .459 -.15 .459 
5 1 -.12 .050 -.26 .110 -.10 .654 -.05 .757 -.10 .654 -.10 .654 
5 2 -.11 .087 -.22 .195 -.06 .776 -.04 .806 -.06 .776 -.06 .776 
5 3 -.01 .863 -.04 .806 .10 .643 .09 .550 .10 .643 .10 .643 



























b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 .20 .001 .57 <.001 .48 .008 .15 .138 0.38 .009 -0.32 .025 
1 3 .36 <.001 .80 <.001 .61 .001 .36 <.001 0.87 <.001 -0.48 .001 
1 4 .41 <.001 .75 <.001 .64 <.001 .56 <.001 1.03 <.001 -0.77 <.001 
1 5 .42 <.001 .61 <.001 .58 .002 .63 <.001 1.23 <.001 -1.09 <.001 
2 1 -.20 .001 -.57 <.001 -.48 .008 -.15 .138 -0.38 .009 0.32 .025 
2 3 .17 <.001 .23 .030 .13 .301 .21 .031 0.49 <.001 -0.16 .181 
2 4 .22 <.001 .18 .057 .16 .140 .41 <.001 0.65 <.001 -0.45 <.001 
2 5 .22 <.001 .04 .752 .11 .449 .48 <.001 0.85 <.001 -0.77 <.001 
3 1 -.36 <.001 -.80 <.001 -.61 .001 -.36 <.001 -0.87 <.001 0.48 .001 
3 2 -.17 <.001 -.23 .030 -.13 .301 -.21 .031 -0.49 <.001 0.16 .181 
3 4 .05 .166 -.05 .563 .04 .721 .20 .014 0.16 .100 -0.29 .002 
3 5 .05 .222 -.19 .100 -.02 .864 .27 .012 0.36 .006 -0.61 <.001 
4 1 -.41 <.001 -.75 <.001 -.64 <.001 -.56 <.001 -1.03 <.001 0.77 <.001 
4 2 -.22 <.001 -.18 .057 -.16 .140 -.41 <.001 -0.65 <.001 0.45 <.001 
4 3 -.05 .166 .05 .563 -.04 .721 -.20 .014 -0.16 .100 0.29 .002 
4 5 .007 .864 -.14 .182 -.06 .626 .07 .459 0.20 .086 -0.32 .003 
5 1 -.42 <.001 -.61 <.001 -.58 .002 -.63 <.001 -0.23 <.001 1.09 <.001 
5 2 -.22 <.001 -.04 .752 -.11 .449 -.48 <.001 -0.85 <.001 0.77 <.001 
5 3 -.05 .222 .19 .100 .02 .864 -.27 .012 -0.36 .006 0.61 <.001 















MFQ (Self Report) MFQ 
(Parent Report) 
SSP Total Tactile Sensitivity 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 .01 .417 .04 .062 -.006 .939 .20 .051 .04 .026 .21 .026 
1 3 .03 .048 .06 .008 .09 .160 .34 <.001 .07 <.001 .34 <.001 
1 4 .03 .048 .07 .001 .11 .062 .36 <.001 .10 <.001 .48 <.001 
1 5 .04 .121 .08 .001 .13 .128 .32 .002 .13 <.001 .63 <.001 
2 1 -.01 .417 -.04 .062 .006 .939 -.20 .051 -.04 .026 -.21 .026 
2 3 .02 .256 .02 .374 .10 .171 .14 .050 .03 .058 .12 .095 
2 4 .02 .295 .03 .104 .12 .077 .16 .017 .06 <.001 .26 <.001 
2 5 .02 .343 .03 .102 .13 .133 .11 .153 .09 <.001 .41 <.001 
3 1 -.03 .048 -.06 .008 -.09 .160 -.34 <.001 -.07 <.001 -.34 <.001 
3 2 -.02 .256 -.02 .374 -.10 .171 -.14 .050 -.03 .058 -.12 .095 
3 4 -.003 .836 .01 .521 .02 .720 .02 .673 .03 .003 .14 .011 
3 5 .003 .897 .02 .421 .03 .672 -.03 .663 .06 <.001 .29 <.001 
4 1 -.03 .048 -.07 .001 -.11 .062 -.36 <.001 -.10 <.001 -.48 <.001 
4 2 -.02 .295 -.03 .104 -.12 .077 -.16 .017 -.06 <.001 -.27 <.001 
4 3 .003 .836 -.01 .521 -.02 .720 -.02 .673 -.03 .003 -.14 .011 
4 5 .006 .784 .005 .751 .01 .846 -.05 .415 .03 .010 .15 .003 
5 1 -.04 .121 -.08 .001 -.13 .128 -.32 .002 -.13 <.001 -.63 <.001 
5 2 -.02 .343 -.03 .102 -.13 .133 -.11 .153 -.09 <.001 -.41 <.001 
5 3 -.003 .897 -.02 .421 -.03 .672 .03 .663 -.06 <.001 -.29 <.001 
















Auditory Filtering Low Energy/Weak Visual/Auditory 
Sensitivity 
b p b p b p b p b p b p 
1 2 .11 .112 .07 .614 .03 .637 .09 .161 .13 .040 .11 .380 
1 3 .11 .103 .08 .542 .14 .014 .25 <.001 .12 .050 .32 .004 
1 4 .17 .005 .29 .009 .25 <.001 .33 <.001 .18 .002 .46 <.001 
1 5 .30 <.001 .265 .039 .35 <.001 .36 <.001 .18 .003 .62 <.001 
2 1 -.11 .112 -.07 .614 -.03 .637 -.09 .161 -.13 .040 -.11 .380 
2 3 .003 .959 .01 .917 .11 .056 .16 .004 -.005 .923 .21 .041 
2 4 .06 .232 .22 .040 .22 <.001 .25 <.001 .05 .184 .35 <.001 
2 5 .19 .002 .20 .118 .32 <.001 .27 <.001 .06 .195 .51 <.001 
3 1 -.11 .103 -.08 .542 -.14 .014 -.25 <.001 -.12 .050 -.32 .004 
3 2 -.003  -.01 .917 -.11 .056 -.16 .004 .005 .923 -.21 .041 
3 4 .06 .259 .21 .051 .11 .013 .09 .037 .06 .159 .14 .034 
3 5 .19 .002 .18 .143 .21 <.001 .11 .029 .06 .171 .30 <.001 
4 1 -.17 .005 -.29 .009 -.25 <.001 -.33 <.001 -.18 .002 -.46 <.001 
4 2 -.06 .232 -.22 .040 -.22 <.001 -.25 <.001 -.05 .184 -.35 <.001 
4 3 -.06 .259 -.21 .051 -.11 .013 -.09 .037 -.06 .159 -.14 .034 
4 5 .13 .010 -.03 .776 .10 .011 .03 .541 .008 .827 .16 .004 
5 1 -.30 <.001 -.27 .039 -.35 <.001 -.36 <.001 -.18 .003 -.16 <.001 
5 2 -.19 .002 -.20 .118 -.32 <.001 -.27 <.001 -.06 .195 -.51 <.001 
5 3 -.19 .002 -.18 .143 -.21 <.001 -.11 .029 -.06 .171 -.30 <.001 
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